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Abstract
There is no general method of measuring the interoperability of systems which
accommodates all types of systems and interoperations. Additionally, no mathematical
method of describing the impact of interoperability on operational effectiveness has been
published. Creating a general method of measuring the interoperability of systems is
difficult because the number of system types and means of their interoperation is
infinitely large. The complexity of modeling interoperations between all system types
and the impossibility of cataloging them has precluded the publication of a general
method of measuring interoperability. While limited methods of measuring the
interoperability of certain types of systems interoperating in specific ways have been
published, these methods are compartmentalized, largely incompatible with each other,
quickly become outdated as technology changes, and produce imprecise measurements.
Because of the difficulty in creating a general interoperability measurement method,
other researchers have relied upon a problem decomposition approach, effectively
fracturing the problem and driving them further from the solution.
In this research, a holistic, fundamental, and flexible approach towards describing
a general method of interoperability measurement was taken. The method applies to both
collaborative and confrontational interoperability. It models systems according to their
interoperability-related features in the context of an operational process. The system
models are as abstract or concrete as desired which supports a final interoperability
measurement that is not limited to a small set of levels, and is as precise as desired. A
v

fundamental result of the method states that a measure of the similarity of systems
modeled in this way is a measure of their interoperability. Furthermore, if systems
implement a confrontational operational process and are identified and modeled in the
context of a measure of operational effectiveness tied to that process, then another
fundamental result mathematically relates the change in interoperability of the systems
with a change in the measure of operational effectiveness.
As a general method of measuring interoperability it has uncountable uses,
however three applications are given to illustrate the method. The first application shows
how the method can be used to measure the interoperability of coalition forces in the
context of a multi-national operation. The application also demonstrates that many extant
interoperability measurement methods are special cases of the more general method
given in this research. The second application demonstrates the relationship between
interoperability and operational effectiveness in the context of a suppression of enemy air
defenses (SEAD) problem. It also illustrates that an interoperability measurement can
motivate system upgrades and highlights the concept that friendly systems should be
directionally interoperable with adversary systems (i.e., friendly systems should control
adversary systems). The final application explains the time-variance of interoperability
in the context of a precision strike example and further illustrates the sufficient conditions
for operational effectiveness. More applications are proposed in the areas of nontechnical interoperability, cross-domain interoperability, and international
interoperability. Finally, observing that the method in this dissertation measures direct
interoperability of systems, further research is proposed in the area of indirect
vi

interoperability, noting that a system may not directly impact adjacent systems, but might
strongly, and indirectly, impact distant systems.
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Definitions
Architecture “The structure of components, their relationships, and the principles and
guidelines governing their design and evolution over time.” (DoD, 2007a)
Architecture Framework “Guidance and rules for structuring, classifying, and organizing
architectures.” (Ibid)
Blue System “A U.S. or allied system; a friendly system.”
Capability “The ability to execute a specified course of action. (A capability may or may
not be accompanied by an intention.)” (JP 1, 2007)
Character “A feature, trait, attribute, or characteristic.”
Classification “A taxonomy.”
Collaborative Interoperability “The interoperability between friendly (blue) systems.”
Confrontational Interoperability “The interoperability between friendly (blue) and
adversary (red) systems.”
Confrontational Operational Process “An operational process implemented by two or
more opposing sets of systems.”
Contextual Interoperability Measurement “A measure of the interoperability of two
systems whose instantiations have been aligned with at least one other system
possessed of one or more different characters not possessed by the original two
systems.”
Diagnostic Character “A character which distinguishes one taxon from related taxa.”
Diametric Measure of Operational Effectiveness “A measure of operational effectiveness
written as a pair which relates the effectiveness of the blue systems to the lack of
effectiveness of the red systems.”
Directional Interoperation “An interoperation that occurs from System A to System B,
but not vice versa.”
Effect “A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom.” (JP 1, 2007)
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Interoperability “The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept
services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged
to enable them to operate effectively together.” (JP 1-02, 2008)
Interoperability Character “Short for System Interoperability Character. A character
which describes how a system provides and accepts services from another
system.”
Interoperability Character State “A qualitative or quantitative instance of a system
character; a sub-division of a system character.”
Interoperability Function “A similarity function which takes a pair of system
instantiations as its arguments, has a range of [0,1], rewards for shared characters
and optionally penalizes for unshared characters, and gives a greater reward to
system pairs whose shared characters’ states have a “better” value.”
Interoperability Measurement “A measure of the interoperability of two or more systems,
or in other words, a measure of the similarity of two or more systems instantiated
with interoperability characters.”
Maturity Model “A model which describes the stages through which a process
progresses.” (DoD, 1998)
Measurement “The assignment of numbers to properties or events in the real world by
means of an objective empirical operation, in such a way as to describe them.”
(Finkelstein & leaning, 1984)
Measure of Effectiveness “A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior,
capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of
an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also called
MOE.” (JP 1-02, 2008)
Measure of Operational Effectiveness “An MOE associated with an operational process
which is used to assess changes in the production of a desired operational effect.
Also called MoOE.”
Natural Character “A character which is not confounded with another character.”
Numerical Taxonomy “The grouping by numerical methods of taxonomic units into taxa
on the basis of their character states.” (Semple & Steele, 2003)
Operation “1. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical,
service, training, or administrative military mission. 2. The process of carrying on
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combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to
gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.” (JP 1-02, 2008)
Operational Advantage “The condition in which a set of friendly (blue) systems enjoy
directional interoperability over a set of adversary (red) systems.”
Operational Process “A series of activities and decisions, logically sequenced, which
when executed achieve a desired effect.”
Performance Enhanced Instantiation “A system instantiation with a performance overlay
(e.g., cost, efficiency, throughput, rate, etc.)”
Pure Interoperability Measurement “A measure of the interoperability of two systems
whose instantiations are aligned only with themselves.”
Red System “An enemy or adversary system.”
Self-Interoperability “A type of interoperation which originates at a system, exits the
system boundary, and then is accepted back through the boundary.”
Similarity Function “A function used to measure the resemblance of two or more system
instantiations. The converse of a distance (dissimilarity function).”
System “An entity which is composed of at least two elements and a relation that holds
between each of its elements and at least one other element in the set” (Ackoff,
1971)
System Characterization “A set of system instantiations which have been aligned with
each other.”
System Identification “The association of a system with the activities and decisions of an
operational process.”
System Instantiation “A sequence of character states which models a system.”
System Similarity “A measure of the resemblance of two systems made by providing two
aligned system instantiations representing those systems as the arguments to a
similarity function.”
Taxon “(plural taxa) A taxonomic grouping.”
Taxonomy “An orderly grouping of systems into taxa according to their characters.”
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Time Variant Interoperability Measurement “A set of interoperability measurements
associated with a set of time periods.”
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Notation

si

An individual system

S
ci

A set of n systems si
A system character state
A set of n system character states ci

C
xi

A system character

X

A set of n system characters xi (called the Characterization of S )
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INTEROPERABILITY MEASUREMENT
1. Introduction
Developing and applying precise measurements in an area as multidimensional
and complex as interoperability is difficult. However, measuring, assessing, and
reporting interoperability in a visible way is essential to setting the right priorities.
—M. Kasunic & W. Anderson
1.1

Overview
In 2004, then Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, said “we’ve put a

premium…on interoperability.” That same year, the Department of Defense (DoD) hired
a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC), the Carnegie-Mellon
University Software Engineering Institute (CMU-SEI), to research and report on the state
of the practice in interoperability measurement. They responded that measuring
interoperability is difficult yet essential (see quote at chapter head). (Kasunic &
Anderson, 2004:vii) Unfortunately, they also wrote that “despite laudable case-by-case
efforts, there is today no method for tracking interoperability on a comprehensive or
systematic basis.” (Kasunic & Anderson, 2004:ix) In fact, CMU-SEI highlighted one
extant interoperability measurement model, published nearly a decade earlier, as the state
of the practice and called it “immature.” (Ibid) There has been little change to the state of
the practice since.
1.2

Uniqueness and Substantiality of Research
This research presents an inaugural general method of quantitatively measuring

the interoperability of a heterogeneous set of systems. It overcomes the weaknesses of
1

extant methods (Chapter 2) which, 1) limit their scope to specific types of systems and
interoperability, 2) generally qualitatively bin systems into a limited number of
interoperability levels, resulting in an imprecise measurement, 3) do not provide a means
of correlating interoperability to operational effectiveness in context of a confrontational
operational process, 4) restrict themselves to interoperability attributes which can become
outdated, 5) limit themselves to collaborative interoperability and do not recognize the
confrontational interoperability between opposing systems, units, or forces, and 6) do not
describe appropriate extensions to the DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF) which
would facilitate the use of existing architecture descriptions in performing
interoperability measurement. Noting that “everything in the world can be expressed as a
system,” (Guan, et. al., 2008) this research uniquely provides a general method of
measuring the interoperability of many different types of entities, described as a
heterogeneous set of systems (e.g., coalitions, technological systems, organizations,
cultures, political philosophies, languages, people, and religions, among others),
experiencing a wide variety of types of interoperations (e.g., enterprise, doctrine, force,
joint, logistics, operational, semantic, and technical, among others). Indeed, the method
improves upon existing stoplight models, maturity models, interoperability attribute
models, and frameworks by applying those models’ descriptions of system types and
interoperability hierarchies, levels, and attributes towards the creation of a foundational
theory and general method of interoperability measurement. The method of this research
is flexible and allows systems and their interoperations to be defined at any level of
abstraction, resulting in interoperability measurements which are not limited to a small
2

set of possible values, but are as precise as desired. The method includes proposed
extensions to DoDAF which allow an architecture to be better used in interoperability
analysis and, more importantly, interoperability-based operational effectiveness analysis.
The method recognizes that interoperability is not an end unto itself, but that it facilitates
operational advantage and effectiveness. Finally, the method introduces the important
concept of confrontational interoperability, and mathematically correlates the impact of
interoperability on operational effectiveness.
A brief background on interoperability is given next, followed by a specific
statement of the research problem and associated hypothesis and research goals. The
interoperability measurement method is then previewed and limitations of and
assumptions pertinent to the method are given. Chapter 1 concludes with an overview of
the structure of the dissertation.
1.3

Background
Interoperability has been an important and widely discussed topic over the past

decade, and continues to be so, especially within the Department of Defense (DoD)
(Ford, et. al., 2007b). A search of thirty years of definitions and types of interoperability
(Appendices A1 and A2) indicates the recent surge in popularity of the subject (Figure 1).
The survey of interoperability types and definitions revealed that interoperability, as a
research area, is broad with at least a thousand academic papers written on the topic. The
oldest definition found (first published in 1977) is still one of the most popular and is the
official definition given in Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, “the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and
3

accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged
to enable them to operate effectively together.” (2008) This definition, while not perfect
(e.g., it limits the object of an interoperation to a service and does not address the
confrontational interoperability of adversarial forces), is adopted in this research because
it 1) infers that interoperation occurs between many types of entities (e.g., systems, units,
or forces), 2) describes interoperability as a relationship between those entities, 3) implies
that interoperation is an exchange, 4) infers that interoperation requires a “provider” and
an “acceptor,” and 5) explains that interoperation enables effective operation. These
important concepts permeate and are foundational to this research.
Interoperability Definitions

Interoperability Types

18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

0

Figure 1. Popularity of interoperability research as indicated by the number of definitions and
types introduced over the past thirty years (adapted from Ford, et. al., 2007b)

It is important to understand that interoperability occurs in collaborative and noncollaborative (confrontational) ways. For example, a computer network consists of a set
of systems working in a collaborative fashion to provide and accept information and
4

services from each other. Collaborative interoperability is the most commonly
understood type of interoperability today. However, a second type of non-collaborative
interoperability, called confrontational interoperability, is critical in both military and
non-military domains. Confrontational interoperability occurs when sets of opposing
systems attempt to control each other (i.e., a jammer’s attempt to degrade an enemy
communication system’s effectiveness or a negotiation team’s attempt to swing a deal in
their favor). While collaborative interoperability has been previously researched,
confrontational interoperability has not, and is introduced in this research. An
understanding of this new topic of confrontational interoperability is critical to being able
to relate interoperability to operational effectiveness.
Joint Vision 2020 clearly states the importance of interoperability to the DoD:
“interoperability is the foundation of effective joint, multinational, and interagency
operations.” (2006:15) In fact, sixty joint publications cataloged in the Joint Doctrine,
Education and Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS) mention interoperability.
(2008) The recent Chief of Staff of the US Air Force stated that he takes every
opportunity “to highlight the significant advantages of interoperable equipment and
systems with…joint and coalition partners,” that he looks for “interoperability
opportunities with…coalition and allied partners,” and he recognizes that
“interoperability is cultural, as well as technical.” (Moseley, 2007) In light of the
importance of interoperability and noting that “management must be able to measure
what they wish to change,” (Kasunic & Anderson, 2004:16) a comprehensive method for

5

measuring collaborative and confrontational interoperability and associating it with
operational effectiveness is needed.
1.4

Problem Statement
How can collaborative and confrontational interoperability be measured, and how

can the effectiveness of an operational process be improved by first measuring, then
changing the interoperability of a heterogeneous set of systems implementing the
process?
1.5

Hypothesis and Research Objectives
It is hypothesized that interoperability of a heterogeneous set of systems

implementing an operational process can be measured and that there is a relationship
between that interoperability measurement and measures of effectiveness associated with
the process. To confirm the hypothesis, the following research objectives are pursued.
1) How are operational processes modeled and what are appropriate measures of
operational effectiveness for a process?
2) How are systems implementing an operational process identified, modeled,
and classified? Specifically, what characteristics, features, attributes, or traits
of a system are important if the interoperability of systems is to be measured?
What represents a common framework of system interoperability
characteristics?
3) How can the interoperability of systems be measured? What is an acceptable
measurement according to accepted metrological standards?

6

4) What is the relationship between operational effectiveness and
interoperability?
5) What is the role of architecture in interoperability measurement? Can a
Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) architecture be
used and/or extended to source and store information required for
interoperability measurement?
6) Demonstrate the interoperability measurement method by application.
1.6

Method Preview
Systems representing both friendly (blue) and adversary (red) forces implement

the activities and decisions of an operational process and can be modeled as a sequence
of states of system characteristics. If strictly interoperability-related characteristics are
used to model systems, then a fundamental result is obtained—that a measure of the
similarity of a pair of system models is a measure of their associated systems’
interoperability. This constitutes a general method of measuring the interoperability of
systems implementing both collaborative and confrontational operational processes.
The research is taken one step further however, and it is shown that given a
measure of operational effectiveness for a confrontational operational process, another
fundamental result is obtained which states that if all systems and system interoperability
features pertinent to the confrontational operational process are completely modeled, then
friendly (blue) systems have operational advantage over adversary (red) systems if the
blue systems are more directionally interoperable with red systems than vice versa. In
other words, blue is able to control red (and prevent red from reciprocating) if blue is
7

more directionally interoperable with red than red is with blue. This important result
allows an interoperability measurement to be related to operational effectiveness.
1.7

Assumptions/Limitations
The interoperability measurement method presented in Chapter 3 is applicable to

both military and non-military scenarios. However, in this research, it is purposefully
focused on military applications (Chapter 4). Those wishing to measure the collaborative
(non-confrontational) interoperability of non-military systems or use the method in
blue/blue situations are encouraged to rely heavily on the Performance Enhanced
Instantiation section (3.4.5) vice the Interoperability Impact on Operational Effectiveness
section (3.6) and to reference the discussions on indirect interoperability and blue-to-blue
impact on operational effectiveness presented in the Future Research section (5.3) of
Chapter 5. Also, as the method is model-based, any resultant interoperability
measurement or operational effectiveness assessment should be accepted at the same
level of accuracy and precision as the model which generated it. Indeed, an imprecisely
built model of a set of systems and their interoperations can result not only in an
imprecise interoperability measurement, but possibly inaccurate analysis. The accuracy
of the application of the Interoperability Impact on Operational Effectiveness axiom
especially depends upon the accuracy and precision of the initial system models.
1.8

Dissertation Overview
The next chapter contains a review of seminal and recent publications

underpinning all aspects of the interoperability measurement method presented in
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Chapter 3. Chapter 4 uses the method in several applications, demonstrating that 1)
extant maturity model methods of measuring interoperability, such as the Organizational
Interoperability Maturity Model, can be derived from the more general method of this
dissertation, 2) many types of interoperability can be measured, such as coalition and
confrontational interoperability, 3) the Interoperability Impact on Operational
Effectiveness axiom provides a sufficient condition for relating interoperability to
operational advantage or effectiveness, and 4) interoperability is often time variant.
Chapter 5 summarizes and makes recommendations for application of the dissertation
method and proposes future research based upon the dissertation findings. Augmenting
the body of the dissertation are multiple appendices which provide additional original
research results and analysis which have not been included in the body of the dissertation
in order to optimize flow and readability of the document.

9

2. Literature Review and Analysis
The quest for interoperability is not new,
but it has never been so important.—D. Alberts & R. Hayes
2.1

Overview
Current approaches to interoperability measurement, numerical (mathematical)

taxonomy, and system classification are the starting point and the basis for development
of the interoperability measurement method in Chapter 3. Important publications, both
historical as well as recent, in these areas and others are surveyed and analyzed for their
significant contributions. A summary of work in the supporting topic areas of process
modeling, operational effectiveness measurement, and architecture is also presented. An
analysis of all these publications is given which highlights key concepts pertinent to
interoperability measurement and its relation of interoperability to operational
effectiveness. Current gaps in research are highlighted and discussed.
2.2

Interoperability Measurement
Few papers have been published specifically on interoperability measurement.

Allowing for a very broad definition of the term “interoperability measurement,”
approximately a dozen papers have been written on the topic—most published within the
decade. All limit themselves to discussions of collaborative interoperability with none
addressing confrontational interoperability. Those proposing a new interoperability
measurement method or an extension/improvement to an existing method include
(LaVean, 1980; Mensh, et. al., 1989; Amanowicz & Gajewski, 1996; DoD, 1998; Leite,
1998; Clark & Jones, 1999; Hamilton, et. al., 2002; Alberts & Hayes, 2003; Fewell &
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Clark, 2003; NATO, 2003; Tolk, 2003; Tolk & Muguira, 2003; Stewart, et. al., 2004,
2005; Kingston, et. al., 2005; Schade, 2005; Ford, et. al., 2007a, 2008b). Other papers
offer analyses of existing methods (Sutton, 1999; Brownsword, et. al., 2004; Kasunic &
Anderson, 2004; Morris, et. al., 2004; Ford, et. al., 2007b). Each published method can
be classified as maturity- (leveling) or non-maturity model-based and generally is
applicable to only one system and interoperability type. Ford, et. al. provide a detailed
survey of the aforementioned interoperability methods (Figure 2) in a separate paper
(2007b) which is excerpted and augmented with more detail in Appendices A3 and A4.
LISI,
IAM

Stoplight

OIM

OIM (revised),
LCI,
LCIM,
NCW,
NMI
NTI

SoIM

’80

QoIM

’89

MCISI

‘96

’98 ’99

’02 ’03 ’04 ’05

OIAM,
NID (revised)
i-Score

‘07

Figure 2. Chronology of published interoperability measurement methods (non-maturity modelbased methods in italics, maturity-based methods in boldface)

2.2.1

Maturity Model and Other Leveling Methods
The US Air Force developed the maturity model concept through a grant to the

Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute (CMU-SEI) in 1987. (Humphrey &
Sweet, 1987) Although the maturity model concept, which describes the stages through
which a process progresses (DoD, 1998:2-1), was originally designed as a management
tool to assess contractor software engineering ability, it was adopted in 1998 by the
MITRE Corporation as the basis of the first maturity model-based interoperability
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measurement method called Levels of Information System Interoperability (LISI) (Figure
3). (Ibid) This method was eventually formalized and mandated in CJCSI 6212.01B
Interoperability and Supportability of Information Technology and National Security
Systems (2000) but later deleted as a requirement in the 2006 issue of the same document.
In the LISI model, maturity was represented by thresholds of interoperability capability
which defined measurable levels of interoperability. (DoD, 1998) From 1998 to 2006,
LISI was the template for numerous maturity model and maturity model-like (leveling)
interoperability measurement models designed to measure both information and noninformation system interoperability such as the Organizational Interoperability Model for
C2 (OIM) (Clark & Jones, 1999; Clark & Moon, 2001; Fewell & Clark, 2003), the
Network Centric Warfare Maturity Model (NCW) (Alberts & Hayes, 2003), the Levels of
Conceptual Interoperability Model (LCIM) (Tolk & Muguira, 2003), Layers of Coalition
Interoperability (LCI) (Tolk, 2003), NATO C3 Technical Architecture Reference Model
for Interoperability (NMI) (NATO, 2003), the Non-Technical Interoperability Framework
(NTI) (Stewart, et. al., 2004), the Organizational Interoperability Agility Model (OIAM)
(Kingston et. al., 2005), and a modification of the NATO Interoperability Directive (NIDrevised) (Schade, 2005). As can be inferred from the titles of these models, none are
generalized models of interoperability, but each is designed to address a specific type of
system and interoperability.
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Figure 3. LISI interoperability maturity model (DoD, 1998)

The maturity model (leveling) interoperability measurement approach defines a
basic set of interoperability maturity levels (usually five), listed as rows in the model,
defined by a set of attributes (usually three or four, but sometimes only one) listed as
columns in the model (Figure 3). (DoD, 1998) Thus, the range of interoperability
measurements is generally limited to an integer from zero to the number of levels
(usually five). This limited measurement range is one of the weaknesses of the maturity
model interoperability measurement approach as there is generally not enough fidelity in
the measurement to support design, reliability, maintainability, interoperability, or
affordability analyses of the systems under measurement. Indeed, two systems sharing
the same LISI defined interoperability level may not have any real ability to interoperate.
(CMU, 2008) For example, two systems both classified as level 2c may still not be able

13

to share information because the level calls for the ability to create documents, briefings,
pictures, maps, spreadsheets, and databases, yet does not specify the application to
generate these files, nor does it specify the format the files are to be saved in.
Interestingly, the strength of the maturity model is not in providing an interoperability
measurement, but in its ability to facilitate a measurement; in other words, to portray a
qualitative framework for describing the types of attributes impacting interoperability for
different types of systems and interoperability. For example, the LISI model describes
four top-level attributes (Policy & Procedure, Application, Infrastructure, Data) and at
least five sub-attributes for each. (DoD, 1998) Published maturity model (leveling)
methods apply strictly to collaborative interoperability. As will be shown in Chapter 4,
the maturity model and other leveling methods are special cases of the more general
interoperability measurement method developed in Chapter 3.
2.2.2

Non-Leveling Methods
Non-maturity model-based interoperability measurement methods are a much

more diverse group and, as a whole, generally pre-date the maturity model-based
methods. Like the maturity model methods, they are not generalized methods of
measuring interoperability, but specialized to a particular type of system or
interoperability. The earliest known model, the Spectrum of Interoperability Model
(SoIM), was designed as a program management tool and defined seven levels of
interoperability for technical systems. (LaVean, 1980) Nearly a decade later, Mensh, et.
al., published their mission-based Quantification of Interoperability Methodology (QoIM)
which assigned a measure of effectiveness (MOE) logic equation to each of seven
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interoperability-related components. (1989) Their noteworthy contributions are 1)
associating interoperability measurement with a mission and 2) relating interoperability
to measures of effectiveness via a discrete event simulation. Seven years later,
Amanowicz & Gajewski made the important observation that the distance between
systems described in n dimensional space, according to their features, was a measure of
interoperability. (1996) They drew heavily from Florek, et. al., (1951) who, hailing from
Wroclaw, Poland, developed a parallel to numerical taxonomy called Wroclaw
Taxonomy which relied upon both the Czekanowski coefficient (Czekanowski, 1913) and
graphical techniques such as dendrograms. (Sneath & Sokal, 1973) Concurrent with the
publication of LISI was the Interoperability Assessment Methodology (IAM), which
provided an eclectic mix of interoperability attributes and assorted equations applied by a
flowcharted interoperability assessment process. (Leite, 1998) Hamilton, et. al.,
criticized LISI as being too complex and instead offered an overly-simplified stoplight
model (2002) which unfortunately gives no specific basis for assigning colors to systems,
and does not provide for system-to-system comparison. The Interoperability Score (iScore) (Ford, et. al., 2007a; 2008b) recognized that 1) interoperability must be measured
in the context of the operational mission, 2) an operation is implemented by systems of
many types, and the interoperability measurement must account for them all, 3) perfect
interoperability is not always desirable or possible, and 4) it is not the number of
interoperations that is important, but the quality of the interoperations.
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2.2.3

Extant Method Contributions
Each method surveyed in sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 contributed towards the general

theory of interoperability measurement described in Chapter 3. Table 1 lists their main
contributions (details in Appendix A3) and section 2.8 highlights remaining gaps in
knowledge which are addressed in this dissertation.
Table 1 Main contributions of extant interoperability measurement methods
Method
SoIM
QoIM
MCISI
LISI
IAM
OIM
Stoplight
LCI
LCIM
NMI
NCW
SoSI
NTI
OIAM
NID
i-Score

2.3

Main Contribution
Interoperability can be measured in levels
Interoperability can be correlated to measures of effectiveness via simulation
The distance between systems modeled as points in space indicates their
interoperability
Systems possess interoperability attributes
Same as LISI
Organizations interoperate, but have different interoperability attributes than
technical systems
Operations and acquisitions both have interoperability requirements
Operational interoperability is an extension of technical interoperability
Conceptual interoperability bridges system interoperability
Same as LISI
Interoperability occurs in the physical, information, cognitive, and social domains;
lack of interoperability impedes mission accomplishment
System-of-system research is founded upon operational, conceptual, and
programmatic interoperability
Social, personnel, and process interoperability are valid types of non-technical
interoperability
There are levels of ability of organizations to be agile in their interoperations
Levels of interoperability can be described in linguistic terms
Interoperability measurements are operational process-specific and have a maximum
value

Numerical Taxonomy
The science and methods of numerical taxonomy were introduced to the world by

Sokal and Sneath in 1963 in Principles of Numerical Taxonomy. Their later text
Numerical Taxonomy remains the de-facto handbook thirty years after its original
publication date. (Sneath & Sokal, 1973) Sneath & Sokal have defined numerical
taxonomy as “the grouping by numerical methods of taxonomic units into taxa on the
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basis of their character states.” (1973:4) While numerical taxonomy has largely been
applied to biological, botanical, and genetic research, it has also been used with great
success in the fields of ecology, medicine, the social sciences, the earth sciences, and the
arts and humanities. (Dunn & Everitt, 2004) It has only recently been applied to systems.
(Ford, et. al., 2008a) The classification of life on earth (Maddison, et. al., 2007) may be
the most visible result of numerical taxonomy and other classification techniques. The
methods and applications of numerical taxonomy have been documented in over onethousand articles and books. Numerical taxonomy defines a science and method used to
classify taxonomic units (objects) according to character states. (Sneath & Sokal, 1973)
As such, the science of numerical taxonomy includes foundational principles; a definition
of pertinent terms such as taxa, character, state, and cluster; a description of types of
characters and states; methods of choosing characters; methods of estimating taxonomic
resemblance; and methods of identifying taxa and clustering taxon into those taxa. (Ibid;
Dunn & Everitt, 2004) If a system is also considered a taxonomic unit which can be
described according to its character states, then the methods of numerical taxonomy can
appropriately be applied to systems just as they are applied to the classification of
animals, bacteria, plants, language groups, minerals, and cultures.
2.4

System Classification
The human mind classifies everything according to a variety of factors including

morphological, emotional, and functional among others. Expectedly, all branches of
study classify. For example, historians demarcate events into time periods, poets and
authors attribute a particular literary work to a genre, and artists associate a work with a
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style. In some disciplines, however, the classification is foundationally important as the
basic conceptual and mathematical model of that discipline. For example, the criticality
of the biologists’ empirically derived classification of organisms (Linnaeus, 1735) and
the chemists’ quantitative classification of the elements (Mendeleev, 1869) are
indisputable to all biological and chemical studies and analyses. The uses of
classifications are as numerous as the number of types that exist and include naming,
theory promotion, lineage determination, relationship demonstration, and discovery of an
object’s nature.
Several systems engineers have noted the necessity and usefulness of a system
classification. Maier and Magee & de Weck state that the most important use of a
classification lies in the realm of system design and analysis. (1999; 2004) Shenhar &
Bonen showed by example that a system classification is necessary to determine the
proper engineering and management style for system development. (1997) And Maier
pointed out that misclassified systems have problems not only in design and
development, but also in use. (1999) As Mendeleev’s classification predicted new
elements (e.g., Germanium) which were later discovered (Mendeleev, 1869), a
classification of systems can predict desirable future design directions or new uses of
systems which, rather than being discovered, are created by the engineer or implemented
by the system operator. Ford, et. al., presented a mathematically rigorous method of
classifying systems and postulated that if the systems were classified according to their
interoperability characteristics, that a system interoperability measurement could be made
from the classification. A table summarizing generic system classifications (taxonomies)
18

published in the system science and systems engineering fields is given in Table 2 with
more detail provided in Appendix A5.
Table 2 Historical summary of system taxonomies (adapted from Ford, et. al., 2008a)
Year
1955

Originator
Von Bertalanffy

Basis of Taxonomy
open/closed

1956
1957

complexity
system inputs

1962

Boulding
Goode &
Machol
Hall

1985
1968
1971

Boulding
Jordan
Ackoff

world-corresponding
organizing principles
system concepts

1981
1990
1995,
1997
1997
1999

Checkland
Wilson
Shenhar &
Bonen
Martin
Maier**

2005

Gideon et al.**

2005

Kovacic

origin of system
none given
technological uncertainty &
scope
product type
Operational & managerial
independence of components
acquisition type, operational
type, domain type
complexity

2006

similarities & differences

2007

Blanchard &
Fabrycky
Valdma

2008

Ford, et. al.

similarity of system characters

none given

information classes

Purpose of Taxonomy
Launch General Systems
Theory (GST)
An approach to GST
Find solution to problems
Partition subsystems & enhance
meaning of “system”
World modeling
Furtherance of systems thinking
Create system concept
framework
Group by origin
Refine definition of “system”
Allocate appropriate SE method
to the system
Provide SE checklist
System-of-system architecting
Aid in system-of-system
understanding
Reduce set of systems into
meaningful clusters
Provide insight into wide range
of systems
Study of non-deterministic
phenomena
Support system design

System classification is important to interoperability measurement for the
following reasons; 1) generic classifications of systems (Table 2) assist in ensuring that
all systems implementing an operational process are identified; 2) system classifications
highlight characteristics of systems, including interoperability-related characteristics; 3)
quantitative classifications of systems describe numerically the similarity between
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systems; and 4) numerical taxonometric-based system classification provides a method
for orderly characterizing systems.
2.5

Process Modeling
Numerous process modeling methods and formats have been published over the

past several decades. A detailed survey was published by Knutilla, et. al. in 1998 which
identified common attributes of all process modeling methods and formats, however
several important candidate operational process models and formats were not included—
the Process Specification Language (PSL) (NIST, 2007), the flow chart (IBM, 1969), the
SysML activity diagram (OMG, 2007), and the DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF)
Activity & System Diagrams (OV-5, OV-6a, b, c, SV-5b) (DoD 2007a, b, c). A
complete list is given in Appendix A6. A process modeling method or format used to
represent an operational process in support of an interoperability measurement must 1)
identify and describe the operational tasks (activities and decisions), 2) describe the order
and decision logic associated with the task flow, and 3) identify and associate systems to
tasks. Mapping process modeling attributes from Knutilla, et. al. to these requirements
results in the following.
•

Req. #1: Identify and describe the tasks
o Simple Task Representation and Characteristics
o Complex Task Representation and Parameters

•

Req. #2: Describe the order & decision logic associated with the task flow
o Simple Sequences
o Simple Precedence
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o Alternative Task
o Complex Sequences
o Concurrent Tasks
o Conditional Tasks
o Iterative Loops
o Parallel Tasks
o Serial Tasks
o Complex Precedence
o Synchronization of Multiple, Parallel Task Sequences
•

Req. #3: Identify & associate systems to tasks
o Resource
o Resource Requirements for a Task
o Simple Resource Capability/Characteristics
o Resource Allocation/Deallocation for One or Many Tasks

The following process modeling methods possess most of the aforementioned
attributes and are considered as candidate operational process model formats: ACT
Formalism, I-N-OVA Constraint Model, O-Plan Task Formalism, Virtual Process
Modeling Language (VPML), Process Specification Language (PSL), and SysML.
Although other methods could have been chosen, for this dissertation, the SysML
Activity Diagram is the operational process modeling format of choice because 1) it is an
emerging systems engineering tool, 2) it is derived from and similar to the ubiquitous
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Unified Modeling Language (UML) diagrams, and 3) several popular software packages
available at the Air Force Institute of Technology support it.
2.6

Operational Effectiveness Measurement
There has been much published on measures of effectiveness, to include a recent

doctoral dissertation (Bullock, 2006), master’s theses (James, 1996; Bell, 2005), research
reports (Doyle, et. al., 1997; Gaedecke, 2006), technical reports (including a survey
paper) (Nelson, et. al., 1996; Campbell, 2004), refereed journal articles (Sproles, 2000;
Sproles, 2001; Murray, 2001; Sproles, 2002; Finkelstein & Morawski, 2003; Finkelstein,
2003; Bullock & Deckro, 2006), conference papers (Sarle, 1995; Green, 2001; Smith &
Clark, 2004), and workshop reports (Sweet, et. al., 1985; Green & Johnson, 2002). Also
published have been many textbooks (of which only two are referenced here) (Keeney,
1992; Geisler, 2000) and several Department of Defense documents (Bornman, 1993;
Stenbit, et. al., 2002a; USJFCOM, 2005; DAU, 2006; DAU, 2006a; JP 3-0, 2006; JP 5-0,
2006; JP 1, 2007). Measures have many names, including metrics, measures of merit,
figures of merit, measures of effectiveness, and measures of performance among others.
(Stenbit, et. al., 2002a) Many researchers have acknowledged confusion with regards to
terminology. (Bell, 2005; Bullock, 2006; Green & Johnson, 2002; Green, 2001; Stenbit,
et. al., 2002; Nelson, et. al., 1996; Smith & Clark, 2004; Sproles, 2000; Sproles, 2001)
The term measure of operational effectiveness (MoOE) is used in this dissertation and is
appropriately chosen because it 1) reflects the importance of capturing the effectiveness
of an operation to the end of describing how changes in interoperability affect operational
effectiveness; 2) synchronizes with Department of Defense publications which define an
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MOE as a measure of an effect (JP 3-0, 2006; JP 5-0, 2006); and 3) fits properly within
the measurement hierarchy (Stenbit, et. al., 2002) which has been widely accepted by
MOE researchers. Appendix A6 includes additional analysis on the hierarchy of
measures, operational effectiveness assessment in joint operations, and MOE
characteristics, types, and domains.
2.7

Architecture
An architecture is a depiction (written or drawn) of “the structure of components,

their relationships, and the principles and guidelines governing their design and evolution
over time.” (DoD, 2007a) Curts & Campbell stated, “without a consolidated,
coordinated, and organized architecture there is little chance of ever attaining that elusive
goal of total interoperability.” (1999:1) The architecture description is a possible source
and repository for that which is required to make an interoperability measurement as well
as for decisions based upon the measurement. Many frameworks exist which provide
guidelines for creating such an architecture description. The first of these was the
Zachman Framework (Zachman, 1987) followed by numerous others including the
Federal Enterprise Architecture Framework (FEAF) (Federal CIO, 1999), the Treasury
Enterprise Architecture Framework (TEAF) (Department of the Treasury, 2000), the
Open Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF) (The Open Group, 2003), and the latest
version of the Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) (DoD, 2007a,
b, c). As can be inferred from some of their titles (the Zachman framework and TOGAF
excepted), each of these frameworks was developed for a specific government agency or
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application. DoDAF’s relationship to interoperability is specifically addressed in this
research.
Volume II, version 1.5 of DoDAF mentions many uses of DoDAF architecture
descriptions—one of which is system interoperability analysis. (DoD, 2007b:2-5, fig 2-2)
Specifically, the architecture products listed in Table 3 are named as being highly,
partially, or non-applicable to system interoperability uses. While some of the elements
required for system interoperability measurement are stored cleanly within the DoDAF
products in the table, section 3.7 shows that some are absent, or stored but not easily
extracted. For example, the interoperability measurement method of Chapter 3
accommodates a broad definition of the word “system” whereas DoDAF defines a strong
separation between operational nodes and organizations and system nodes and systems.
This hampers its ability to act cleanly as a source/repository for interoperability
measurement key elements.
Table 3 DoDAF claimed product applicability to system interoperability (DoD, 2007b)
Level
Highly applicable

DoDAF Product
AV-1, 2
OV-1, 2, 3, 5, 6
SV-1, 4, 6, 8
TV-1
OV-4, 7
SV-2, 7, 11
TV-2
SV-3, 5, 9, 10

Partially applicable
Not applicable

2.8

Gaps in Current Research
The following selected key concepts, which are critical to a unified method of

interoperability measurement, have not been addressed by other researchers and represent
gaps in knowledge. All are addressed in Chapter 3. The list is not comprehensive, but is
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representative in showing the magnitude of the current gap in interoperability
measurement understanding.
What entities should have their interoperability measured?
How are systems modeled in support of an interoperability measurement?
How does a measure of system similarity relate to interoperability?
Should the similarity measure be allowed to be a distance measure?
What does a complete framework of system interoperability attributes contain?
What method can be used to identify interoperability attributes?
How can the interoperability of two heterogeneous systems be measured?
How are multiple interoperability types accommodated in the measurement?
Can one measurement accommodate different systems and interoperability types?
Can the interoperability of confrontational (i.e., opposing systems) be measured?
What is the difference between collaborative and confrontational interoperability?
How do interoperability and operational effectiveness relate?
Is an interoperability measurement specific to an operational process?
Where should interoperability data be stored and obtained?
How interoperable must systems be?
How can an interoperability measurement be used?
2.9

Conclusion
Analysis of the aforementioned publications indicates that the following concepts

are important for interoperability measurement: 1) interoperability of sets of systems
(vice single systems) should be measured; 2) the set of systems should be determined by
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an operational process; 3) a framework of interoperability attributes should be used to
help identify system interoperability characters; 4) systems should be modeled as a set of
system interoperability character states; 5) system character states should be identified
numerically or coded numerically; 6) a similarity function gives the resemblance between
systems as pertaining to their system character states; 7) the similarity function is the
interoperability measurement if the systems have been appropriately modeled; 8)
interoperability is related to measures of operational effectiveness associated with the
operational process; 9) the interoperability of collaborative and confrontational systems
can be measured; 10) an interoperability architecture can be used to supply and store the
data supporting an interoperability measurement.

26

3. Method
Interoperability will never be an analytically useful field of study
until it is defined in a quantitative way.—E. Presson
3.1

Overview
This chapter describes a general interoperability measurement method (Figure 4)

which can be summarized as follows. Given a purpose for making an interoperability
measurement and an associated operational process, a set of systems implementing the
activities and decisions of that process can be identified. Each system in that set can be
modeled quantitatively as a sequence of states of descriptive features of the system.
These system models, called system instantiations, can be aligned with each other and
their similarity measured. A fundamental concept of the interoperability measurement
method is that if the set of systems is instantiated strictly according to interoperability
features, then a measure of the similarity of a pair of system instantiations is a measure of
the associated pair of systems’ interoperability. Furthermore, another fundamental
concept states that if the systems are instantiated with interoperability features pertinent
to a measure of operational effectiveness associated with a confrontational operational
process, then the interoperability measurement can be related mathematically to the
measure of operational effectiveness. Finally, the method can be integrated with the
Department of Defense Architecture Framework which is suitable for storing key
interoperability measurement elements. Succeeding sections address the method in
detail.
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State
Purpose
Take
Action

Identify
Process

Perform
Analysis

Identify
MoOEs

Measure
Interoper‐
ability

Identify
Systems

Instantiate
Systems

Identify
Characters

Figure 4. Interoperability measurement method

3.2

Purpose of Interoperability Measurement
The number of interoperability types is large (Appendix A2) and the number of

reasons to measure interoperability is even larger. Some reasons important to the
Department of Defense, extracted from selected joint publications and the Department of
Defense System Engineering Plan Preparation Guide (DoD, 2008), are given in Table 4.
Before an interoperability analysis is undertaken, the purpose of the analysis must be
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stated. Identification of this purpose is critical in keeping the analysis focused and
properly scoped.
Table 4 Some DoD reasons for measuring interoperability
Collaborative or
MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS REASONS
Confrontational
Interoperability
Determine level of integration and synchronization of coalition
Collaborative
forces (JP 3-16)
Measure effectiveness of coalition equipment (JP 3-16)
Confrontational
Troubleshoot coalition logistics problems (JP 3-16)
Collaborative
Determine mission impact of lack of common tactics, techniques,
Collaborative
and procedures (JP 3-16)
Measure mission impact of language and cultural difference among
Collaborative
coalition forces (JP 3-16)
Measure results of multinational planning and preparation on
Collaborative
mission success (JP3-16)
Predict impact of liaison officers on coalition force mission success
Collaborative
(JP 6-0)
Provide metrics to 5-nation Combined Communications Electronics
Board in support of their pursuit of communications-electronics
Collaborative
interoperability (JP 6-0)
Provide COCOM with interoperability reqs. for theater security
Both
cooperation plan (JP 6-0)
Determine impact of interface (translation) used to ensure
Both
interoperability of incompatible communications systems (JP 6-0)
Determine predicted advantage over the enemy
Confrontational
Identify areas for improvement in coalition operations
Both
JOINT OPERATIONS REASONS
Determine impact of communications interoperability on personnel
Collaborative
recovery (JP 3-50)
Determine impact of joint service training on mission success
Collaborative
Specifying joint force interoperability requirements
Both
Measure success of joint force exercises
Confrontational
Determine impact of insertion of new communications technology
Both
(JP 6-0)
Assessing shortfalls/deficiencies of communications on operational
Both
effectiveness (JP 6-0)
Determine ability to cooperate with OGAs and NGAs (JP 6-0)
Collaborative
Facilitate CIO responsibility to enforce interoperability (JP 6-0)
Collaborative
Support COCOMs in verifying operational interoperability
Both
procedures (JP 6-0)
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Measure interoperability of the joint communications system (JP 60)
Determine ISR product distribution bottlenecks (JP 6-0)
Measure system-to-system compatibility (JP 6-0)
Validate key interoperability solutions prior to mission execution (JP
6-0)
Correlate interoperability with the speed of commander
decisionmaking (JP 3-27)
Predict advantage over the enemy in future conflicts
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING REASONS
Determine compliance with program certification requirements
(SEPPG)
Specify program requirements in terms of interoperability
measurements (SEPPG)
Characterize system design requirements in the System Engineering
Plan (SEPPG)
Determine level of interoperability within and without the Systemof-System (SEPPG)
Determine impact of system configuration changes (SEPPG)
State interoperability key performance parameter requirements
(SEPPG)
Ensure systems in development will be interoperable with fielded
systems (SEPPG)
Facilitate interoperability testing (JP 6-0)
HOMELAND DEFENSE REASONS
Measure and predict future interagency interoperability (JP 3-27)
Establish requirements for interagency emergency response
communications (JP 3-27)
Measure ability of government agencies to share information during
crisis (JP 3-27)
Measure operational connection between agencies in a dynamic
environment (JP 3-27)
Determine possibility of information overload as multiple first
responders use common equipment and procedures
Determine usefulness of inserting commercial communication
standards into DoD acquisition requirements (JP 3-27)
HEALTH SERVICE REASONS
Justify standardization of medical capabilities and material with
other nations (JP 4-02)
Methodically measure compliance with OPLAN (JP 4-02)
Discover medical training, logistics, doctrine, and other concerns (JP
4-02)
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Collaborative
Collaborative
Both
Both
Both
Confrontational
Both
Both
Both
Both
Both
Both
Collaborative
Both
Collaborative
Collaborative
Collaborative
Collaborative
Collaborative
Collaborative
Collaborative
Collaborative
Collaborative

Determine communication interoperability concerns between
MEDEVAC platforms and medical regulating authority (JP 4-02)
OTHER REASONS
Determine level of net-centricity of networked systems
Quantify Joint Interoperability Test Command operational
interoperability test requirements (JP 6-0)
3.3

Collaborative
Collaborative
Both

Operational Process
After determining the purpose for an interoperability measurement analysis, the

subjects of the interoperability measurements must be determined and a method for
identifying them must be given. In this dissertation, the operational process is used to
identify a set of systems, both friendly (blue) and adversarial (red), whose interoperability
is to be measured and to identify the measure of operational effectiveness to which the
interoperability measurement will be correlated. The operational process is defined as a
set of tasks, logically sequenced, which when executed achieve a desired effect.
Operational processes can be collaborative, which are operational processes implemented
by a set of friendly systems working together to achieve a shared goal, or confrontational,
which are operational processes implemented by two sets of systems acting in opposition
to each other (i.e., when one set of systems experiences a level of success in
implementing the operational process, the other experiences a corresponding level of
failure).
3.3.1

Modeling Methods
While many practical operational processes are simplistic in structure, it is

possible to define a process in which all, some, or none of the tasks occur concurrently
and in which timing and logic are associated with the elements of the process. For
example, the finish of one task may drive the start of another, or the decision of which
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task to execute next might depend upon certain prerequisites (including timing) being
met. Not surprisingly, many methods and formats of task, activity, process, and thread
modeling have been devised over the years. These methods and formats are graphical,
mathematical, and linguistic in nature and all have different fortes. Of three dozen
candidate modeling methods and formats (Appendix A6), the SysML activity diagram is
appropriate for operational process modeling and is the method of choice for this
dissertation because it 1) captures the operational activities and decisions in a process, 2)
describes what is transferred between activities and decisions, 3) describes the decision
logic and timing (swim-lane variant) of the process, 4) accommodates the association of
systems to activities and decisions as an object attribute, and 5) is supported by a growing
number of software packages. An example SysML activity diagram with six activities
and one decision is given in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Sample SysML activity diagram used to model an operational process
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3.3.2

Measures of Operational Effectiveness
An interoperability measurement can be correlated to operational effectiveness for

both collaborative and confrontational operational processes. For a collaborative
operational process, this correlation must be done via discrete event or other type of
simulation and is outside the scope of this research. An early attempt at doing this was
made in 1989 by Mensh, et. al. in which the interoperability of Battle Force Command,
Control, and Communications systems was measured and correlated to measures of
effectiveness and measures of performance written as binary logic equations. For a
confrontational operational process however, this research provides sufficient conditions
which allow the interoperability measurement to be related to a measure of operational
effectiveness (MoOE) for the operational process. The MoOE should be written at a
level of abstraction equivalent to that of the operational process and can be a natural,
constructed, or proxy measure originating from the physical, information, or cognitive
domain (Appendix A7). Ideally the MoOE is relevant, measurable, responsive
(sensitive), resourced, understandable, discriminatory, quantitative, realistic, objective,
appropriate, inclusive, independent, valid, and reliable. Additionally, in order to apply
the Interoperability Impact on Operational Effectiveness axiom (section 3.6) the MoOE
must be written diametrically. In other words, the MoOE must be written as a pair

O = {OB , OR } which relates the effectiveness of the set of friendly (blue) systems to the
lack of effectiveness of the set of adversary (red) systems. For example, OB + OR = 1
describes the relationship between the diametric MoOE O = {OB , OR } where OB is the
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percent of red force targets destroyed and OR is the percent of red force targets protected.
While many MOEs contained in the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) (CJCSM
3500.04D, 2006) cannot be written as diametric MoOEs, such as OP 2.2.1, M31,
“Minutes to determine raid size.”, many others can. For example, numerous percentage
MOEs in the UJTL such as SN 3.4, M7 “percent of cruise missiles destroyed before
impact,” ST 1.3.5, M5 “percent of enemy forces drawn away from main thrust after
demonstration,” or OP 1.2.4.7, M13 “percent of friendly personnel recovered uninjured”
can be all be written diametrically. Similarly, MOEs in the UJTL which represent a
count such as SN 3.4.1, M11 “number of safe passage aircraft engaged,” can be
normalized and converted to a percentage (e.g., “percent of safe passage aircraft
engaged”) and then written diametrically. In general, UJTL MOEs which can be
converted to a percentage and which correlate friendly force action to enemy force
reaction (or vice versa) are candidate diametric MoOEs.
3.4

Systems
Among others, the interoperability of processes, enterprises, organizations,

coalitions, concepts, functions, objects, products, models, cultures, doctrines, forces,
cities, public services, and applications can be measured, however, systems are chosen as
the object of the interoperability measurement in this research. The word “system” is
used in a variety of fields of study, but its definition is fairly standardized across those
disciplines. For example, the military scientist defines system as “a functionally,
physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent
elements; that group of elements forming a unified whole.” (JP 1-02, 2008:534) The
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system engineer defines it as “a combination of interacting elements organized to achieve
one or more stated purposes.” (Haskins, 2007:1.5) The management scientist defines it
as “an entity which is comprised of at least two elements and a relation that holds
between each of its elements and at least one other element in the set” (Ackoff,
1971:662). And finally, the physician defines it as “a consistent and complex whole
made up of correlated and semi-independent parts; a complex of functionally related
anatomic structures.” (Pugh, 2000:1775) There are three common themes to these
definitions: 1) systems are comprised of a set of elements, 2) those elements interact, and
3) the interacting set of elements forms a whole and act in concert to achieve the system’s
purpose. Therefore, in this research a system is defined as “an entity comprised of
related interacting elements, which act together to achieve a purpose.” This definition is
broad enough to include a wide variety of systems including, but not limited to, technical,
biological, environmental, organizational, conceptual, physical, and philosophical, among
others. Because the definition of system used in this research is broad, the system
interoperability measurement method presented is applicable to an equally broad set of
entities.
Other interoperability researchers also promote measuring the interoperability of
systems. Nine of the fourteen interoperability measurement method papers surveyed
(section 2.2), directly advocated the measurement of system interoperability. (LaVean,
1980; Mensh, et. al., 1989; Amanowicz & Gajewski; 1996; DoD 1998; Leite, 1989;
Hamilton, et. al., 2002; NATO, 2003; Stewart, et. al, 2004; Ford, et. al., 2007a; 2008b)
The other five recommended measuring the interoperability of an entity that could be
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modeled as a system or as a system enabler. (Clark & Jones, 1999; Tolk & Muguira,
2003; Tolk, 2003; Stewart, et. al., 2004; Kingston, et. al., 2005;). Although six of the
fourteen methods surveyed proposed measuring the interoperability of singleton systems
(Leite, 1989; Clark & Jones, 1999; Hamilton, et. al., 2002; Tolk & Muguira, 2003; Tolk,
2003; Kingston, et. al., 2005), measuring the interoperability of a single system is
antithetical to the connotation of the word interoperability and to the definition of the
word as used in this research. Measuring the interoperability of a set of two or more
systems is a better choice. But as the set of all systems is infinite, a means of limiting the
size of the set is needed.
3.4.1

Constraining the Set of Systems with an Operational Process
Although many methods exist for determining which systems should have their

interoperability measured, using the operational process to determine the set of systems is
appropriate for at least three reasons. First, systems perform different interoperations in
different scenarios (i.e., they are used differently); second, effectiveness is often
measured at the operational process level (i.e., measures of effectiveness); and third,
operational processes can be written at any level of abstraction which enables system
definition at the same level of abstraction. When using an operational process to
constrain the set of systems, all systems are identified which implement the operational
process. The set of systems is often diverse and can be small or large.
3.4.2

System Identification
There are a variety of methods which can be used, within the constraints of an

operational process, to identify the set of systems S = {s1 , s2 ,…, sn } whose
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interoperability is to be measured. These methods include architectural methods such as
Activity Based Modeling (Ring, et. al., 2004) and DoD Architecture Frameworkassociated structured analysis modeling (DoD, 2007a, b, c), engineering methods such as
IDEF0 and IDEF3, project methods such as the Microsoft Project method (2007), process
methods such as SySML activity/decision to resource (system) association (OMG, 2007),
as well as others. While seemingly simplistic, it is easy to neglect certain types of
systems (e.g., weather systems) which may not be routinely considered as such, but
which might be important in the final interoperability analysis. For this reason, any
system identification method chosen can be complemented by the use of a generic system
taxonomy. These comprehensive taxonomies, while simplistic and general in nature, are
reminders of the wide variety of systems that exist. Researchers in the fields of system
science and systems engineering have published taxonomies of systems for at least fifty
years. A survey of these taxonomies is given in appendix A5.
3.4.3

System Characterization
Once the set of systems S has been identified, those systems must be modeled.

Applying numerical taxonomic concepts, a system can be modeled using a set of
characters X = { x1 , x2 ,…, xn } which represent traits, attributes, or characteristics which
describe the important features of the system. These system characters can be
morphological (e.g., size, shape, color, structure, type and method of construction,
material composition, or number of components), physiological (e.g., system functions or
behaviors), interfacial (e.g., type and number of system or element interfaces), ecological
(e.g., system context, environment, or type of fuel consumed), and distributional (e.g.,
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geographic location or domain) among others. Ideally, the set of characters chosen
should be natural (i.e., a character not confounded with another) and diagnostic (i.e., a
character which distinguishes one system, or system type, from another). Additionally,
the types of characters chosen should be related to the type of interoperability
measurement that is to be undertaken. For example, interoperability measurement of
devices on a network demands that functional characters be emphasized, whereas a
spatial interoperability analysis requires that certain morphological characters should be
used.
Extending a definition from the phylogeneticists (Semple & Steel, 2003),
characters are functions which map systems in S to the states C of their characters X
where the set of valid character states for a set of characters is C = {c1 , c2 …, cn } (see
definition below). Character states are either qualitative (discrete) or quantitative
(discrete or continuous), or a mixture of both (Sneath & Sokal, 1973). Generally, the set
of character states is restricted to the binary numbers (absence/presence states) or the
positive real numbers, although other states are certainly possible.
DEFINITION (System Characterization): Given a set of systems S , then

X : S → C is a function which maps systems to a set of character
states C and X is called the characterization of S .
3.4.3.1 Interoperability Characters
As mentioned previously, there are numerous types of system characters that can
be used to describe a system. However, in order to form a basis for an interoperability
measurement, only a special type of system characters should be used to model a system;
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these are called system interoperability characters, or interoperability characters for short.
This is a foundational concept in interoperability measurement. In their essence,
interoperability characters describe what systems do to each other. For example,
opposing forces attack each other, two computers communicate with each other, and
two businesses trade with each other. In these three examples, the words attack ,
communicate , and trade all imply a type of interoperation.

It is not possible to list all interoperability characters, however it is important to
note that generally any type of character is an interoperability character in specific
circumstances. For example, although physiological and interfacial characters are clearly
interoperability characters, the morphological character shape becomes an
interoperability character when the docking interoperation of the space shuttle and the
international space station is measured. Similarly, the distributional character of domain
is an interoperability character when considering the environment in which systems are
used. For example, a Navy destroyer is interoperable with the ocean but not the land, yet
the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) is interoperable with both.
An interoperability character represents a pair of actions, such as “provide” and
“accept,” which constitute an interoperation. These pairs describe how systems provide
and accept matter, energy, or information from each other. A selection of interoperability
characters associated with pairs of actions and type of intended interoperability
measurement is given in Table 5. While not exhaustive, it gives a sample of the many
types of interoperability actions performed by systems. An example framework of some
interoperability characters arranged by system type is given in Table 34 in Appendix A8.
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Table 5 A selection of interoperability pairs and associated characters
Interoperability Pairs
Interoperability Type
Character
Interoperate
Provide ⇔ Accept
General
Transmit ⇔ Receive
Communicate
Communication
Attack ⇔ Attacked
Attack
Confrontational
Impact
Impact ⇔ Impacted
Confrontational
Detect ⇔ Detected
Detect
Technological
Publish ⇔ Subscribe
Service
Net-Centric
Occupy ⇔ Accommodate
Accommodate
Spatial
Serve ⇔ Be Served
Service
Human
Give ⇔ Take
Share
Human
Buy ⇔ Sell
Trade
Business
Pay ⇔ Get Paid
Transact
Financial
OutputInput
Output ⇔ Input
Traditional System
Lead ⇔ Follow
Dance
Organizational
Order ⇔ Obey
Command
Human, Organizational
Economy
Produce ⇔ Consume
Business, Human
Transport
Transport ⇔ Transported by
Business
3.4.3.2 Interoperability Character Identification
Interoperability characters can be extracted in a methodical fashion from
sentences which describe what systems do. These sentences may originate in
requirements, architecture, and a host of other acquisition, capabilities, and operations
documents. A guide for relating the parts of speech commonly found in sentences to
system interoperability measurement is given in Table 6. Note that the table does not
give definite relationships. For example, the table does not insist that all nouns must be
systems, as some nouns are simply objects of verbs.
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Table 6 Guide for relating parts of speech to interoperability modeling
Part of Speech
Relationship
Noun
System or refinement of an interoperability character
Verb
Interoperability character
Pronoun
System
Adverb
Refinement of an interoperability character
Adjective
Refinement of a system
Preposition
Refinement of an interoperability character
Conjunction
Not applicable
Interjection
Not applicable
Article
Not applicable
To illustrate, the following sentence is given. “The long train expeditiously
transports raw material down the tracks to the factory.” Two of the four nouns (train,
factory) in the sentence can be considered as systems. The two adjectives refine the
names of the systems (long train, raw material), or imply the existence of other systems
(e.g., short trains or refined material). The single verb (transports) in the sentence implies
interoperation between system pairs and is an interoperability character. The adverb
(expeditiously) refines the interoperability character (transports) implying that there may
be different types, or levels, of hauling (e.g., sluggishly transports). And the remaining
two nouns (material, tracks) also refine the interoperability character by describing what
is transported and by which method it is transported. Similarly, the prepositional phrase
(“down the tracks”) also refines the interoperability character (transports). The last
prepositional phrase (“to the factory”) hints at the fact that the train and the factory
interoperate (e.g., by providing and accepting raw material). From this analysis, it can be
seen that a hierarchical description of interoperability characters can be made. If the
interoperability pair (transports ⇔ transported by) is represented by the character
Transport , then refining interoperability characters can be Transport .Material ,
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Transport .Material .onTracks , and Transport .Material .onTracks.Expeditiously . If the

character states are assumed to be binary then the beginnings of a system interoperability
model can be given in (1). If a new system is added to the model, for example, a truck ,
then it can be seen that the truck can also T ransport raw material, but on the road rather
than on the tracks (i.e., T ransp ort .Material .onRoad ).

S = {train, material , tracks, factory}
⎧Transport ,
⎫
⎪Transport.Material ,
⎪
⎪
⎪
X =⎨
⎬
⎪Transport.Material.onTracks,
⎪
⎪⎩Transport.Material.onTracks.Expeditiously ⎪⎭

(1)

C = {0,1}

3.4.3.3 Interoperability Character Directionality
Interoperability characters are inherently directional. As previously mentioned,
interoperability involves a pair of systems doing something to each other. For example,
given two systems s1 and s2 , assume that s1 attacks s2 . From both systems’
perspectives, s1 is initiating the attack (i.e., transmitting) while s2 is absorbing the attack
(i.e., receiving). Thus the interoperation (e.g., X = { Attack} ) between s1 and s2 is
directional from s1 to s2 , but not vice versa. The directionality of system interoperation
can modeled four different ways (Figure 6).
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s1

X =∅

s2

s1

No interoperation

s1

X

X

s2

Bi-directional interoperation

s2

s1

Uni-directional interoperation →

X

s2

Uni-directional interoperation ←

Figure 6. Directional interoperability possibilities

Thus, when an interoperation occurs between two systems, the direction of the
interoperation must be captured. This directionality can be annotated by a (T) for
transmit or a (R) for receive appended to each interoperability character code. For
example, X = { Attack (T ), Attack ( R)} is the complete characterization for the example in
the previous paragraph. Generalizing, X = { X T , X R } . Although the size of X doubles
in order to accommodate the directionality of interoperability characters, it is important to
keep track of one-way interoperations between systems. Both collaborative and
confrontational interoperations can be directional. If every interoperability character in
X is bi-directional, then the (T) and (R) suffixes are not needed.

3.4.4

System Instantiation
Once systems, their interoperability characters, and the states of those characters

have been identified, then a specific system can be modeled, or instantiated, as a
sequence (Bullock, 2006; Amanowicz & Gajewski, 1996) of states of system characters.
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DEFINITION (System Instantiation): Given a specific s ∈ S and a set
x ⊆ X of system characters descriptive of s , then σ = x ( s ) is a
sequence of system character states, called the instantiation of s ,
which models s .
Once all s ∈ S have been instantiated, the system instantiations must be aligned
with each other in order to support meaningful system comparisons and other
mathematical operations. Unless otherwise stated, hereafter the term system instantiation
implies an aligned system instantiation.
DEFINITION (Instantiation Alignment): Given a set x′ ⊆ X of system
characters descriptive of s′ and a set x′′ ⊆ X of system characters
descriptive of s′′ , and X = { x′ ∪ x′′} , then two system instantiations

σ ′ and σ ′′ are aligned if σ ′ = X ( s′) and σ ′′ = X ( s′′) . The aligned
instantiation of S is given by Σ = X ( S ) .
In order to illustrate these concepts, an example is given. Let S = {s1 , s2 , s3} be a
set of systems of interest, let X = { x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 } be a set of bi-directional interoperability
characters used to characterize S , and let all character states be absence/presence states
(i.e., C = {0,1} ). Define individual, unaligned, system instantiations as in (2), then an
aligned instantiation of S is given by (3).
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σ 1 = { x1 ( s1 ) , x2 ( s1 ) , x3 ( s1 ) , x4 ( s1 )} = {1,1, 0,1}
σ 2 = { x1 ( s2 )} = {1}

(2)

σ 3 = { x2 ( s3 ) , x4 ( s3 )} = {1, 0}
⎡1 1 0 1 ⎤
Σ = X ( S ) = {{1,1, 0,1} , {1, 0, 0, 0} , {0,1, 0,0}} = ⎢⎢1 0 0 0⎥⎥
⎣⎢0 1 0 0⎦⎥
3.4.5

(3)

Performance Enhanced Instantiation
A system instantiation Σ in which interoperability characters are assigned binary

character states is an underlying interoperability model upon which a performanceenhanced instantiation is based. The performance-enhanced instantiation can be used to
facilitate data rate, cost, efficiency, or throughput analysis, among others. For example,
given a set of systems (4) and a set of bi-directional interoperability characters (5) with
character states (6), then S can be instantiated as (7) if it is assumed that the Laptop has
USB, Wi-Fi, and Serial communication capability and that the PDA possesses the same
plus GSM, IR, and Bluetooth functionality.

S = { Laptop, PDA}

(4)

X = {CommUSB
.
, CommWiFi
.
, Comm.Serial , Comm.GSM , Comm.Bluetooth}
C = {0,1}
USB WiFi Serial GSM
⎡
⎢
Σ = ⎢ Laptop
1
1
1
0
⎢⎣ PDA
1
1
1
1
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(5)
(6)

IR Bluetooth ⎤
⎥
0
0
⎥
⎥⎦
1
1

(7)

If a data rate focused interoperability analysis is desired, a performance-enhanced
system instantiation ΣP can be defined (8) which models, for example, the peak data rates
(in Mbits/sec) for each type of interoperation characterized by X .

USB WiFi Serial
IR GSM Bluetooth ⎤
⎡
⎢
⎥
Σ P = ⎢ Laptop 480 54
0.02
0
0
0
⎥
⎢⎣ PDA 480 11 0.250 0.271 1.152
⎥⎦
2

(8)

This performance-enhanced system instantiation assumes that the Laptop and
PDA adhere to the standards given in Table 7.

Table 7 System implementation standards
Laptop

CommUSB
.
CommWiFi
.
Comm.Serial
Comm.GSM
Comm.IR
Comm.Bluetooth
3.5

USB 2.0
802.11g
RS‐232 (strict)
N/A
N/A
N/A

PDA
USB 2.0
802.11b
RS‐232 (relaxed)
GSM
MIR IrDA
Bluetooth 2.0

Interoperability Measurement
Metrology, or the science of measurement, defines measurement as “the objective

representation of our empirical knowledge of the world by numbers,” or in other words,
“the assignment of numbers to properties or events in the real world by means of an
objective empirical operation, in such a way as to describe them.” (Finkelstein &
Leaning, 1984:25-26) If interoperability is considered as a property of a set of systems,
then an operation, called a system interoperability measurement, can be defined which
objectively and empirically assigns a number to systems interoperability. This operation,
its derivation, and its varieties are defined in succeeding sections.
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3.5.1

System Similarity
Similarity measures have been well-studied. (Guan, et. al., 2008) In its essence,

similarity reflects the degree of resemblance of two or more objects. In this research, the
similarity of systems is measured by using a function which takes aligned system
instantiations as its arguments, which rewards for shared interoperability characters, and
which (optionally) penalizes for unshared interoperability characters.
DEFINITION (System Similarity): Given aligned sequences σ ′, σ ′′
instantiating two systems s ′, s ′′ , then the similarity between s ′, s ′′ is
given by Sim (σ ′, σ ′′) where Sim (σ ′, σ ′′) is a similarity function.
There are numerous types of candidate similarity functions to choose from.
Sneath & Sokal categorized similarity functions as distance, association, correlation, and
probabilistic measures. (1973) Guan, et. al., offered a new classification, describing
similarity measures as geometric, feature contrast, alignment-based, and transformational
measures. (2008) Each type is briefly addressed below, followed by definitions of two
similarity functions especially appropriate for interoperability measurement.
Distance (geometric) functions measure how far apart objects reside in character
space. In other words, the geometric function is a measure of dissimilarity vice similarity
which is a measure of how close objects reside to each other in character space. (Sneath
& Sokal, 1973) A geometric dissimilarity function can be converted to a similarity
function by first normalizing the function by maximum character state value cmax and by
number of characters n so that its range is [ 0,1] , then subtracting it from 1. Thus, perfect
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similarity implies Sim (σ ′, σ ′′) =1 and no similarity implies Sim (σ ′, σ ′′ ) = 0 . For
example, given the Minkowski distance function (9), the corresponding Minkowski
similarity function can be written as (10). SimReal , as defined later in this section, can be
classified as a weighted geometric similarity measure, and is used to measure the
similarity of systems instantiated with positive real-valued character states.
r ⎞
⎛ n
Minkowski Distance = MD = d r (σ ′, σ ′′ ) = ⎜ ∑ σ ′ ( i ) − σ ′′ ( i ) ⎟
⎝ i =1
⎠

r
⎛ 1 ⎞ ⎛ n ⎛ σ ′ ( i ) − σ ′′ ( i ) ⎞ ⎞
Minkowski Similarity = MS = 1 − ⎜ r ⎟ ⎜ ∑ ⎜
⎟ ⎟
cmax
⎝ n ⎠ ⎜⎝ i =1 ⎝
⎠ ⎟⎠

1

1

r

(9)

r

(10)

Association similarity measures are related to distance/geometric similarity
measures but are more appropriately described as feature, or character, contrast measures.
They are especially appropriate for measuring the similarity of objects described in
character space with absence/presence character states. (Batagelj & Bren, 1995; Sneath &
Sokal, 1973; Baulieu, 1989) The general form of a character contrast measure is given in
(11) where θ , α , β are weights, f is a function, σ ′ ∩ σ ′′ represents the features that
σ ′, σ ′′ have in common, σ ′ − σ ′′ represents the features that σ ′ possesses that σ ′′ does

not, and σ ′′ − σ ′ represents the opposite. (Guan, et. al., 2008) SimBin , as defined later in
this section, can be considered a character contrast similarity measure and is used to
measure the resemblance of systems instantiated with binary (absence/presence)
character states. Other examples of character contrast measures include the Jaccard
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coefficient, the Czekanowski metric, and the Simple Matching coefficient, among many
others; Batagelj & Bren compare over twenty character contrast measures (1995).

Sim (σ ′, σ ′′) = θ f (σ ′ ∩ σ ′′) − α f (σ ′ − σ ′′) − β f (σ ′′ − σ ′)

(11)

Correlation coefficients associate the similarity of objects modeled in character
space with a function of the angle between the object vectors. (Sneath & Sokal, 1973)
An example of a correlation coefficient is the cosine function. Probabilistic similarity
measures account for the distribution of character states for a particular character (Ibid)
and alignment-based similarity measures give greater weight to common features of
objects which are related or belong to the same sub-object. (Guan, et. al., 2008) Finally,
transformational similarity measures associate similarity with the number of operations
required to transform one object so as to become identical to another. (Hahn, et. al., 2003)
An interoperability function is a similarity function which meets certain criteria
given in the definition below.
DEFINITION (Interoperability Function): An interoperability function I
is a similarity function which 1) takes a pair of system instantiations as
its arguments, 2) has a range of [ 0,1] , 3) rewards for shared
characters and optionally penalizes for unshared characters, and 4)
gives a greater reward to system pairs whose shared characters’ states
have a “better” value.
Although many interoperability functions might be appropriate for
interoperability measurement, two fundamental interoperability functions previously
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alluded to, SimBin and SimReal , are defined below. SimBin is a character contrast
similarity function used to measure the similarity of system instantiations with binaryvalued (absence/presence) character states. It can be modified in many ways which could
be useful for certain applications. For example, SimBin does not penalize for unshared
interoperability characters, although a penalty term could be easily added. A penalty
might be desired when the lack of a certain interoperability character is a severe
detriment to the effectiveness of the operational process. SimBin adheres to the standard
character contrast measure form given in (11) with θ =

1

n

, α = β = 0 , and

f = (σ ′ ∧ σ ′′ ) .

DEFINITION ( SimBin ): Given a pair of systems s ′, s ′′ instantiated with

σ ′, σ ′′ ∈ {0,1} , then I = SimBin = ( 1 n )
n

n

∑(σ ′ ( i ) ∧ σ ′′ ( i ) ) is an
i =1

interoperability function which gives a normalized measure of the
similarity of systems instantiated with binary-valued character states
where ∧ is the boolean AND operator.

SimReal , is a normalized geometric measure appropriate for measuring the
similarity of system instantiations with real-valued character states. It assumes that the
range of all characters’ states are the same [ 0,cmax ] , either inherently or by mapping. The
core of SimReal is the Minkowski similarity function (10) modified to reward strictly for
shared characters by inserting the bi parameter defined in (13). The modified Minkowski
similarity function is given in (12).
50

1
⎡
r
r⎤
n
⎛
⎞
′
′′
⎛
−
⎞
σ
i
σ
i
(
)
(
)
⎛ 1 ⎞
⎢
⎥
Modified Minkowski Similarity = MMS = 1 − ⎜ r ⎟ ⎜ ∑ bi ⎜
⎟ ⎟ ⎥ (12)
⎢ ⎝ n ⎠ ⎜ i =1
cmax
⎝
⎠ ⎟⎠ ⎥
⎝
⎢⎣
⎦

⎧0 σ ′ ( i ) = 0 or σ ′′ ( i ) = 0
bi = ⎨
else
⎩1

(13)

Although it would be desirable to just use the Modified Minkowski Similarity
function as SimReal , this is not possible because it violates the fourth criteria of an
interoperability function by not giving a greater reward to system pairs whose shared
characters’ states have a better value. For example, consider four system instantiations

σ1 = [1] , σ 2 = [ 2] , σ 3 = [3] , σ 4 = [ 4] and assume r = 2 and cmax = 4 . Each system
instantiation possesses one (the same) interoperability character, i.e., n = 1 , but each
exhibits a different state of that character. As expected, MMS (σ1 , σ 2 ) = 0.75 , but

MMS (σ 3 , σ 4 ) = 0.75 as well. In other words, σ 1 resembles σ 2 just as much as σ 3
resembles σ 4 , but intuitively, the similarity of σ 3 ,σ 4 should be higher because those two
systems possess larger character state values than σ1 , σ 2 . Hence, a weighting must be
applied to the similarity measurement to correct this deficiency. Although numerous
weighting schemes could be chosen, the average character state value (14) provides a
simple, yet appropriate, weighting scheme and is chosen to finalize the definition of

SimReal . SimReal has the capability of yielding very precise similarity measures of system
instantiations limited only by the number of characters and the precision of those
characters’ states.
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n

Average Character State Value = w =

n

∑ σ ′ ( i ) + ∑ σ ′′ ( i )
i =1

i =1

2ncmax

(14)

DEFINITION ( SimReal ): Given a pair of systems s ′, s ′′ instantiated as

σ ′, σ ′′ ∈

n

∩ [ 0, cmax ] , then I = SimReal = w ⋅ MMS , written out

completely in (15), is an interoperability function which gives a
weighted, normalized measure of the similarity of systems instantiated
with real-valued character states where w is the average character
state value of a pair of system instantiations, MMS is the Modified
Minkowski Similarity function, n is the number of characters used to
instantiate σ ′, σ ′′ , cmax is the maximum character state value, and r is
the Minkowski parameter (usually set to r = 2 ).

I = SimRe al

3.5.2
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(15)

System Interoperability
Applying the concept of similarity to interoperability measurement, a

foundational axiomatic relationship between similarity of systems and interoperability of
systems can be stated.
AXIOM (System Similarity and Interoperability): If a pair of systems is
instantiated only with system interoperability characters, then the measure of
their similarity is also a measure of their interoperability.
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The System Similarity and Interoperability axiom can be used to formally define
interoperability measurement.
DEFINITION (Interoperability Measurement): Given two systems
s ′, s ′′ ∈ S instantiated with bi-directional characters as σ ′, σ ′′ and an

interoperability function I , then m = I (σ ′, σ ′′) is a measure of the
interoperability of s′ and s′′ where m = 0 → σ ′, σ ′′ are noninteroperable and m = 1 → σ ′, σ ′′ are perfectly interoperable.
M = ⎡⎣ mij ⎤⎦ , i, j ≤ S is a matrix of interoperability measurements for

all system pairs in S .
If the interoperability characters used to instantiate systems are directional in
nature (i.e., a system can provide an interoperation, but not accept it), then directional
interoperability measurements (see next definition) must be made.
DEFINITION (Directional Interoperability Measurement): If two systems

σ ′ = {σ T′ ,σ R′ } ,σ ′′ = {σ T′′ , σ R′′} are instantiated with directional
interoperability characters X = { X T , X R } , then m = I (σ T′ , σ R′′ ) is a
measure of the directional interoperability of σ ′ to σ ′′ .
3.5.3

Interoperability Measurement Modes

3.5.3.1 Directional
All interoperations are either bi-directional or uni-directional. Bi-directional
interoperation implies mσ ′,σ ′′ = I (σ ′, σ ′′) = mσ ′′,σ ′ = I (σ ′′, σ ′) whereas uni-directional
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interoperation implies that mσ ′,σ ′′ ≠ mσ ′′,σ ′ (e.g., σ ′ is a transmit only system and σ ′′ is a
receive only system).
3.5.3.2 Self
Self interoperability is defined as m = I (σ , σ ) and is usually assumed to be zero.
Self interoperability implies an interoperation originating at the system, exiting the
system boundary and then accepted back through the boundary. An example of this is a
network loopback “ping” in which a computer attempts to detect its own IP address on
the local network.
3.5.3.3 Pure
Pure interoperability is a measure of the interoperability of two systems whose
instantiations are aligned only with each other, hence their interoperability measure is
pure, or unencumbered by other systems’ interoperability characters. In other words,

S = 2 . Pure interoperability is measured for performance or cost analysis reasons,
among others. The following example illustrates the concept.
Given S = {s1 , s2 } , X = { x1 , x2 , x3} (all bi-directional), C ∈ { ∩ [ 0,9]} , S
instantiated as Σ = {σ1 , σ 2 } = {{1, 2,3} , {4,5,6}} , and I = SimRe al (with Minkowski
parameter set to r = 2 ), an interoperability matrix is obtained (16) which shows that the
interoperability of σ1 , σ 2 is relatively low. This was to be expected as the values of both
system instantiation’s character states are all well below cmax = 9 . No selfinteroperability was assumed, so the diagonal of M was assigned a value of 0.
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0.259 ⎤
⎡ 0
M =⎢
0 ⎥⎦
⎣0.259

(16)

If a third system is added to S , bringing with it additional interoperability
characters, then expectedly, a third instantiation is added to Σ and the size of M
increases, but the value of I (σ1 , σ 2 ) can change as well because the context, or basis, of
the interoperability measurement has changed. This phenomenon is called contextual
interoperability and is addressed next.
3.5.3.4 Contextual
Contextual interoperability is a measure of the interoperability of two systems
whose instantiations have been aligned with at least one other system possessed of one or
more different characters not used to characterize the initial two systems. In other words,
it is the measure of the interoperability of two systems in the context of a larger set of
systems. By increasing the size of S , the number of characters in X generally increases
(although not necessarily so), thus providing a basis for a more precise interoperability
measurement. This is analogous to making a length measurement with a measuring tape
with only two markings, versus using one with a hundred markings. More markings
yield a more precise basis for the length measurement.
Applying this idea and taking the example given in the previous section, add s3 to

S where s3 is instantiated as σ 3 = {3,7,8,9} and X = { x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 } . Aligning the three
system instantiations yields the following complete instantiation of S .
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⎡1 2 3 0 ⎤
Σ = ⎢⎢ 4 5 6 0⎥⎥
⎢⎣ 3 7 8 9 ⎥⎦

(17)

Again, using I = SimReal as the interoperability function, and assuming n = 4 ,
r = 2 , cmax = 9 , and no self-interoperability, the interoperability matrix in (18) is

obtained.

0.207 0.162⎤
⎡ 0
⎢
M = ⎢0.207
0
0.276⎥⎥
⎢⎣0.162 0.276
0 ⎥⎦

(18)

By adding a new system instantiation to Σ , which increased the number of
characters used to instantiate S , the interoperability measurement of s1 and s2 becomes
more precise, changing from I = 0.259 to I = 0.207 . This drop in the interoperability
measurement was expected because the interoperability of s1 and s2 is now being
measured in the context of s3 which not only adds a new interoperability character to the
model but exhibits much higher character state values than the other two system
instantiations. In the context of the expanded model, s1 and s2 still appear very similar
(i.e., the Modified Minkowski Similarity function shows their similarity is MMS = 0.8 3 )
but their overall interoperability measurement is penalized by their low interoperability
character state values ( w = 0.292 ). In the context of the very capable s3 , the
interoperability measurement of s1 and s2 drops. While this result might be considered
non-intuitive, it is nevertheless correct. Indeed, s1 and s2 are not less interoperable
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because s3 is added to S , but their interoperability measurement becomes more precise
because of the infusion of the additional characters associated with s3 . It can be
postulated that as the number of characters used to instantiate S approaches infinity, then
the interoperability measurements of the systems in S approach perfect precision.
3.5.3.5 Time-variant
Interoperability is generally time variant. For example, atmospheric effects due to
the changes from night to day will degrade the optical interoperability of reconnaissance
satellites and ground targets. Similarly, the directional interoperability of an attacker and
his target may increase as the attacker has ingressed long enough to come in range of the
target. Finally, end-to-end computer interoperability may improve or diminish with
changes in network congestion tied to worker shift changes, lunchtime usage, etc. There
are two distinct methods of modeling time-variant interoperability. The first method
creates a time-continuous basis for the interoperability measurement in which systems are
instantiated using interoperability characters which themselves are functions of time.
Hence, the resulting interoperability measurement is also a function of time. The second
method is a discrete method in which a series of instantiations are created which
represent “snapshots” in time. The series of interoperability measurements tied to these
instantiations represents a sampled time-varying interoperability measurement. Timevariant interoperability measurements can be directional, self, pure, contextual,
confrontational, collaborative, direct, or in-direct interoperability measurements. A timevariant interoperability measurement can be equivalent to an activity-phased
measurement if the activities occur in time sequential fashion. Time variant
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interoperability measurements are useful in determining if/when interoperability lapses
cause associated degradation in operational effectiveness.
3.5.3.6 Constrained Upper Bound on Interoperability Measurement
It is not possible, or even desirable, for all systems to interoperate with each other,
let alone interoperate perfectly. Furthermore, for those systems which ought to
interoperate, there are often many limitations, specific to the operational process, which
prevent them from interoperating at their full potential. Some of these limitations are
physical (e.g., electromagnetic interference), operational (i.e., rules of engagement), or
reliability related (i.e., mission capability), among many others. Therefore, in order to
manage expectations on the final interoperability measurement, it is useful to define a
realistic upper bound on the interoperability measurement, called the constrained upper
bound. This constrained upper bound on the interoperability measurement admits that
the best possible interoperability measurement must be less than m = 1 due to these
various degradations and limitations. The constrained upper bound on the
interoperability measurement is calculated by first determining the operational processspecific interoperability limiting factors, then by building an interoperability model
which accommodates those limitations. This model includes all interoperability
characters the set of systems could conceivably implement with their character states set
to their best possible value in light of the predetermined limitations. The difference
between the constrained upper bound on the interoperability measurement and the current
interoperability measurement is called the interoperability gap and represents the trade
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space, design space, or funding space in which process or system changes can occur, to
the end of improving operational effectiveness.
3.5.3.7 Collaborative
Collaborative interoperability is the type of interoperability most understood by
people today. For example, in the Department of Defense the term interoperability is
usually associated with the idea of service, joint, and allied systems, units, and forces
working together to mutual advantage as opposed to friendly (blue) systems
interoperating with adversary (red) systems. Similarly, in the civilian sector, an engineer
might consider interoperability to be a property of how well the various systems he
operates or designs interface or provide and accept services from each other. Written
another way, collaborative interoperability is the interoperability between friendly, or
blue systems. Collaborative interoperability also carries a connotation that if one system
provides something, another system gives something back in exchange. In other words,
the systems interoperate in a collaborative fashion for mutual benefit or to achieve a
shared goal. Applying traditional military terminology, collaborative interoperability can
also be called blue-to-blue interoperability. The interoperability measurement method
presented in this Chapter provides a methodical means of measuring the collaborative
interoperability of all types of systems interoperating in all kinds of ways.
It is important to note however, that not all interoperations are collaborative.
Indeed, collaborative interoperability often supports the goals of the operational process
but does not directly implement them. For example collaborative forms of
interoperability such as linguistic, technical, logistics, and cultural interoperability of
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coalition forces and systems enabled the ouster of Iraq from Kuwait during operation
DESERT STORM, however they did not directly cause the ouster—that was done by
confrontational interoperability methods such as attack operations. In general, if the
operational process implies any form of opposition (i.e., an oppositional or
confrontational operational process) between systems (e.g., negotiation, attack,
greediness, pushing, removing, limiting, and preventing, among others), then another
type of interoperability, called confrontational interoperability can be measured. This
type of interoperability measurement is powerful because it can be related directly to
operational effectiveness without discrete event, or other types of simulation.
3.5.3.8 Confrontational
A unique contribution of this research is the announcement and explanation of
confrontational interoperability, which is the interoperability of friendly (blue) and
adversary (red) forces. Examples of confrontational interoperability include the actions
of a friendly (blue) jammer to degrade the communications of adversary (red) force
command and control systems, the efforts of two negotiation teams attempting to resolve
an issue, environmental activity which inhibits technology (e.g., gravity vs a rocket, wind
vs an airplane, oxidation vs a metal bridge, or sunspot-generated electromagnetic
interference vs radios), and marketing aimed at attracting business for one company
while preventing it for another, among others. In a confrontational operational process,
one set of systems tries to achieve advantage or effectiveness over the remaining systems.
Many military processes, such as time critical targeting, psychological operations, or
defensive counter air, are inherently confrontational. Indeed, for these processes
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confrontational interoperability should receive focus as it describes the ability of friendly
(blue) systems to control adversary (red) systems and to prevent reciprocation—an
inherently military concept.
Confrontational interoperability implies and underpins effects-based operations in
which all planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of an operation concentrates
on the desired effects on the enemy. Everything that does not contribute toward
achieving the desired effect is considered irrelevant and anything that could hinder the
effect is eliminated. For example, in a time critical targeting operation, the goal is not to
have a high degree of collaborative interoperability of friendly systems (this might be
helpful or could be damaging to the operation), but to have a high degree of directional
confrontational interoperability from friendly (blue) to adversary (red) systems. In other
words, the goal is to ensure that blue systems are able to destroy red systems. Indeed, for
certain operational processes, collaborative interoperability ideally is minimized and
confrontational interoperability is maximized. For example, during stealth operations, a
single stealthy aircraft may conduct a bombing operation without support aircraft, while
maintaining radio silence, and while flying without the benefit of active radar.
While too much collaborative interoperability in any type of operational process
might result have degrading effects, such as information overload, in a confrontational
operational process, a high degree of directional confrontational interoperability from
friendly to adversary systems is always desired as it will likely result in decisive success.
Furthermore, in the context of a confrontational operational process, when the statement
is made that collaborative interoperability must be improved, the implication is that it
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must be improved in order to increase operational effectiveness (i.e., improve
confrontational interoperability). Some have made the dangerous assumption that the
more interoperable friendly systems and forces are with each other the more operational
success they will enjoy. This is often false. For example, fighter pilots have warned
against information overload in the cockpit which might distract them from their main
tasks. Similarly, the ability of mid- and senior-level managers to interoperate with each
other and their subordinates via e-mail is both a benefit and a detractor if misused.
Information overload, distraction, and inefficiencies, among other detractors, are the
result of too much collaborative interoperability. The relationship between
confrontational interoperability and operational effectiveness is described in succeeding
sections and demonstrated in Chapter 4.
3.6

Interoperability Impact on Operational Effectiveness
General Hal Hornburg quipped in 2004 that he looks forward “to the day where

we can convince a surface-to-air missile that it’s a Maytag in a rinse cycle, making it
irrelevant to combat.” (Tirpak, 2004:31) This statement implies a desire to control the
enemy. Stated another way, General Hornburg desires friendly (blue) force operational
advantage resulting from improved friendly (blue)-to-adversary (red) directional
interoperability and degraded adversary (red)-to-friendly (blue) directional
interoperability. Sun Tzu encapsulates this concept by stating “The clever combatant
imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on
him.” (Giles, 1910:VI-2) The following axiom gives a sufficient condition which relates
directional confrontational interoperability to operational advantage.
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AXIOM (Operational Advantage): Let the subscripts B , R refer to
friendly (blue) and adversary (red) forces respectively. Given a set of
systems S = {SB , SR } instantiated as Σ = {ΣB , ΣR } , then a sufficient
condition for friendly (blue) force operational advantage over
adversary (red) force is for all pairs (σ B , σ R ) , I (σ B , σ R ) > I (σ R , σ B )
assuming Σ completely characterizes S .
While the Operational Advantage axiom states that if the directional
interoperability of all friendly (blue) toadversary ( red) systems exceeds that of adversary
(red) to friendly (blue), then operational advantage is obtained, it is important to
emphasize that this is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition. For example, if a set of
friendly (blue) systems includes a home base σ HB and a bomber σ B , while the set of
adversary (red) systems consists of an integrated air defense system σ IADS and a target

σ TGT , then probably the home base does not need to have operational advantage over the
enemy target in order for the operation to be effective, however the bomber must have
operational advantage over both the air defense system and the target. Thus, in this
limited example it might be postulated that a necessary condition for friendly (blue) force
operational advantage operational advantage over adversary (red) force is that

I (σ B , σ IADS ) > I (σ IADS , σ B ) and I (σ B , σ TGT ) > I (σ TGT , σ B ) . Unfortunately, these
necessary conditions are not always possible to define, and generally discrete event or
some other type of simulation is required in order to determine the minimal set of
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systems which must enjoy operational advantage over each other in order to ensure
operational success.
As MoOEs quantify operational advantage, applying the Operational Advantage
axiom, the impact of interoperability on operational effectiveness can be described. This
important result is given below as the Interoperability Impact on Operational
Effectiveness axiom, which, like the Operational Advantage axiom, describes a sufficient
condition. The Interoperability Impact on Operational Effectiveness axiom, 1) applies to
confrontational interoperability (noting that collaborative interoperability between
friendly systems contributes to confrontational interoperability between opposing forces’
systems), 2) requires that the MoOE be written as a diametric pair, and 3) demands that
the set of systems be instantiated by a complete set of interoperability characters X
which describe all interoperations related to the diametric pair. For example, if OB is the
percent of red targets destroyed and OR is the percent of red targets protected, then X
must characterize all interoperations between all systems in S which contribute to the
destruction and protection of red targets.
AXIOM (Interoperability Impact on Operational Effectiveness): Let the
subscripts B , R refer to friendly (blue) and adversary (red) forces
respectively. Given a set of systems S = {SB , SR } characterized by X
and instantiated as Σ = {ΣB , ΣR } and a diametric MoOE O = {OB , OR } ,
then if X completely characterizes all interoperations related to

OB , OR then a sufficient condition for OB > OR is that friendly (blue)
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systems have Operational Advantage over adversary (red) systems, or
in other words friendly (blue)-to-adversary (red) directional
interoperability exceeds adversary (red)-to-friendly (blue) directional
interoperability for all pairs (σ B , σ R ) (i.e.,

∀ (σ B , σ R ) , I (σ B , σ R ) > I (σ R , σ B ) ↔ OB > OR ).
3.7

Architecture and Interoperability
Numerous enterprise, system, and operational architectures have been created

over the past decade using the DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF). Many, if not all,
of the organizations which created these architectures are also interested in
interoperability. This is apparent in the heavy focus on describing needlines, information
exchanges, and system functions as well as in documenting the technical standards
required for communication and net-centric operation. Unfortunately, only some of the
key elements required to perform an interoperability measurement (e.g., operational
process and set of systems) can be extracted from a candidate DoDAF architecture
description. Additionally, the Core Architecture Data Model (CADM) used as a template
for storing DoDAF architecture descriptions (DoD, 2007c) has only a portion of the
structure necessary to store the required elements for an interoperability measurementfocused architecture. The CADM designers were definitely considering interoperability
when they designed the model. For example, they included a seldom used field called
interopera bilityLevelCode intended to hold a LISI level. However, using CADM to

store the key elements given in Table 8 would be an inefficient force-fit at best. For
65

example, CADM provides for storing systems in multiple places (i.e., what is called a
system in the context of this dissertation is called a system, sub-system, system node,
operational node, and organization within the CADM model). Possibly even more
concerning are fields in CADM which simultaneously store interoperability measurement
elements and non-interoperability measurement elements (e.g., operational activities,
system functions, needlines, and information exchanges stored in a CADM database
could be interoperability characters, but not necessarily so). Thus it is concluded that
DoDAF and CADM in their current forms (version 1.5) are incapable of storing or
representing an architecture whose purpose is interoperability assessment and analysis.
Table 8 Interoperability measurement key elements
Key Element
Purpose
Operational Process
Measure of Operational Effectiveness
Set of Systems
Set of Interoperability Characters
States of Interoperability Characters
System Instantiation
Interoperability Function
Interoperability Measurement

DoDAF and CADM are currently unable to accommodate the elements of Table
8, but it is possible to extend them to do so. An interoperability-focused redesign of
CADM is outside the scope of this dissertation, however, embracing the motivations of
DoDAF version 2.0 development (architecture with a purpose), a set of views are
proposed specifically for the purpose of interoperability assessment (Table 9). The views
proposed in the extension are numbered so as to be roughly analogous to existing DoDAF
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views. In the table, the name, contents, format, and current DoDAF analogue view are
given for each proposed view.
IV-1 Interoperability Purpose and Assumptions is a text- document, augmenting
the AV-1, which describes the purpose of the interoperability analysis, the associated
MoOE, and critical assumptions such as which interoperability function was used to
make the interoperability measurement. It also includes the final analysis made based
upon the IV-4 view.
IV-2 Interoperability Graph visually depicts the systems and their interoperations.
A mathematical definition follows.
DEFINITION (Interoperability Graph): Given a set of systems S
instantiated as Σ = {ΣT , ΣR } over a set of interoperability characters
X with character states C , let G be a directed multigraph in which

V ( G ) = S and E ( G ) is a set of edges such that for all characters
xi ∈ X , there exists a directed edge from s′ to s′′ labeled with the
name of that character if s′ is able to provide that interoperation and

s′′ is able to accept it.
IV-3 System Instantiation ( Σ ) is a system to interoperability character matrix
containing states of the characters, IV-4 Interoperability Measurement is the matrix of
pairwise system interoperability measurements M , and IV-5 Operational Process (i.e., an
OV-5) is a SysML activity diagram modeling the operational process. A simple
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interoperability architecture is given in Table 10 to illustrate the five interoperability
architecture products.
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Set of interoperability measurements
Operational process

IV-4 Interoperability Measurement
IV-5 Operational Process

IV-3 System Instantiation

IV-2 Interoperability Graph

Contents
Interoperability measurement purpose
Measure of operational effectiveness
Interoperability function
Set of systems
Set of interoperability characters
States of Interoperability characters
Set of systems
Set of interoperability characters
Interoperability character states

Matrix
Graph

Matrix

Graph

Format
Text

Table 9 Interoperability extension to DoDAF

View
IV-1 Interoperability Purpose, Assumptions, and
Analysis

OV-2 Op. Node Conn. Descr.
SV-1 Sys. Interf. Descr.
SV-2 Sys. Comm. Descr.
OV-3 Op. Info. Exch. Matrix
SV-3 System-System Matrix
SV-4 Sys. Func. Descr.
SV-5 Op. Act. Sys. Func. Matrix
SV-6 Sys. Data Exch. Matrix
SV-7 Sys. Perf. Parms. Matrix
None
OV-5 Op. Activity Model

DoDAF Analogue
AV-1 Overview and Summary

IV-1

Table 10 Example interoperability architecture
NAME: Precision Strike Interoperability Measurement
PURPOSE: To predict operational success by application of the Interoperability
Impact on Operational Effectiveness axiom.
INTEROPERABILITY FUNCTION: I = SimBin
MoOE: O = {OB , OR } , OB is “target destroyed?” and OR is “target protected.”

IV-2

ANALYSIS: Assuming the critical interoperation is PSP − TGT , then because
I (σ PSP , σ TGT ) > I (σ TGT , σ PSP ) then it is assumed that OB > OR .

C2
C2.Communicate
Intel
Fires

AOC
1
1
1
0

PSP
1
1
0
1

AOC
AOC 0
PSP 1/2
TGT 0

IV-5 (OV-5)

IV-4

IV-3

Transmit
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Receive

TGT
0
0
0
0

PSP
3/4
0
0

AOC
1
1
0
0

TGT
0
1/4
0

PSP
1
1
1
0

TGT
0
0
0
1

3.8

Summary
The general method of interoperability measurement presented in this chapter is

foundational and weaves together the best ideas from extant literature with key missing
elements described in this research (e.g., system interoperability characters, character
states, system instantiations, system similarity, operational advantage, and others). The
result is a flexible method suitable for measuring the collaborative and confrontational
interoperability of all types of systems interoperating in all types of ways. Because the
method is grounded in an operational process, the interoperability measurement is not
abstract, but mathematically related to the operational effectiveness of the confrontational
operational process. The flexibility of the method supports the instantiation of systems at
any level of abstraction, with resultant interoperability measurements at any desired level
of precision. In the method of this chapter, numerous weaknesses of extant methods are
resolved. For example, no longer is interoperability measurement limited to specific
types of systems or interoperations, no longer is an interoperability measurement an
abstract measure divorced from the operational circumstances in which the interoperation
occurred, and no longer are interoperability measurements restricted to the precision of a
limited scale or the accuracy of a limited/outdated set of attributes. In short, the method
of this chapter defines a basic theory of interoperability measurement.
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4. Analysis and Results
One key way to ensure effectiveness is to ensure that our systems are interoperable.
—General Lester Lyles
4.1

Overview
The interoperability measurement method of Chapter 3 is foundational and

broadly useful. By applying the method, the interoperability of organizations, coalitions,
weapon systems, technology, philosophies, the environment, and uncountable other
entities can be measured. While it is not possible to provide an example for all possible
applications (Chapter 3, Table 4) of the interoperability measurement method, several are
given in this chapter to demonstrate its application.
First, it will be shown that maturity model (leveling) methods are a special case of
the more general method of Chapter 3. Specifically, the Organizational Interoperability
Model (OIM) will be modeled using the method of Chapter 3 and, using the same
example given in Clark & Moon (2001), the interoperability of coalition forces will be
measured and the results compared to that of Clark & Moon. Second, to demonstrate the
relationship of interoperability with operational effectiveness, the Interoperability Impact
on Operational Effectiveness axiom will be applied to a Suppression of Enemy Air
Defenses (SEAD) problem. Finally, the time variance of interoperability will be explored
through a Precision Strike application.
4.2

Application: Coalition Interoperability
Technological interoperability has been commonly discussed in other research,

often focusing on network information technology standards, however, other types of
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interoperability are often more important. For example, the US air strikes against Libya
in 1986 not only highlighted equipment interoperability problems (i.e., the Navy lacked
HAVE QUICK radios which the Air Force possessed), but more especially joint
procedural interoperability problems between the Navy and Air Force. (Clark & Moon,
2001) Similarly, NATO forces experienced secure, tactical voice communication
problems in Kosovo, not because of lack of proper radios, but also because of procedural
interoperability problems. (Nutwell & Price, 2000). Finally, Lieutenant General Cevic
Bir, the commander of United Nations Operations Somalia (UNOSOM II) in 1993
remarked that interoperability was a major problem in every phase of his coalition
operation. (Bir, 1997) Joint and coalition interoperability must be addressed, not just at
the technical level, but also at the organizational level. Coalition interoperability
measurements can focus the commander’s efforts on improving joint and coalition
warfighting effectiveness by increasing the interoperability of coalition forces.
Clark & Jones recognized the importance of coalition interoperability and
described a maturity model, called the Organizational Interoperability Model (OIM),
which describes a framework of coalition interoperability attributes and levels. (1999)
Their model is based on the structure of the Department of Defense Levels of Information
Systems Interoperability (LISI) model and is given in Table 11.

73

Table 11 Organizational interoperability maturity model (OIM) (Clark & Moon, 2001)
Command
Preparedness Understanding
Ethos
Style
Level 4
(Unified)

Complete
normal day‐to‐
day working

Shared

Level 3
(Combined)

Detailed
doctrine and
experience in
using it

Shared
communications
and knowledge

Level 2
(Collaborative)

General
doctrine in
place and some
experience

Shared comms
and shared
knowledge about
specific topics

Level 1
(Cooperative)

General
guidelines

Level 0
(Independent)

No
preparedness

Electronic
comms and
shared
information
Voice comms via
phone, etc.

Homogeneous

Uniform

One chain of
command and
interaction with
home
organization
Separate
reporting lines
of
responsibility
overlaid with a
single
command chain
Separate
reporting lines
of
responsibility

Shared ethos
but with
influence from
home
organization
Shared
purpose; goals,
value system
significantly
influenced by
home
organization

No interaction

Shared purpose
Limited shared
purpose

The usefulness of the OIM model was demonstrated when Clark & Moon used it
to analyze the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) coalition sent to enforce
peace in East Timor in 1999. (2001) The coalition consisted of forces from Australia
(lead nation), the United States, New Zealand, Thailand, Phillipines, and Republic of
Korea among others. Using after-action reports pertaining to the operation, Clark &
Moon were able to apply their model to determine qualitatively that the highest levels of
interoperability occurred between Australia, the United States, and New Zealand, that
Thailand and the Phillipines enjoyed a lower level of interoperability with Australia, and
that all other interoperations were at the lowest level.
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Clark & Moon assessed the interoperability of INTEREFET coalition forces with
respect to the Australian Deployable Joint Force (ADJF) standard, as implemented
according to the American, British, Canada, and Australia (ABCA) coalition operations
handbook (COH). Obviously, not all INTERFET member nations were capable of
adhering, or even desired to adhere completely to this standard, and their interoperability
levels, as assessed by Clark & Moon, reflected this. For example, Clark & Moon stated
that with respect to the Preparedness attribute, the Thai forces were scored at level 1 with
respect to the standard, while the United States was scored at level 2. Similarly, in Clark
& Moon’s aggregate interoperability measurement, when they state that the
interoperability of the US and the Republic of Korea was level 1, it is to be understood
that this assessment was made 1) in context of the INTERFET operation, and 2) with
respect to the ADJF-ABCA COH standard. For the OIM model, level 0 infers lack of
interoperability and level 4 infers full compliance with the standard.
Hypothesis: Maturity model (leveling) interoperability assessment methods, such
as the OIM model, can be shown to be a special case of the general interoperability
method presented in Chapter 3. To demonstrate, the method of Chapter 3 can be used to
measure the interoperability of INTERFET coalition forces and to arrive at the same
conclusions as those made by Clark & Moon when they applied the OIM model to the
INTERFET operation.
4.2.1

The Special Case of the Maturity Model Method
A maturity model (or leveling) interoperability method such as LISI or OIM

defines a set of entities, interoperability attributes (usually limited to one to four
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X which characterize the

entities, and the levels are states of those characters C . For each of the entities modeled,
the maturity model methods take the lowest interoperability level of all the attributes, and
call it the generic interoperability Gi of that entity. Then the interoperability
measurement for a pair of entities is called the expected interoperability, and is defined as
the lesser of the two entities’ generic interoperability measurements. In other words,
Expected Interoperability = Min ( G1 , G2 ) . For example, in Table 12, the expected
interoperability assessment of Entity #1 and Entity #2 is 1 (i.e., the minimum of the two
generic interoperability assessments). Using the terminology from Chapter 3, it can be
said that the maturity models use an interoperability function I = Min ( G1 , G2 ) to
calculate the interoperability of a pair of systems . Thus, the maturity model method is
shown to be a limited case of the general method of Chapter 3 in which entities equate to
systems S , attributes equate to characters X , levels equate to character states C , and
minimum common generic interoperability is used as an interoperability function I .
Table 12 Example OIM interoperability assessments
Entity #1
Entity #2

4.2.2

Preparedness
3
4

Understanding
2
4

Command Style
2
3

Ethos
1
3

Generic Interoperability
1
3

INTERFET Coalition Interoperability Results and Method Comparisons
Clark & Moon applied the OIM model to assess the interoperability of coalition

forces participating in the 1999 INTERFET operation. (2001) Drawing from their paper,
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systems, interoperability characters, and character states can be assigned as in (19), (20),
and (21).

S = { AUS ,US , NZ , Thai, Phil , ROK}

(19)

X = { Preparedness,Understanding , Command Style, Ethos}

(20)

C = {0,1, 2,3, 4}

(21)

While the OIM authors limited themselves to four attributes (characters) and five
levels (states), using the method of Chapter 3, their model could have been expanded to a
much larger number of characters and states, which would result in a better
characterization of the coalition forces and a more precise interoperability measurement.
Indeed, after the original publication of the OIM model (Clark & Jones, 1999), other
researchers debated the number and descriptions of the attributes of the OIM model.
Although the final version of the OIM model remained limited to a 4-attribute, 5-level
model, at least 35 sub-attributes were further defined. (Fewell & Clark, 2003) The
method of Chapter 3 could easily accommodate these 35 sub-attributes as additional
characters. Although these 35 additional characters help an analyst assign an
interoperability level to each attribute, by not addressing them as individual attributes,
fidelity is lost from the model, and their contribution is effectively averaged out.
Extracting from Clark & Moon, the set of interoperability characters are defined in Table
13.
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Table 13 Explanation of coalition characterization X
Preparedness
Understanding
Command Style
Ethos

How well does the nation adhere to ADJF standards as implemented by
ABCA-COH doctrine and training?
How well does the nation share information and knowledge according to
ADJF practice and ABCA-COH guidelines?
How well does the nation delegate and share roles according to ADJF and
ABCA-COH guidelines?
How well does the nation seek to assist the East Timorese and to maintain
their relationship with Indonesia?

S is instantiated as in (22) according to Clark & Moon’s descriptions of member
nations’ participation in the INTERFET coalition operation. Although their paper gives
enough information to have used more precise real-valued character states, integer states
were used to maintain consistency with their model. One decimal precision is given in
the interoperability measurement (23) to illustrate the improved measurement fidelity.

⎡
⎢ AUS
⎢
⎢ US
⎢
Σ = ⎢ NZ
⎢ Thai
⎢
⎢ Phil
⎢ ROK
⎣

Preparation Understanding Command Style Ethos ⎤
2
3
3
1 ⎥⎥
2
3
3
1 ⎥
⎥
2
3
3
1 ⎥
1
1
1
1 ⎥
⎥
1
1
1
1 ⎥
0
1
1
1 ⎥⎦

(22)

Selecting I = SimReal as the interoperability function, with cmax = 4 , r = 2 , and

n = 4 , the following coalition interoperability measurement M results.
⎡
⎢ AUS
⎢
⎢ US
⎢
M = ⎢ NZ
⎢ Thai
⎢
⎢ Phil
⎢ ROK
⎣

AUS US

NZ Thai Phil

0.6

0.6 0.6

0.3

0.3

0.6
0.6

0.6 0.6
0.6 0.6

0.3
0.3

0.3
0.3

0.3

0.3 0.3

0.3

0.2

0.3

0.3 0.3

0.2

0.3

0.2

0.2 0.2

0.2

0.2
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ROK ⎤
0.2 ⎥⎥
0.2 ⎥
⎥
0.2 ⎥
0.2 ⎥
⎥
0.2 ⎥
0.2 ⎥⎦

(23)

If the interoperability measurement M is scaled from its current [ 0,1] scale to the
OIM [ 0,4] scale, then the measurement (24) can be compared to Clark & Moon’s
original results (Table 14).

M scaled

⎡
⎢ AUS
⎢
⎢ US
⎢
= ⎢ NZ
⎢ Thai
⎢
⎢ Phil
⎢ ROK
⎣

AUS US

NZ Thai Phil

2.3

2.3 2.3

1.0

1.0

2.3
2.3

2.3 2.3
2.3 2.3

1.0
1.0

1.0
1.0

1.0

1.0 1.0

1

0.9

1.0

1.0 1.0

0.9

1

0.9

0.9 0.9

0.8

0.8

ROK ⎤
0.9 ⎥⎥
0.9 ⎥
⎥
0.9 ⎥
0.8 ⎥
⎥
0.8 ⎥
0.8 ⎥⎦

(24)

Table 14 Clark & Moon's original INTERFET interoperability measurements
US
NZ
Thai
Phil
ROK

AS
2
2
1
1
0

US

NZ

Thai

Phil

2
0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0

0

Clark & Moon noted the best coalition interoperability among the US, Australia,
and New Zealand (OIM 2) and the worst among Thailand, the Phillipines, and the
Republic of Korea (OIM 0). Similar measurements (24) result from the method of
Chapter 3, but with more accuracy and precision. For example, whereas the OIM model
scored the interoperability of the Republic of Korea with Australia as a zero, meaning the
nations were operating completely independently of each other, the method of Chapter 3
gives a more accurate result of 0.9. An OIM score of zero indicates the two nations 1)
had no level of preparedness to operate in a coalition together, 2) had no interaction
amongst their commanders and forces, 3) were limited to telephone communication, and
4) shared a common purpose only in a limited fashion. However, Clark & Moon’s paper
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indicates that although the Koreans did have preparation issues, they 1) did jointly attend
briefings and planning meetings, 2) understood at least half of the material presented at
those briefings and meetings, 3) received taskings from HQ INTERFET, but operated in
their own area of responsibility, 4) had personal contact between commanders, and 5)
were not willing to participate in all aspects of the INTERFET operation, but strongly
supported the humanitarian aspect of the operation. Considering that an OIM score of
one indicates 1) preparation was made by learning general guidelines (not met by
Koreans), 2) understanding is obtained through electronic communication and shared
information (partially met by Koreans), 3) command is implemented through separate
lines of responsibility (met by Koreans), and 4) the ethos of the operation is shared
(partially met by Koreans), it seems reasonable to assume that the Australian-Korean
interoperability score should probably be somewhere between zero and one. Thus, the
Chapter 3-derived measurement of 0.9 is appropriate and more precisely and accurately
reflects the true interoperability of the Republic of Korea with Australia than the
assessment originally given by Clark & Moon.
4.2.3

Analysis of INTERFET Interoperability Measurements
INTERFET coalition interoperability M is shown graphically in Figure 7. It can

be seen that among INTERFET member nations were three clusters { AUS ,US , NZ } ,

{Thai, Phil} , and {ROK} .

Expectedly the nations with Western-type philosophies, and

presumably more familiar with ADJF standards as implemented by the ABCA-COH,
enjoyed a high degree of interoperability with each other, but less so with the Asian
nations and vice versa. Coalition interoperability could improve in the future among
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these Western and Eastern nations if common philosophies on doctrine, training,
information sharing, delegation, and cultural values and goals, acceptable to both East
and West, are agreed upon, practiced, and implemented prior to future operations.

ROK

1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0

AUS
AUS
US

US
NZ
Thai

Phil

NZ

Phil
ROK

Thai
Figure 7 INTERFET coalition interoperability

The lack of coalition interoperability between the Western and Eastern nations
participating in INTERFET manifested itself in the fact that “the Thais, South Koreans,
and Filipinos had their own areas of operation…and conducted their own operations.”
(Clark & Moon, 2001:32) Similarly, the “divergent nature of the operational
philosophies of the participating countries” was one of the “most difficult aspects of
assembling and maintaining the coalition.” (Ibid) Furthermore, some of the coalition
officers “only understood half of what was said at briefings and conferences and…the
Australians were unaware of this.” (Ibid:33)
4.3

Application: Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)
The following application further demonstrates the interoperability measurement

method of Chapter 3, explores confrontational interoperability, and illustrates the
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Interoperability Impact on Operational Effectiveness axiom which states that improved
friendly (blue)-to-adversary (red) directional interoperability combined with degraded
adversary (red)-to-friendly (blue) interoperability results in higher operational
effectiveness.
Hypothesis: Applying the Interoperability Impact on Operational Effectiveness
axiom, it can be shown that operational effectiveness of the SEAD mission is improved
by 1) the addition of friendly (blue)-force precision strike and electronic attack capability
(i.e., increased friendly (blue)-to-adversary (red) interoperability) and 2) the addition of
friendly (blue)-force stealth (i.e., decreased adversary (red)-to-friendly (blue)
interoperability).
SEAD is defined by JP 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms as “activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades surfacebased enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means.” (JP 1-02, 2008:523)
In this application, the definition is further refined to include only activity which destroys
enemy air defenses by destructive means. An operational process for this application is
given in Figure 8 and is based upon the targeting process given in JP 3-60 Joint Targeting
and AFDD 2-1.9 Targeting. (2007; 2006)
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Figure 8. SEAD operational process

A MoOE “Percent of enemy air defenses destroyed” for the process is taken from
CJCSM 3500.04D Universal Joint Task List task OP 3.2.4 “Suppress Enemy Air
Defenses” measure M1. (2006) This MoOE can be written as the diametric pair given in
(25) which obeys the relationship OB + OR = 1 .
⎧Percent of enemy air defenses destroyed, ⎫
O = {OB , OR } = ⎨
⎬
⎩Percent of enemy air defenses protected ⎭

(25)

Typical SEAD systems are associated with the activities and decisions of the
operational process (Figure 8) and are given in (26). The ISR system performs the Find,
Fix, and Track activities, the AOC system performs the Target, Assess, and Reattack?
activities and decision, and the PSP (precision strike package) system performs the
Engage activity. Two enemy IADS systems are targets for the mission. An operational
view of the mission is given in Figure 9.
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S = {SB , SR } = {{ HB, ISR, AOC, PSP} , { IADS1 , IADS2 }}

(26)

FEBA
ISR

90% prob. of detection

IADS1
Home
Base

50% prob. of detection

MEZ
PSP

AOC
IADS2

t0

t1

t2

t3

Figure 9. Operational view of SEAD mission

In order to apply the Interoperability Impact on Operational Effectiveness axiom,
the characterization X of S must include all interoperability characters which describe
every interoperation (collaborative and confrontational) between systems in S related to

O . In other words, all interoperability characters related to the destruction and protection
of the IADS systems must be included in X . This hierarchical set of directional
interoperability characters X is given in Table 15. In order to ensure the set of
interoperability characters X chosen for the SEAD application in this section is
complete and authoritative, they have been methodically identified and extracted from
Joint Publications and Air Force Doctrine Documents related not just to suppression of
enemy air defenses, but to Joint and Air Force operations in general. The top level of the
hierarchy is the set of joint operational functions given in JP 3-0 Joint Operations (2006)
and the second level is a pertinent subset of the operational functions of air and space
power given in AFDD 1 Air Force Basic Doctrine. (2003) Lower levels of the
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interoperability character hierarchy have been extracted from JP 3-0 Joint Operations
(2006), AFDD 2 Operations and Organization (2007), JP 3-01 Countering Air and
Missile Threats (2007), AFDD 2-1 Air Warfare (2000), AFDD 2-1.1 Counterair
Operations (2002), JP 3-13.1 Electronic Warfare (2007), AFDD 2-5.1 Electronic
Warfare (2002), AFDD 2-9 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations
(2007), JP 3-60 Joint Targeting (2007), AFDD 2-1.9 Targeting (2006), and JP 3-13.4
Military Deception. (2006) In order to maintain the ability to assess the value of future
capabilities (e.g., precision ground attack and electronic attack), those interoperability
characters are included in X as well, but their states are zeroed out in the initial system
instantiation Σ . An explanation of the interoperability characters in X is given in Table
16.
Table 15 SEAD hierarchical characterization X
1
2
3
4
5

C2
Comm
Blue
Red
Target

Intel
ISR
Detect
Blue Red

Fires
Counterair (CA)
OCA
DCA
Ground
Cluster Precision
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Info Ops (IO)
EW
Infl. Ops
EA
MILDEC
Barrage Reactive

Fires.CA.DCA

Fires.CA.OCA.Ground.Precision

Fires.CA.OCA.Ground.Cluster

Fires.CA.OCA.Ground

JP 3-01
AFDD 2-1.1

Ibid
JP 3-0
JP 3-0
AFDD 1
AFDD 2-1.1
JP 3-0
AFDD 1
AFDD 2-1.1
JP 3-01
AFDD 2-1.1

Intel.ISR.Detect.Red
Fires
Fires.CA

Fires.CA.OCA

Ibid
JP 3-0
JP 3-0
AFDD 2-9
Ibid

C2.Comm.Red
Intel
Intel.ISR
Intel.ISR.Detect
Intel.ISR.Detect.Blue
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attack ground-based threats to airborne systems prior to their employment/be
attacked, prior to employment, as a ground based threat to airborne systems
attack ground-based threats to airborne systems using cluster bombs/be
attacked as a ground-based threat to airborne systems using cluster bombs
attack ground-based threats to airborne systems using precision guided
munitions/be attacked as a ground-based threat to airborne systems using
precision guided munitions
attack threats to airborne systems after weapon employment/be attacked as a
threat to airborne systems after weapon employment

attack threats to airborne systems prior to their employment/be attacked, prior
to employment, as a threat to airborne systems

Explanation
command & control/be commanded & controlled
communicate(T)/communicate(R)
communicate(T) on blue channels/communicate(R) on blue channels
communicate(T) red targets on blue channels/communicate(R) red targets on
blue channels
communicate(T) on red channels/communicate(R) on red channels
intel(T)/intel(R)
ISR(T)=collect, and ISR(R)=collected against
detect = (collect)/be detected by (= collected against)
detect blue systems (=identify blue)/be detected as a blue system (identified as
blue)
detect red systems (identify red)/be detected as a red system (identified as red)
attack/be attacked
attack threats to airborne systems/be attacked as a threat to airborne systems

Table 16. Explanation of SEAD characterization X
Source
JP 3-0
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid

Interoperability Character
C2
C2.Comm
C2.Comm.Blue
C2.Comm.Blue.Target

Movement&Maneuver
Protection
Sustainment

AFDD 1
JP 3-13.4
AFDD 1
JP 3-0
JP 3-0
JP 3-0

JP 3-0

Fires.IO.EW.EA
Fires.IO.EW.EA.Barrage
Fires.IO.EW.EA.Reactive
Fires.IO.InflOps
Fires.IO.InflOps.MILDEC

Fires.IO.EW

Source
JP 3-0
AFDD 1
JP 3-0

Interoperability Character
Fires.IO
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not used in this scenario
not used in this scenario
not used in this scenario

attack via info operations using electronic warfare/be attacked via info
operations by electronic warfare
jam/be jammed
jam by barrage method/be jammed by barrage method
jam precisely by reactive method/be jammed precisely by reactive method
apply influence operations/receive influence operations
apply military deception/receive military deception

Explanation
attack via info operations/be attacked via information operations

Assign the set of states of X as absence/presence states C = {0,1} then the
instantiation of S is given as Σ in Table 17. Although the joint operational functions

Movement & Maneuver , Protection , and Sustainment are included in the instantiation
for completeness, they have been assigned zero states as their functionality is not critical
to the following analysis.
Table 17. SEAD instantiation Σ

ISR

AOC

PSP

IADS1

IADS2

HB

ISR

AOC

PSP

IADS1

IADS2

C2
C2.Comm
C2.Comm.Blue
C2.Comm.Blue.Target
C2.Comm.Red
Intel
Intel.ISR
Intel.ISR.Detect
Intel.ISR.Detect.Blue
Intel.ISR.Detect.Red
Fires
Fires.CA
Fires.CA.OCA
Fires.CA.OCA.Ground
Fires.CA.OCA.Ground.Cluster
Fires.CA.OCA.Ground.Precision
Fires.CA.DCA
Fires.IO
Fires.IO.EW
Fires.IO.EW.EA
Fires.IO.EW.EA.Barrage
Fires.IO.EW.EA.Reactive
Fires.IO.InflOps
Fires.IO.InflOps.MILDEC
Movement&Maneuver
Protection
Sustainment

Receive

HB

Transmit

1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0

1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0

1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0

1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
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If the interoperability function I = SimBin is chosen, then assuming no selfinteroperability, the resulting directional interoperability measurements are given in (27).

⎡
⎢ HB
⎢
⎢ ISR
⎢
M = ⎢ AOC
⎢ PSP
⎢
⎢ IADS1
⎢ IADS
2
⎣

HB ISR
0

1

1

0

1
1
2
2

9
9
9

27
27

1
1
5
5

9

9
9

27
27

AOC
1
5

9

27

0
1
5
5

9

27
27

PSP IADS1
1
8
4

9

27
27

0
10
10

27
27

2

27

2
2
7

9

27
27

0
1

3

IADS2 ⎤
⎥
2
27
⎥
2
⎥
9
⎥
2
27 ⎥
7
⎥
27
⎥
1
3
⎥
0 ⎥⎦

(27)

For this application, the appropriate analysis of M is the comparison of friendly
(blue)-to-adversary (red) and adversary (red)-to-friendly (blue) interoperability (i.e.,
confrontational interoperability) to the end of applying the Interoperability Impact on
Operational Effectiveness axiom to determine if the friendly (blue) systems will enjoy
operational effectiveness over the adversary (red) systems. Four friendly (blue)adversary (red) system pairs are possible and must be considered, HB ↔ IADS ,

ISR ↔ IADS , AOC ↔ IADS , and PSP ↔ IADS . The Interoperability Impact on
Operational Effectiveness axiom (see Table 18 summary) shows only one friendly (blue)
system ( ISR ) is operationally effective over the adversary (red) IADS systems. Two
others ( AOC , PSP ) do not possess operational advantage over the IADS and a third
( HB ) is at a standoff (i.e., equivalent directional interoperability measurements).
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Table 18. SEAD interoperability analysis
Blue-Red System Pair

Analysis

B>R

HB ↔ IADS

I ( HB, IADS ) = 2 27 = I ( IADS , HB ) → OB ≤ OR

No

ISR ↔ IADS

I ( ISR, IADS ) = 2 9 > I ( IADS , ISR ) = 5 27 → OB > OR

Yes

AOC ↔ IADS

I ( AOC, IADS ) = 2 27 < I ( IADS , AOC ) = 5 27 → OB ≤ OR

No

PSP ↔ IADS

I ( PSP, IADS ) = 7 27 < I ( IADS , PSP ) = 10 27 → OB ≤ OR

No

The directional interoperability measurements in Table 18 indicate that adversary
(red) targets are able to be detected, but not effectively destroyed by friendly (blue)
systems. Additionally, the measurement of the directional confrontational
interoperability from IADS to PSP indicates that the PSP is vulnerable to destruction
by the IADS systems. According to the Interoperability Impact on Operational
Effectiveness axiom, in order to give friendly (blue) systems operational effectiveness
over adversary (red) systems, friendly (blue)-to-adversary (red) directional
interoperability must exceed adversary (red)-to-friendly (blue) interoperability. To this
end, according to the hypothesis in the introduction to this section, friendly (blue)-toadversary (red) interoperability will be increased by adding precision strike and
electronic attack capability to the PSP system. Additionally, adversary (red)-to-friendly
(blue) interoperability will be decreased by adding stealth capability to the PSP system
(manifested in the model as an inability of the IADS to detect the PSP ). Assuming that
adversary (red) systems are also capable of being upgraded, the ability to resist all but
reactive jamming will be given to the IADS systems. The upgraded instantiation ΣU is
given in Table 19. Changes from the original instantiation are highlighted.
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Table 19. Upgraded SEAD instantiation ΣU

ISR

AOC

PSP

IADS1

IADS2

HB

ISR

AOC

PSP

IADS1

IADS2

C2
C2.Comm
C2.Comm.Blue
C2.Comm.Blue.Target
C2.Comm.Red
Intel
Intel.ISR
Intel.ISR.Detect
Intel.ISR.Detect.Blue
Intel.ISR.Detect.Red
Fires
Fires.CA
Fires.CA.OCA
Fires.CA.OCA.Ground
Fires.CA.OCA.Ground.Cluster
Fires.CA.OCA.Ground.Precision
Fires.CA.DCA
Fires.IO
Fires.IO.EW
Fires.IO.EW.EA
Fires.IO.EW.EA.Barrage
Fires.IO.EW.EA.Reactive
Fires.IO.InflOps
Fires.IO.InflOps.MILDEC
Movement&Maneuver
Protection
Sustainment

Receive

HB

Transmit

1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0

1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0

1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0

1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0

Again using I = SimBin as the interoperability function, a set of interoperability
measurements MU for the upgraded systems is obtained and given in (28). As above,
changes from the original interoperability matrix are highlighted.
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⎡
⎢ HB
⎢
⎢ ISR
⎢
M U = ⎢ AOC
⎢
⎢ PSP
⎢
⎢ IADS1
⎢
⎢⎣ IADS2

HB ISR
1
0
9
1
1
1
2
2

9
9
9

27
27

0
1
1
5
5

9
9

27
27

AOC
1
5

9

27

0
1
5
5

9

27
27

PSP IADS1
1
7
4

9

27
27

2

27

2
2

9

27

0

4

1

0

1

3
3

1

9

3

IADS 2 ⎤
⎥
2
27
⎥
⎥
2
9
⎥
2
27 ⎥
⎥
4
⎥
9
⎥
1
⎥
3
⎥
0 ⎥⎦

(28)

After upgrading the PSP system with precision strike, electronic attack, and
stealth and countering with an adversary (red) force upgrade of the IADS systems with
resistance to all but reactive jamming, then I ( PSP, IADS ) = 4 9 > I ( IADS , PSP ) = 13

→ OB > OR . Hence the friendly (blue) force now has a slight edge over the adversary
(red) force, implying that the percentage of adversary (red) targets destroyed will be
greater than the percentage of adversary (red) targets protected. Thus, the original
hypothesis of this application is confirmed. Finally, it is interesting to note that one
element of friendly (blue)-to-friendly (blue) interoperability (i.e., collaborative
interoperability) decreased as a result of the system upgrades. Specifically, I ( ISR, PSP )
decreased from

8

27

to

7

27

. The interpretation of this is that due to the addition of stealth

capability the PSP system is also less detectable by the friendly (blue) force ISR
system.
4.4

Application: Precision Strike

Time variance of the interoperability of a set of systems is caused by progression
through the activities and decisions of the operational process, by time variant characters,
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or by random effects. Interoperability decreases due to time variance are not always bad.
For example, a process may call for a certain system to be periodically turned off, which
causes its interoperability with other systems to drop to zero. On the other hand, some
interoperability decreases are undesirable, such as those due to time varying
electromagnetic interference. It is useful to analyze interoperability with respect to time
in order to highlight process bottlenecks, discover previously unknown environmental
impacts, or to determine minimum required interoperability to meet operational goals to
the end of optimizing monetary investment.
The following application illustrates the time variance of interoperability
measurements by repeated application of the method of Chapter 3 at various stages of the
Precision Strike mission and demonstrates that perfect interoperability of all systems at
all stages of a mission is not desired or necessary, but that appropriate levels of
interoperability should be achieved at the appropriate times.
Hypothesis: The interoperability of Precision Strike systems varies during

different mission time periods. Furthermore, if the constrained upper bound on the
interoperability of each system pair is achieved in each time period, then the sufficient
condition for operational effectiveness given by the Interoperability Impact on
Operational Effectiveness axiom can be relaxed, yet still be appropriately applied to
predict operational effectiveness. In other words, during a specific time period some
friendly (blue)-to-adversary (red) and adversary (red)-to-friendly (blue) operational
advantage can be ignored if it is not pertinent to that time period.
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In this application (Figure 10), a penetrating strike package (PSP) attacks its
target kinetically after being escorted part way to the target by a modified escort jammer
(MEJ). A static baseline interoperability measurement is first made, then interoperability
is measured at four different time periods, (t0) prior to the PSP and MEJ crossing the
forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), (t1) when the PSP and MEJ are between the
FEBA and the missile engagement zone (MEZ), (t2) while the PSP is over the target
(within the MEZ), and (t3) after the PSP attacks the target and is egressing the MEZ.
FEBA
ISR

target
MEJ
MEZ

home base
PSP

90% prob. of detection

IADS

t0

t1

t2

50% prob. of detection

t3

Figure 10. Operational view of time-phased precision strike mission

The precision strike operational process (Figure 11) is derived from the following
use case. “A PSP launches from home base and proceeds towards its target accompanied
from base, across the FEBA and up to the MEZ by a MEJ, which jams enemy radar and
communications signals detected by a stand-off intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) platform orbiting on the friendly side of the FEBA. The PSP
crosses into the MEZ, leaving the MEJ outside the MEZ to orbit and jam, proceeds to the
target, destroys it kinetically, and quickly egresses, recovering on a safe route.”
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Figure 11 Precision strike operational process

Finally, define the diametric MoOE for the precision strike operational process is

O = {OB , OR } where OB is “target destroyed” and OR is “target protected.”
4.4.1

Static Unconstrained Interoperability Model

For comparison purposes, a static interoperability model is provided first which is
later perturbed to demonstrate time-variant interoperability. Given a set of systems
S = { PSP , MEJ , IADS , ISR , HB , TGT } let each system s j be characterized by a set of

interoperability characters X = { X T , X R } (29) where X T and X R are directional
(transmit/receive) interoperability characters. Let the set of interoperability character
states be given as absence/presence states C = {0,1} .
.EM (T ), Detect.EM .Radar (T ), Attack .EM .Jam(T ), , ⎫
{Comm
} ⎪⎬
Attack .KM .Ground (T ), Attack .KM . Air (T )
.EM ( R), Detect.EM .Radar ( R ), Attack .EM .Jam( R),
{Comm
} ⎪⎭
Attack .KM .Ground ( R), Attack .KM . Air ( R)

⎧
⎪
X =⎨
⎪
⎩

Assuming no time, space, or other constraints (e.g., IADS radar has unlimited
reach, MEJ jams continuously regardless of position, etc.) then S is instantiated as Σ
(30).
95

(29)

⎡1
⎢1
⎢
⎢0
Σ = [ ΣT | Σ R ] = ⎢
⎢1
⎢1
⎢
⎣0

1
1
1
0
0
0

0
1
0
0
0
0

1
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
1
0
0
0

1
1
0
1
1
0

1
1
1
1
0
0

0
0
1
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
1

1⎤
0 ⎥⎥
0⎥
⎥
0⎥
0⎥
⎥
0⎦

(30)

Using I = SimBin as the interoperability function, and assuming no selfinteroperation, the interoperability measurement M is given by (31).

⎡
⎢ PSP
⎢
⎢ MEJ
⎢
M = ⎢ IADS
⎢ ISR
⎢
⎢ HB
⎢ TGT
⎣

PSP MEJ
2
0
5
2
0
5
2
5

1
5

1
5

1
5

1
5

1
5

0

0

IADS
1
5
2
5

0
0
0
0

ISR HB TGT ⎤
2
1
1 ⎥
5
5
5 ⎥
2
1
0 ⎥
5
5
⎥
1
0
0 ⎥
5
1
0
0 ⎥
5
⎥
1
0
0 ⎥
5
0
0
0 ⎥⎦

(31)

The interoperability measurement M shows the direct, contextual interoperability
(both collaborative and confrontational) of all system pairs in S . The average
interoperability of S is M = 0.1 3 . Applying the Interoperability Impact on Operational
Effectiveness axiom, the results in Table 20 show that while some operational advantage
is enjoyed (e.g., PSP should be effective in attacking the TGT and the MEJ should be
effective in jamming the IADS ), the sufficient condition for operational effectiveness is
not met. However, the model raises some questions. For example, does the PSP always
need to have operational advantage over the IADS ? Likewise, does the MEJ need to
have operational advantage over the TGT ? Similar questions can be asked for the

( ISR, IADS )

and ( ISR, TGT ) pairs. And most likely HB requires no direct operational
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advantage over any enemy system. Hence a time-variant interoperability measurement is
indicated. For each time period, systems are instantiated according to operational and
other constraints associated with that time period. Additionally, the interoperability
measurement taken in each time period is the constrained upper bound for that period
because each system is instantiated by character states which represent the best the
system can and is expected to do in that time period.
Table 20. Precision strike static model interoperability analysis
Blue-Red
System Pair

Analysis

OB > OR

PSP ↔ IADS

I ( PSP, IADS ) = 15 < I ( IADS , PSP ) = 2 5 → OB ≤ OR

No

PSP ↔ TGT

I ( PSP, TGT ) = 15 > I (TGT , PSP ) = 0 → OB > OR

Yes

MEJ ↔ IADS

I ( MEJ , IADS ) = 2 5 > I ( IADS , MEJ ) = 15 → OB > OR

Yes

MEJ ↔ TGT

I ( MEJ , TGT ) = 0 = I (TGT , MEJ ) → OB ≤ OR

No

ISR ↔ IADS

I ( ISR, IADS ) = 0 < I ( IADS , ISR ) = 15 → OB ≤ OR

No

ISR ↔ TGT

I ( ISR, TGT ) = 0 = I (TGT , ISR ) → OB ≤ OR

No

HB ↔ IADS

I ( HB, IADS ) = 0 = I ( IADS , HB ) → OB ≤ OR

No

HB ↔ TGT

I ( HB, TGT ) = 0 = I (TGT , HB ) → OB ≤ OR

No

4.4.2

Time Variant Interoperability Model

Let S , X , C remain unchanged from the static model and modify the system
instantiation Σ for the four time periods described in Figure 10. For each time period,
the modifications to Σ are changes to the states of the interoperability characters which
describe exactly what the systems are expected to do in that time period.
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4.4.2.1 Prior to Crossing the FEBA ( t0 )

At time t0 , all friendly (blue) systems are safe on their own side of the FEBA.
Let Σt0 be given (32) with the assumptions of Table 21. In this time period it is
appropriate to assume that only the ISR system should have operational advantage over
the adversary (red) systems.

⎡1 0 a
⎢
e
⎢1 0
⎢0 1
Σt0 = ⎢
⎢1 0
⎢1 0
⎢
⎣⎢0 0

0
0f

0b
0

0
0

1 0c
1 0g

0
0

0
0

0

0

0i

0 0j

0

0

0
0

0
0

0
0

1
1

1
0

0
0

0
0

0

0

0

0

0

0 0k

0d ⎤
⎥
0h ⎥
0⎥
⎥
0⎥
0⎥
⎥
0 ⎦⎥

(32)

Table 21. Precision strike t0 assumptions
a) PSP not detectable by radar until t1 at the soonest
b) PSP can’t kinematically attack until t2
c) see a)
d) PSP not susceptible to missile attack until t2
e) MEJ not detectable by radar until t1 at the soonest
f) MEJ doesn’t jam until t1
g) see e)
h) MEJ not susceptible to missile attack until t2
i) IADS has nothing to attack until t1
j) IADS can’t detect anything until t1 at the soonest
k) TGT can’t be kinematically attacked until t2
Using I = SimBin as the interoperability function, an interoperability measurement
at t0 is obtained (33). Average interoperability of S at t0 is M t0 = 0.072 and an
interoperability analysis follows in Table 22. The analysis shows that no friendly (blue)
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systems enjoy operational advantage over adversary (red) systems in the first phase of the
mission. This is only worrisome in one point, the ISR system is less interoperable with
the IADS than vice versa. In other words, the ISR system may not be able to accurately
detect the threat for the PSP . All other system pairs are achieving desired levels of
interoperability (i.e., their interoperations are not required until later time periods).

⎡
⎢ PSP
⎢
⎢ MEJ
⎢
M t0 = ⎢ IADS
⎢ ISR
⎢
⎢ HB
⎢ TGT
⎣

PSP MEJ
1
0
5
1
0
5
0
0

IADS
0
0

1
5

1
5

1
5

1
5

0
0
0

0

0

0

ISR HB TGT ⎤
1
1
0 ⎥⎥
5
5
1
1
0 ⎥
5
5
⎥
1
0
0 ⎥
5
1
0
0 ⎥
5
⎥
1
0
0 ⎥
5
0
0
0 ⎥⎦

(33)

Table 22. Precision strike interoperability analysis ( t0 )
Blue-Red
System Pair

Analysis

OB > OR

PSP ↔ IADS

I ( PSP, IADS ) = 0 = I ( IADS , PSP ) → OB ≤ OR

No

PSP ↔ TGT

I ( PSP, TGT ) = 0 = I (TGT , PSP ) → OB ≤ OR

No

MEJ ↔ IADS

I ( MEJ , IADS ) = 0 = I ( IADS , MEJ ) → OB ≤ OR

No

MEJ ↔ TGT

I ( MEJ , TGT ) = 0 = I (TGT , MEJ ) → OB ≤ OR

No

ISR ↔ IADS

I ( ISR, IADS ) = 0 < I ( IADS , ISR ) = 15 → OB ≤ OR

No

ISR ↔ TGT

I ( ISR, TGT ) = 0 = I (TGT , ISR ) → OB ≤ OR

No

HB ↔ IADS

I ( HB, IADS ) = 0 = I ( IADS , HB ) → OB ≤ OR

No

HB ↔ TGT

I ( HB, TGT ) = 0 = I (TGT , HB ) → OB ≤ OR

No

4.4.2.2 Prior to Entering the MEZ ( t1 )

At time t1 , the PSP and MEJ have crossed the FEBA and have entered enemy
territory. Let Σt1 be given (34) constrained by the assumptions of Table 23. In this time
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period, it is appropriate to assume that the ISR and MEJ systems should have
operational advantage over the adversary (red) systems. Any adversary (red) system
operational advantage over the PSP system can be ignored as the PSP system is neither
in range to attack the TGT , nor within the range of IADS defensive counter-air attack.

⎡1 1a 0
⎢
e
f
⎢1 1 1
⎢0 1 0
Σt1 = ⎢
⎢1 0 0
⎢1 0 0
⎢
⎢⎣0 0 0

0b

0 1 1c

0

0

0
0

0 1 1g 0
0 0 1i 1 j

0

0

0 1

1

0

0

0 1

0

0

0
0

0

0 0

0

0

0k

0

0d ⎤
⎥
0h ⎥
0⎥
⎥
0⎥
0⎥
⎥
0 ⎥⎦

(34)

Table 23. Precision strike t1 assumptions
a) PSP has small, but finite chance of reflecting IADS radar signal
b) PSP can’t kinematically attack until t2
c) PSP has small, but finite chance of being hit by IADS radar signal
d) PSP still outside MEZ
e) MEJ has small, but finite chance of reflecting IADS radar signal
f) MEJ turns on jamming in t1
g) MEJ has small, but finite chance of being hit by IADS radar signal
h) MEJ not susceptible to missile attack until t2
i) IADS has small, but finite chance of detecting a target
j) IADS can be jammed
k) TGT can’t be kinematically attacked until t2
Using I = SimBin as the interoperability function, an interoperability measurement
at t1 is obtained (35). Average interoperability of S increased during t1 to M t1 = 0.12
largely due to more system interoperations occurring during this time period than in the
previous period. An interoperability analysis follows in Table 24. The ISR system’s
lack of operational advantage over the IADS system remains unchanged, however, in t1 ,
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the MEJ is beginning to disrupt the IADS system’s ability to counter the inbound PSP
(highlighted in the table).

⎡
⎢ PSP
⎢
⎢ MEJ
⎢
M t1 = ⎢ IADS
⎢ ISR
⎢
⎢ HB
⎢ TGT
⎣

PSP MEJ
2
0
5
2
0
5
1
5

1
5

1
5

1
5

1
5

1
5

0

0

IADS
1
5
2
5

0
0
0
0

ISR HB TGT ⎤
2
1
0 ⎥⎥
5
5
2
1
0 ⎥
5
5
⎥
1
0
0 ⎥
5
1
0
0 ⎥
5
⎥
1
0
0 ⎥
5
0
0
0 ⎥⎦

(35)

Table 24. Precision strike interoperability analysis ( t1 )
Blue-Red
System Pair

Analysis

OB > OR

PSP ↔ IADS

I ( PSP, IADS ) = 15 = I ( IADS , PSP ) → OB ≤ OR

No

PSP ↔ TGT

I ( PSP, TGT ) = 0 = I (TGT , PSP ) → OB ≤ OR

No

MEJ ↔ IADS

I ( MEJ , IADS ) = 2 5 > I ( IADS , MEJ ) = 15 → OB > OR

Yes

MEJ ↔ TGT

I ( MEJ , TGT ) = 0 = I (TGT , MEJ ) → OB ≤ OR

No

ISR ↔ IADS

I ( ISR, IADS ) = 0 < I ( IADS , ISR ) = 15 → OB ≤ OR

No

ISR ↔ TGT

I ( ISR, TGT ) = 0 = I (TGT , ISR ) → OB ≤ OR

No

HB ↔ IADS

I ( HB, IADS ) = 0 = I ( IADS , HB ) → OB ≤ OR

No

HB ↔ TGT

I ( HB, TGT ) = 0 = I (TGT , HB ) → OB ≤ OR

No

4.4.2.3 Within the MEZ ( t2 )

At time t2 , the PSP is within the MEZ. Let Σ t2 be given (36) using the
assumptions in Table 25. During this key time period, it is highly desired that all friendly
(blue) systems (except HB ) have operational advantage over the adversary (red) systems
as the PSP is within the MEZ (i.e., vulnerable to defensive counter-air attack).
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Additionally, success of the mission is contingent upon the friendly (blue) force
maintaining operational advantage over the adversary (red) force in this time period.
⎡1
⎢
⎢1
⎢0
Σ t2 = ⎢
⎢1
⎢1
⎢
⎢⎣0

1 0 1a
1 1 0

0
0

1 1 0
1 1 0

1 0

0 1c

0 1 1

0 0
0 0

0
0

0
0

1 1 0
1 0 0

0 0

0

0

0 0 0

0 1b ⎤
⎥
0 0⎥
0 0⎥
⎥
0 0⎥
0 0⎥
⎥
1d 0 ⎥⎦

(36)

Table 25. Precision strike t2 assumptions
a) PSP can attack TGT
b) PSP vulnerable to kinematic airborne attack
c) IADS can attack airborne targets
d) TGT vulnerable to kinematic ground attack
Using I = SimBin as the interoperability function, the interoperability
measurement at t2 (37) shows that the average interoperability of S increased slightly to

M t2 = 0.13 during this critical phase of the mission indicating an increase in the number
of interoperations (i.e., increased operational intensity). However, the continued lack of
operational advantage of the PSP over the IADS in this time period is especially
concerning in as the PSP is within the MEZ and subject to attack. Hence, the ISR
system’s continued inability to detect threats endangers the PSP (i.e., a pop-up surfaceto-air missile system may emerge, yet remain undetected by the ISR system). Assuming
the PSP survives the IADS , however, the PSP will likely be successful in destroying
the TGT as it possesses operational advantage over the TGT in this time period.
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⎡
⎢ PSP
⎢
⎢ MEJ
⎢
M t2 = ⎢ IADS
⎢ ISR
⎢
⎢ HB
⎢ TGT
⎣

PSP MEJ
2
0
5
2
0
5
2
5

1
5

1
5

1
5

1
5

1
5

0

0

IADS
1
5
2
5

0
0
0
0

ISR HB TGT ⎤
2
1
1 ⎥
5
5
5 ⎥
2
1
0 ⎥
5
5
⎥
1
0
0 ⎥
5
1
0
0 ⎥
5
⎥
1
0
0 ⎥
5
0
0
0 ⎥⎦

(37)

Table 26. Precision strike interoperability analysis ( t2 )
Blue-Red
System Pair

Analysis

OB > OR

PSP ↔ IADS

I ( PSP, IADS ) = 15 < I ( IADS , PSP ) = 2 5 → OB ≤ OR

No

PSP ↔ TGT

I ( PSP, TGT ) = 15 > I (TGT , PSP ) = 0 → OB > OR

Yes

MEJ ↔ IADS

I ( MEJ , IADS ) = 2 5 > I ( IADS , MEJ ) = 15 → OB > OR

Yes

MEJ ↔ TGT

I ( MEJ , TGT ) = 0 = I (TGT , MEJ ) → OB ≤ OR

No

ISR ↔ IADS

I ( ISR, IADS ) = 0 < I ( IADS , ISR ) = 15 → OB ≤ OR

No

ISR ↔ TGT

I ( ISR, TGT ) = 0 = I (TGT , ISR ) → OB ≤ OR

No

HB ↔ IADS

I ( HB, IADS ) = 0 = I ( IADS , HB ) → OB ≤ OR

No

HB ↔ TGT

I ( HB, TGT ) = 0 = I (TGT , HB ) → OB ≤ OR

No

4.4.2.4 Returning to Base ( t3 )

During the final time period, t3 , the target has been attacked and the PSP and

MEJ are returning to base and are out-of-range of the IADS system. The ISR system is
still on-orbit ready for the next mission and the IADS system was not attacked, so it is
still functioning. Let Σt3 be given by (38) assuming the MEJ stops jamming in t3 (a). In
this final time period, it is appropriate to assume that only the ISR system should
maintain operational advantage over the adversary (red) systems (the IADS system in
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particular) as it is the only aircraft remaining on-station (onstensibly to support the next
mission).
⎡1
⎢1
⎢
⎢0
Σt3 = ⎢
⎢1
⎢1
⎢
⎣0

1 0
1 0a
1 0
0 0
0 0
0 0

0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
0
1
1
0

1
1
1
1
0
0

0
0
1
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0

0⎤
0 ⎥⎥
0⎥
⎥
0⎥
0⎥
⎥
0⎦

(38)

Using I = SimBin as the interoperability function, an interoperability measurement
at t3 is obtained (39) with an average interoperability of S of M t3 = 0.116 . By design,
during this final phase of the mission, no friendly (blue) system has operational
advantage over the adversary (red) systems. Table 27 shows, however, that the PSP and

IADS systems appear to be at a standoff, i.e. I ( PSP, IADS ) = 15 = I ( IADS , PSP ) . A
review of which interoperability character state caused the measure to be non-zero
reveals that the PSP system can still be detected by the IADS system. However, the

PSP is outside the MEZ, so, while it can still be detected, it is safe from an IADS attack.
In other words, the PSP makes no effort to hide itself from detection since it can’t be
attacked anyway. Similar logic applies to the MEJ .

⎡
⎢ PSP
⎢
⎢ MEJ
⎢
M t3 = ⎢ IADS
⎢ ISR
⎢
⎢ HB
⎢ TGT
⎣

PSP MEJ
2
0
5
2
0
5
1
5

1
5

1
5

1
5

1
5

1
5

0

0

IADS
1
5
1
5

0
0
0
0
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ISR HB TGT ⎤
2
1
0 ⎥⎥
5
5
2
1
0 ⎥
5
5
⎥
1
0
0 ⎥
5
1
0
0 ⎥
5
⎥
1
0
0 ⎥
5
0
0
0 ⎥⎦

(39)

Table 27. Precision strike interoperability analysis ( t3 )
Blue-Red
System Pair

Analysis

OB > OR

PSP ↔ IADS

I ( PSP, IADS ) = 15 = I ( IADS , PSP ) → OB ≤ OR

No

PSP ↔ TGT

I ( PSP, TGT ) = 0 = I (TGT , PSP ) → OB ≤ OR

No

MEJ ↔ IADS

I ( MEJ , IADS ) = 15 = I ( IADS , MEJ ) → OB ≤ OR

No

MEJ ↔ TGT

I ( MEJ , TGT ) = 0 = I (TGT , MEJ ) → OB ≤ OR

No

ISR ↔ IADS

I ( ISR, IADS ) = 0 < I ( IADS , ISR ) = 15 → OB ≤ OR

No

ISR ↔ TGT

I ( ISR, TGT ) = 0 = I (TGT , ISR ) → OB ≤ OR

No

HB ↔ IADS

I ( HB, IADS ) = 0 = I ( IADS , HB ) → OB ≤ OR

No

HB ↔ TGT

I ( HB, TGT ) = 0 = I (TGT , HB ) → OB ≤ OR

No

4.4.2.5 Precision Strike Conclusions

An important conclusion can be made as a result of the analysis in previous
sections—although the sufficiency condition given by the Interoperability Impact on
Operational Effectiveness axiom was relaxed in each mission time period by neglecting
some interoperations and demanding others critical to that time period, the operational
effectiveness concerns listed in Table 28 were apparent in each mission time period.
Specifically, the lack of ISR operational advantage over the IADS throughout all time
periods combined with the IADS operational advantage over the PSP during t2 when
the TGT is to be attacked indicates that the mission could likely not be successful.
Finally, a minor conclusion that can be drawn that because the HB system’s only role is
to launch the PSP and MEJ aircraft, once it successfully does so, it can be neglected
throughout the remainder of the analysis.
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Table 28 Precision strike operational effectiveness concerns
Time
Period

t0
t1
t2
t3

Operational Effectiveness Concern

ISR can’t clearly detect IADS
ISR can’t clearly detect IADS
IADS can detect the inbound PSP
IADS has operational effectiveness over the PSP which is in-range of the IADS
ISR can’t clearly detect IADS
None

The operational effectiveness concerns listed in Table 28 can possibly be
alleviated by improving the ISR detection capability (i.e., increasing its confrontational
interoperability) or by decreasing the PSP ’s detectability by either adding stealth or
improving the MEJ ’s jamming ability. Figure 12 shows the change in the directional
interoperability of each friendly (blue) system with each adversary (red) system over time
and Figure 13 shows the change in average confrontational interoperability (i.e., friendly
(blue)-to-adversary (red) vs. adversary (red)-to-friendly (blue) interoperability) with time.
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Figure 12 Precision strike blue systems directional interoperability with red systems
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Figure 13 Precision strike average interoperability versus time
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4.5

Summary

In this chapter, three applications were given—Coalition Interoperability,
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD), and Precision Strike. In the Coalition
Interoperability application, it was hypothesized and shown that maturity model
(leveling) interoperability measurement methods are a special case of the more general
method given in Chapter 3. Specifically, it was shown that attributes of models such as
LISI and OIM can be used as interoperability characters and LISI and OIM levels can be
equated to character states. The SEAD application further demonstrated the
interoperability measurement method of Chapter 3 and illustrated that the Interoperability
Impact on Operational Effectiveness axiom can be used to relate interoperability to the
operational effectiveness of a confrontational operational process. The resultant
interoperability measurement can be used to identify areas for system upgrade or for
doctrine, tactics, techniques, or procedures change. Finally, the Precision Strike
application further exemplified the sufficient conditions given by the Interoperability
Impact on Operational Effectiveness and Operational Advantage axioms and showed how
they can be relaxed within the bounds of operational and time constraints.
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5. Conclusion

Everything we do…we do with an eye toward jointness and interoperability.
—K. Krieg, recent USD(AT&L)
5.1

Conclusions of Research

Measuring interoperability has long been considered unquantifiable because of its
complex nature. (Kasunic & Anderson, 2004) While interoperability has been defined
and described, it is multifaceted and permeates many disciplines in many ways. In fact, it
is reasonable to assume that interoperations occur in all human endeavors. Previous
approaches to measuring or describing interoperability relied upon problem
decomposition and several researchers designed limited methods (Chapter 2) of
measuring specific types of interoperations of certain types of entities. The result was an
eclectic set of somewhat related models useful within limited spheres. While the problem
decomposition method was helpful in the short term for certain applications, it prevented
the creation of a general interoperability measurement method because it fractured
“interoperability thinking” into compartments. The answer to the problem could not be
found by creating “a set of compatible models that collectively address all the dimensions
of interoperability” (Morris, et. al, 2004:12) because the set would never be complete, but
by looking at interoperability holistically, generally, and fundamentally and then
describing a flexible method. Such a method was proposed in Chapter 3—a method
which accommodates all types of systems and interoperations, produces a quantitative
interoperability measurement as realistic and precise as desired, and is limited only by the
desires and attentiveness of those who will use it.
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5.2

Recommendations for Application

Chapter 1, Table 4 lists approximately fifty applications of the interoperability
measurement method presented in Chapter 3. The list is small subset of a complete list,
containing military applications extracted from only six DoD publications. While some
of the applications in Table 4 pertain to technical system interoperability, many concern
non-technical interoperability or cross-domain (i.e., mixed system) interoperability.
These three areas are ripe for application of the method given in Chapter 3. Additionally,
problems which have not traditionally been viewed as interoperability related can also be
analyzed in a new way with the method of this dissertation. Discussion follows.
5.2.1

Technical Interoperability

With some exceptions, historically interoperability has largely been associated
with technical systems. It is expected that this focus will remain into the foreseeable
future because of the importance of technical interoperability (both collaborative and
confrontational) to military concepts such as Network Centric Warfare, Enterprise
Integration, and Warfighting Transformation. The need to analyze technical
interoperability will not diminish although there will be an increased emphasis on
viewing technical interoperability within the context of operational art. (Alberts, et. al.,
2000) This interest in interoperability constrained by operations endears itself to the
method of Chapter 3. Previous interoperability assessments, such as the LISI profiles
formerly required by CJCSI 6212.01C (2003) can now be repeated in the context of the
operational process in which the systems were designed to function and the measurement
can be made with more fidelity. Additionally, technical interoperability measurements
for new systems can be made which don’t rely solely upon technical standards, but upon
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interoperability characters associated with the operational processes of newer concepts
such as Systems-of-Systems Integration.
5.2.2

Non-technical Interoperability

One of the most important types of non-technical interoperability is coalition
interoperability. The United States often fights as a coalition and because not all of our
allies possess the same advanced equipment that the United States military does,
interoperability of doctrine, procedures, and culture rise in importance relative to
technical interoperability. These non-technical types of interoperability facilitate
integration and synchronization of coalition forces. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations
states that “coalition partners using very different national doctrines will obviously have
problems harmonizing their efforts, even if they enjoy a high degree of technical
interoperability.” (2007:III-8) The method in Chapter 3 can be used to predict the impact
of language and cultural differences among coalition forces, to innovate compatible
tactics, techniques, and procedures, to measure the usefulness of liaison officers, or to
troubleshoot coalition operations problems. A sample of this type of analysis was given
in Section 4.2.
5.2.3

Cross-domain Interoperability

Power lies in the ability of the interoperability method in Chapter 3 to measure
cross domain interoperability, such as investigating how well non-technical systems
interoperate with technical ones. For example, when engineers design a human-computer
interface (HCI), they are trying to optimize the interoperability of the human and the
machine. Asking the question, “how efficiently are the flight controls laid out?” is
equivalent to saying “how interoperable is the pilot with the airplane?” The popular
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human factors engineering terms, “designing for human use” and “optimizing working
conditions” (Sanders & McCormick, 1987:5) are statements of a desire for non-technicalto-technical interoperability. Because the method of Chapter 3 admits a set of systems of
any type, this type of mixed-system interoperability measurement is now possible.
5.2.4

Non-traditional Interoperability

Applying the method of Chapter 3, a host of problems not previously viewed as
interoperability related can now be looked at as such. This means that many old
problems can be solved in a new way, possibly lending insight or providing a means of
reporting progress not previously available. For example, when studying the relations
between two countries, often the disciplines of history, political science, diplomacy,
business, and economics provide the tools for the analysis. If interoperability is a
relationship between two systems, then two countries can be modeled as systems, and
instantiated with characters representing all the ways in which the two countries interact.
The degree of these interactions can also be captured. Thus, a measure of the
interoperability of the two countries is a measure of the quality of their relationship. If
separate interoperability measurements are taken with respect to cultural interoperations,
business interoperations, technical interoperations, and others, then a portfolio is created
which describes the full spectrum of relations between the two countries. The resulting
set of measurements can be used to drive policy, motivate trade, encourage cultural
interchange, or encourage cooperation in technical development. The method of Chapter
3 can be used to perform “what if” analyses to predict the efficiency, cost, or other
ramifications of diplomatic, economic, or military policy changes.

112

5.3

Recommendation for Future Research

As a general method for interoperability measurement, this research might be the
impetus for other research projects. Two topics immediately present themselves. First,
while this research focused on direct interoperability measurement, many important
interoperations occur through a translator system (i.e., indirect interoperability).
Although a preliminary method of measuring the indirect interoperability of systems was
given by Ford, et. al., (2007a, 2008b) this method is not complete and can be further
extended. Second, while this research related confrontational interoperability (i.e.,
friendly (blue)-to-adversary (red) system interoperability) with operational effectiveness,
no analogue was given which associates the change in friendly (blue)-to-friendly (blue)
system interoperability with changes in operational effectiveness. Each of these future
research areas is discussed in detail in subsequent sections.
5.3.1

Indirect Interoperability Measurement

The method in Chapter 3 measures the direct interoperation of systems, however
an enhancement to the method could possibly be made which supports measuring the
indirect interoperability of systems. Indirect interoperation infers that a pair of systems
cannot interoperate without the assistance of another system. For example, m1,2 is the
measure of the direct interoperability of s1 and s2 . Indirect interoperation, on the other
hand, implies an intermediary system. In other words, given S = {s1 , s2 , s3} , if m1,3 = 0
but m1,2 > 0 and m2,3 > 0 then it may be possible for s1 and s3 to interoperate indirectly
(i.e., influence each other) via s2 which is called a translator system.
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Alberts & Hayes stated this concept in a different fashion, noting three types of
interoperation—common language, direct translation, and translation via reference
language. (2003) The first type, common language interoperation, equates to the term
direct interoperation in this research. Unfortunately, Alberts & Hayes used the
oxymoronic term, direct translation, to refer to an interoperation that is not direct, but indirect with an intermediary providing translation. Finally, their third type, translation via
reference language, is just a special case of the first. Alberts & Hayes used a language
example in their text to illustrate the three types noting that common language means that
two people can converse in the same language. Direct translation was exemplified as a
group of English speakers communicating with a group of French speakers via a
translator versed in both languages. Finally, translation via reference language was
illustrated as two groups speaking different languages who communicate with each other
by speaking a third (reference) language.
Being able to measure the indirect interoperation of systems is important because
something done by one system may or may not impact its adjacent neighbors, but may
have a drastic effect on a “distant” system. For example, an e-mail from one person to
another might result in no action, but the same e-mail forwarded from the second person
to a third could cause an uproar. In other words, the first person in-directly interoperated
with the third, causing an effect. Similarly, a ground system interoperating with the
Global Information Grid (GIG) has the potential to indirectly interoperate with the
myriad of space- and airborne systems also networked to the GIG. This is especially true
if the ground-based system is a service provider (i.e., a weather, geospatial, or
intelligence providing system). Thus, indirect interoperability is measured to analyze
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distant effects as opposed to adjacent effects. For example, indirect interoperability
measurements might help determine the impact of US domestic policy on foreign
countries or it could be used to measure the impact that a mix of legacy systems and
technologically advanced systems have on each other as documents are constantly
translated between them. The ability to measure indirect interoperability facilitates
effects-based action where one system impacts distant systems.
Ford, et al., addressed indirect interoperability in their i-Score papers. (2007a;
2008b) They described a single measure of the interoperability of a set of systems
implementing one sequential pass through an operational process. Each system was
viewed as a translator and was assigned an interoperability “spin” which indicated how it
interacted with the succeeding system in the process (i.e., no translation needed, human
translation needed, or machine translation needed). The overall interoperability score
was impacted each time a translation (interoperation) took place. It was noted that each
time an interoperation occurs, there is a potential loss (change) in physical, syntactic, or
semantic structure of the original input to the process. This loss only gets magnified each
time the original input is translated. Hence, translations occurring early in the process
have more potential possibility for change than those occurring late in the process. To
account for this, each translation was given a case-specific penalty usually resulting from
a performance overlay. In essence, the i-Score measurement was a measure of the
interoperability of the first system in the sequence with the last. More work remains to
be done in order to define a general method of measuring indirect interoperability.
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5.3.2

Collaborative Interoperability Impact on Operational Effectiveness

Section 3.6 provided an axiom which relates the impact of interoperability on
operational effectiveness. However, the axiom only applies to confrontational (friendly
(blue)-to-adversary (red) system) interoperability. In other words, it relates an
improvement in friendly (blue)-to-adversary (red) directional interoperability I (σ B , σ R )
to an improvement in friendly (blue) operational effectiveness OB . But the question
remains as to the impact of collaborative (i.e., friendly (blue)-to-friendly (blue))
interoperability improvements on operational effectiveness. To date, there is no analogue
to the Interoperability Impact on Operational Effectiveness axiom which relates a change
in collaborative interoperability to a change in friendly (blue) operational effectiveness.
It is reasonable to assume that if collaborative system interoperability I (σ B , σ B )
improves, that OB will usually also increase. A recognized researcher in the area of
network centric warfare, John Garstka, speaking specifically on interoperations in which
information is passed, wrote that there is “a strong correlation between information
sharing…and significantly increased combat power.” (2000:1) He further states that
while this is intuitive to the warfighter, quantifying the relationship is “an analytical
challenge of the first order.” (Ibid:3) Hence, he resorts to providing empirically observed
evidence of the relationship between a particular network centric improvement and
increased combat power as gleaned from experiments, exercises, demonstrations, and
real-life conflicts to justify his assertion. (Ibid) Interestingly, Keenan wrote a decade
earlier that the contribution of interoperability initiatives on battlefield effectiveness can
be assessed quantitatively. (1988) He gave six measures of effectiveness (functional area
116

performance, personnel requirements, systems cost, supporting-to-supported ratio,
reconstitution capability, and satisfaction of CINC’s priorities), which, when properly
measured and weighted, can be used to generate an assessment of improvement in
battlefield effectiveness. (Ibid) Unfortunately, Keenan’s six measures cannot be shown
to be a complete, nor a correct list, making his resulting interoperability impact
assessment a subjective measure.
While no simple and complete relationship between collaborative interoperability
and operational effectiveness has yet been published, such an axiom could be on the
horizon. The key to discovering it likely lies in the area of indirect interoperability
measurement discussed in the previous section. While a change in the interoperation of
friendly (blue) systems has no direct impact on the directional confrontational
interoperability of friendly (blue)-to-adversary (red) systems, it most definitely has an
indirect impact. For example, Garstka noted that F-15Cs equipped with the Joint Tactical
Information Distribution System (JTIDS) experienced a kill ratio 2.5 times higher than
that of non-JTIDS equipped F-15Cs. (2000) In other words, an improvement in
collaborative (F-15C-to-E-3 and F-15C-to-F-15C) interoperability indirectly increased
confrontational (F-15C-to-Target) interoperability, resulting in an improvement in
operational effectiveness. A rigorous method of measuring indirect interoperability of
systems might result in an axiom describing the impact of collaborative interoperability
on operational effectiveness.
While early proponents of network centric warfare and other interoperability
improvement initiatives noted empirical evidence of improved operational effectiveness
resulting from interoperability improvements, other researchers have identified the
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problem of information overload (Toffler, 1970) and its effects. (Keller & Staelin, 1987)
Noting that information-based interoperations are only a subset of the overall set of
interoperations, the problem is extrapolated from the more specific term of information
overload to the general term of interoperability overload. It is postulated that a future
axiom relating collaborative interoperability to operational effectiveness will describe a
relation similar to that graphed in Figure 14 which shows an initial operational benefit of
increased collaborative interoperability followed by a decrease as interoperability
overload sets in with an optimum in between.

Operational
Effectiveness

Collaborative
Interoperability

Figure 14. Hypothetical relationship of collaborative interoperability with operational
effectiveness

5.4

Final Thoughts

The Department of Defense has been pursuing interoperability for decades.
While some might argue that the pursuit has not been aggressive enough (GAO, 1987),
interoperability of defense systems has most definitely improved. Whereas early goals
reflected concerns about equipment commonality (i.e., NATO standard equipment), the
focus eventually moved at the turn of the millennium to assessment of system-to-system
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interoperability via verification testing. (Hutchens, 2007) Architecures documented
information exchange requirements which defined how systems interoperated with each
other and the interoperations were described in the Interoperability Key Performance
Parameter (I-KPP). (CJCSI 6212.01B, 2000) While the Department of Defense still
relies upon certification testing, the newer Net-Ready KPP (NR-KPP) concept (CJCSI
6212.01C, 2003) emphasizes compliance with the Net-Centric Operations and Warfare
Reference Model (NCOW-RM), the use of highly integrated architectures, the definition
of interface profiles, and adherence to information assurance precepts to ensure systems
are interoperable and born joint (i.e., network centric). (Hutchens, 2007)
In spite of all this progress, these efforts have been focused on qualitatively
describing technical interoperability. The general method of this dissertation provides a
means to finally quantitatively measure the interoperability of not only technical systems,
but non-technical systems or mixed sets of systems. Because the method draws upon
existing data already mandated by the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System (JCIDS) (e.g., integrated architectures, interface profiles, operational processes,
measures of effectiveness) it becomes an efficient extension to the current state-of-thepractice in interoperability assessment. The ability to put the interoperability
measurement in the context of operations and determine the impact of system
interoperability on those operations is an added bonus and it is hoped that the general
method of measuring system interoperability presented in this research will greatly
improve defense systems and military operations for years to come.
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Definition
Source
The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services (DoDD 2010.6, 1977),
from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to
(DoDD 2010.6, 1980:Encl. 2, p. 2),
enable them to operate effectively together.
(Amanowicz & Gajewski,
1996:280),
(DoD 1998),
(Leite, 1998:3),
(Curts 1999:5.),
(JV2020, 2000:15),
(Clark & Moon, 2001:2),
(Fewell & Clark, 2003:2),
(Kasunic & Anderson, 2004: 2, 32),
(Morris, et al., 2004:3, 7)
The ability of one system to receive and process intelligible information of
(Kasunic & Anderson, 2004:32)
mutual interest transmitted by another system.
Electronic Interoperability. A special form of interoperability whereby two or
(DoDD 2010.6, 1980:Encl. 2, p. 2)
more electronic equipments, especially communications equipments, can be
linked together, usually through common interface characteristics and so
operate the one to the other.
Logistic Interoperability. A form of interoperability whereby the service to be
(DoDD 2010.6, 1980:Encl. 2, p. 3)
exchanged is assemblies, components, spares, or repair parts. Logistic
interoperability will often be achieved by making such assemblies, components,
spares, or repair parts interchangeable, but can sometimes be a capability less
than interchangeability when a degradation of performance or some limitations
are operationally acceptable.
The effort required to couple one system with another.
(Kasunic & Anderson, 2004:32)

A1. A Selection of Interoperability Definitions (adapted from Ford, et. al., 2007b)
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Standard The capability, promoted but not guaranteed by joint conformance with a given
set of standards, that enables heterogeneous equipment, generally built by
various vendors, to work together in a network environment.
Standard The ability of two or more systems or components to exchange information in a
heterogeneous network and use that information.

Technical Interoperability. The condition achieved among communicationselectronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when
information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between
them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be defined when
referring to specific cases.
DoD
JCS defines interoperability as the condition achieved between systems when
information or services are exchanged directly and satisfactorily between the
systems ad/or their users.
Standard The ability of two or more systems of elements to exchange information and to
use the information that has been exchanged.
Standard The capability for units of equipment to work together to do useful functions.

DoD

Definition
Interoperability means the ability of two or more parties, machine or human, to
make a perfect exchange of content. Perfect means no perceptible distortions or
unintended delays between content origin, processing and use.
Standard The ability of two or more systems or components to exchange information and
to use the information that has been exchanged.
Other
Interoperability among components of large-scale, distributed systems is the
ability to exchange services and data with one another.
Other
The ability to communicate with peer systems and access their functionality.

Origin
Other

(Morris, et. al., 2004:7)

(Morris et. al., 2004:7)

(Morris, et. al., 2004:3)

(Morris, et. al., 2004:3)

(Curts, 1999:9)

(Vernadat, 1996),
(Kosanke, 2005:2)
(DoD 1998),
(Leite, 1998:3),
(Morris, et. al., 2004:7-8),
(JP 1-2, 2004:277)

(Kasunic & Anderson, 2004:32),
(Kosanke, 2005:2)
(Heiler, 1995:1)

Source
(Poppel, 1987:1)

DoD
DoD

DoD
DoD
DoD

DoD

DoD

DoD

Origin
DoD
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Definition
(1) Ability of information systems to communicate with each other and
exchange information. (2) Conditions, achieved in varying levels, when
information systems and/or their components can exchange information directly
and satisfactorily among them. (3) The ability to operate software and exchange
information in a heterogeneous network (i.e., one large network made up of
several different local area networks). (4) Systems or programs capable of
exchanging information and operating together effectively.
Programmatic Interoperability. Programmatic interoperability encompasses the
activities related to the management of one program in the context of another
program.
Constructive Interoperability. Constructive interoperability addresses those
activities related to construction and maintenance of one system in the context
of another system. Constructive interoperability includes the common use of
architecture, standards, data specifications, communication protocols,
languages, and COTS products to build interoperable systems.
Operational Interoperability. Operational Interoperability refers to the activities
related to the operation of a system in the context of other systems. These
activities include: doctrine governing the way the system is used, conventions
for how the user interprets information derived from interoperating systems
(i.e., the semantics of interoperation), and strategies for training personnel in the
use of interoperating systems.
The ability of systems to work together.
The ability of systems to exchange and use services.
The degree to which a set of communicating systems are (i) able to exchange
specified state data, and (ii) operate on that state data according to specified,
agreed to, operational semantics.
Ability to achieve “cooperation” is generally termed “interoperability.”
The ability of one services' system to receive and process intelligible
information of mutual interest transmitted by another service's system.

(Carney & Oberndorf, 2004:3)
(Kasunic & Anderson, 2004:32)

(Levine, et. al., 2003:26)
(Levine, et. al., 2003:26)
(Levine, et. al., 2003:26)

(Levine, et. al., 2003:6)

(Levine, et. al., 2003:5)

(Levine, et. al., 2003:4)

Source
(USJFCOM, 2001:76),
(Morris, et al., 2004:4)

Other
DoD

Origin
DoD
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Definition
The ability of a set of communicating entities to (1) exchange specified state
data and (2) operate on that state data according to specified, agreed-upon,
operational semantics.
Ability of two or more devices to work together in one or more applications.
The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks.

(Kosanke, 2005:4)
(JP 1-02, 2008:277)

Source
(Morris, et al., 2004:4)

A2. A Selection of Interoperability Types

Interoperability Type
Application
Architecture
C4I
Cities
Coalition
Communications
Conceptual
Connected
Constructive
Constructive
Cultural
Data
Domain
Electronic
Enterprise
Flexible
Force
Functional
Higher-layer
Horizontal
Information
Information Systems
Intra-organisational
Isolated
Joint
Joint Information
Logistics
Lower-layer
Model
Multidatabase

Source
(Kasunic & Anderson, 2004:34),
(Kosanke, 2005:4)
(Curts, 1999:10)
(Kasunic & Anderson, 2004:9)
(Kinder, 2002:18)
(USJFCOM, 2001:48),
(Fewell & Clark, 2003, p. 1)
(LaVean, 1980:1448),
(Kasunic & Anderson, 2004:34)
(Carney & Oberndorf, 2004:18)
(DoD, 1998)
(Levine, et. al., 2003:5),
(Carney & Oberndorf, 2004:19),
(Morris, et al., 2004:11)
(Morris, et al., 2004:35)
(Clark & Moon, 2001:2)
(Curts, 1999:4),
(USJFCOM, 2001:30),
(Kasunic & Anderson, 2004:4, 7, 34)
(DoD, 1998)
(DoDD 2010.6, 1980:Encl. 2, p. 2)
(DoD, 1998),
(Kosanke, 2005: 8)
(Clark & Moon, 2001:2)
(Clark & Moon, 2001:1)
(DoD, 1998),
(USJFCOM, 2001:22),
(Clark, 2001:2)
(Kasunic & Anderson, 2004:34)
(Kinder, 2002:27)
(Curts, 1999:4)
(DoD, 1998)
(Kinder, 2002:23)
(DoD, 1998)
(Leite, 1998:1),
(USJFCOM, 2001: 49),
(Kasunic & Anderson, 2004:13-14)
(Nutwell, 2000)
(DoDD 2010.6, 1980:Encl. 2, p. 3)
(Kasunic & Anderson, 2004:34)
(Clark & Moon, 2001:1)
(Litwin & Abdellatif, 1986:1)
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Non-GIG
Non-technological
Object Oriented
Operational

(USJFCOM, 2001:29)
(Clark & Moon, 2001:1)
(Konstantas, 1993:i)
(Levine, et. al., 2003:6),
(Carney & Oberndorf, 2004:19),
(Kasunic & Anderson, 2004:2),
(Morris, et al., 2004:11)
Organizational
(Clark & Jones, 1999:1),
(Clark & Moon, 2001:1)
Peacetime
(LaVean, 1980:1450)
Planned
(Clark & Moon, 2001:3)
(USJFCOM, 2001:47)
Plug‐and‐Play
Procedure Oriented
(Konstantas, 1993:4)
Process
(Clark & Moon, 2001:2)
Product-to-Product
(Kasunic & Anderson, 2004:37)
Programmatic
(Levine, et. al., 2003:4),
(Carney & Oberndorf, 2004:19),
(Morris, et al., 2004:11)
Programmatic
(Morris, et al., 2004:33)
Public Administration (Kinder, 2002:6)
Public Service
(Kinder, 2002:7)
Responsive
(Clark & Moon, 2001:2)
Secure-Voice
(USJFCOM, 2001: 33)
Semantic
(Heiler, 1995:1)
Specification Level
(Wileden, et. al., 1989:74)
System-of-Systems
(Morris et. al., 2004:Cover)
Systems
(LaVean, 1980:1449),
(Leite, 1998: 1),
(Curts, 1999: 3),
(USJFCOM, 2001:32),
(Clark & Moon, 2001: 2),
(Kasunic & Anderson, 2004: 1)
System-to-System
(Amanowicz & Gajewski, 1996:280),
(Kasunic & Anderson, 2004, p. 17)
Technical
(Clark & Jones, 19994),
(USJFCOM, 2001:22),
(Clark & Moon, 2001:1),
(Kinder, 2002:25),
(Carney & Oberndorf, 2004:16),
(Kasunic & Anderson, 2004:2)
Telecommunications (LaVean, 1980:1449)
Total
(Curts, 1999:1)
Transitive
(Morris, et. al., 2004:28)
Vertical
(Kinder, 2002:27)
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A3. Summary of Interoperability Measurement Models

Sixteen interoperability measurement models (Table 29) are surveyed in
succeeding paragraphs with the main contributions of each model highlighted. Appendix
A4 summarizes the models’ measurement formats. The succeeding review and analysis
is modified from Ford, et. al. (2007b). Some model nicknames (e.g., SoIM, QoIM,
MCISI, and IAM) were not used by the model authors, but have been assigned by the
author of this research for ease of reference.
Table 29 Interoperability measurement model publishers (adapted from Ford, et. al.,
2007b)
Publishing Organization
Model
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)
SoIM (’80)
MITRE Corporation
QoIM (’89)
LISI (’98)
Military University of Technology, Warsaw, Poland
MCISI (’96)
Joint Theater Air & Missile Def. Org. (JTAMDO) Contractor SIM
IAM (’98)
Australian Defence Science & Technology Organisation (DSTO)
OIM (’99)
OIAM (’05)
Joint Forces Cmd (JFCOM) Joint Forces Program Office (JFPO)
Stoplight (’02)
Old Dominion Univ. Virginia Modeling Analysis & Simulation
LCI (’03)
Center (VMASC)
LCIM (’03)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
NMI (‘03)
DoD Command and Control Research Program

NCW (’03)

Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute (CMU-SEI)
Defence Science & Technology Lab. (Dstl) Contractor, QinetiQ

SoSI (’04)
NTI (’04)

Research Establishment for Applied Science (FGAN)

NID (’05)

Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT)

i-Score (’07)

Spectrum of Interoperability Model (SoIM)

MAIN CONTRIBUTION: Interoperability can be measured in levels.
In 1980, LaVean acknowledged in the IEEE Transactions on Communications
that inter-system interoperability was poor because there existed a “lack of a measure of
interoperability by which to state goals for specific systems.” (1980:1449) To combat
this deficiency, he created a spectrum of interoperability model (SoIM). (Ibid:1448) He
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defined the two most important measures of interoperability (technical possibility and
management/control possibility), assigned levels (Table 30), and stated that by
“combining these two measures, it is possible to derive a spectrum of interoperability that
permits cost-versus-benefits tradeoffs.” (Ibid) Recognizing that the level of
interoperability may be different for each service that pairs of systems provide to each
other, he proposed a visualization method, called an interoperability matrix, which lists
services on the rows of the matrix and levels of interoperability on the columns. He
further proposed a current view and a “future” view of the interoperability matrix in order
to show evolution of the systems over time. Thus, the purpose of SoIM was to provide a
simple tool for program managers to assess current interoperability of their systems and
services, to set goals for future interoperability, and to visualize the current and future
states of interoperability. Although SoIM was groundbreaking and is possibly the earliest
method for measuring interoperability, there is no further mention of his model after its
original publication and it is unknown whether or not it was used by program managers
to improve inter-system interoperability.
Table 30 SoIM levels of interoperability
Level
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Name
Separate Systems
Shared Resources
Gateways
Multiple Entry Points
Conformable/Compatible Systems
Completely Interoperable Systems
Same System

127

Technical
Measure

Management/Control
Measure

1
1
2
2
3
3
4

1
2
3
4
4
5
6

Quantification of Interoperability Methodology (QoIM)

MAIN CONTRIBUTION: Interoperability is correlated to measures of effectiveness.
In 1989, Mensh, Kite, and Darby published a method in the Naval Engineer’s
Journal called “The Quantification of Interoperability” (QoIM) Working for MITRE

Corp., they may have laid some of the groundwork for the well-known LISI model
published by MITRE nine years later although they were never credited. Mensh, et. al.’s
approach to interoperability measurement is unique because they associated
interoperability with measures of effectiveness (MOE). Their goal was to assess
interoperability issues for three mission areas: wide area surveillance (WAS), over-thehorizon targeting (OTH-T), and electronic warfare (EW) by quantifying seven
interoperability components. (Mensh, et. al., 1989) They stated that “interoperability of
systems, units, or forces can be factored into a set of components that can quantify
interoperability” (Ibid:251) and identified the seven components as media, languages,
standards, requirements, environment, procedures, and human factors. They specified an
arbitrary MOE logic function for each component and used that logic function to create a
truth table populated via discrete event simulation. For example, the MOE logic function
for the Language component was defined as “Message Correctness = Intelligibility and
Manual Intervention & Error.” (Ibid:255-256) The truth table listed the binary MOE
value (e.g., Message Correctness, Intelligibility, and Manual Intervention and Error) for
various “significant events” which occurred during an exercise or simulation—the
presence of zeros indicated lack of interoperability during certain component events and
the presence of ones indicated that some level of interoperation occurred. (Ibid:254-255)
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A final Interoperability Data Table was formed showing the truth table results for all
seven interoperability components, which “illustrates the overall quantification of
interoperability,” and “for specific events it enables an evaluation of the interoperability
of…systems in terms of the seven interoperability components…[and]
corresponding…events,” and finally, “having this type of table for two
different…architectures enables a comparison of the relative goodness of each
architecture.” (Ibid:259) Although Mensh, et. al. state that their “methodology for
quantifying interoperability is being pursued,” they admit that “additional exercises will
be required and are currently in the planning stages.” (Ibid) Aside from one citation by
Leite in 1998 (and revised paper in 2003), there are no further mentions or apparent use
of this model beyond the original journal in which it was published.
Military Communications and Information Systems Interoperability (MCISI)

MAIN CONTRIBUTION: The distance between systems modeled as points in space
indicates their interoperability.
In 1996, Amanowicz & Gajewski published an interoperability measurement
model (MCISI) designed to model communications and information systems (CIS)
interoperability mathematically. Noting that interoperability modeling combines
operational requirements, CIS data, standards, interfaces and modeling facilities, they use
a colored cube to visualize their model in which one axis is level of command, the second
is CIS services, and the third is transmission medium. (Amanowicz & Gajewski, 1996)
The color of the intersections is red, yellow, or green representing none, partial, or full
interoperability of a specific service through a specific medium at a specified level of
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command. Amanowicz & Gajewski further describe a set of systems as points in multidimensional space with features of these systems as the coordinates of the points.
Defining a normalized “distance” between two points as d ( A, B ) , they state that when
d ( A, B ) = 0 systems A and B achieve full interoperability and when d ( A, B ) > 1 , the system

pair’s interoperability decreases. (Ibid) They accommodate a set of systems by creating
dendrite (a broken line which connects all points of a set) arrangements of the systems
and state that the best arrangement is the one with the shortest dendrite length. MCISI
was not institutionalized after its publication.
Levels of Information System Interoperability (LISI) Model

MAIN CONTRIBUTION: Interoperability attributes of information systems.
LISI is the most prominent interoperability measurement model within the
Department of Defense. It began development at the MITRE Corporation in 1993 and
was published in 1998 by the C4ISR Architecture Working Group (AWG) co-chaired by
the Joint Staff J6I and the Director, Architectures Directorate of the C4ISR Integration
Support Activity (CISA) under the direction of OSD(ASD(C3I)). (DoD, 1998) The LISI
report stated, “We lack a practical assessment process for determining the interoperability
maturity level or ‘metric’ of a given system or system pair…The LISI Assessment
Process, with its associated tool, system profiles, and data repository, fills these needs.”
(Ibid: ES-7) LISI is a system focused vice mission focused method applicable only to
information systems.
While CJCSI 6212.01C, Interoperability and Supportability of Information
Technology and National Security Systems, (2003) required program managers to ensure
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that they complied with LISI requirements, that mandate expired in the latest version,
CJCSI 6212.01D. (2006) Although LISI was originally to be institutionalized in DoDD
4630.5, DoDI 4830.8, DoDI 5000.2, and DoDD 5000.1, this was never accomplished.
(DoD, 1998) The Joint Staff maintained a repository of LISI profiles for acquisition
programs for several years. (CJCSI 6212.01C, 2003)
Like SoIM, LISI describes levels of interoperability called maturity levels.
Whereas SoIM has seven levels, LISI has five—Level 0 (Isolated), Level 1 (Connected),
Level 2 (Functional), Level 3 (Domain), and Level 4 (Enterprise). However, LISI
improves upon SoIM by giving four attributes of the levels described by the acronym
PAID—Procedures, Applications, Infrastructure, and Data. The LISI Reference Model is
shown in Figure 3. A web-based questionnaire is completed in order to generate the
Interoperability Profile which contains information about a system for all four
interoperability attributes. From the profile, an Interoperability Metric can be obtained
which is a triplet of metric type (Generic, Expected, & Specific), Level (0…4), and Sublevel (a…z). The metric describes the level of interoperability for one system (generic)
or a pair of systems (expected and specific). The generic metric is the best level of
interoperability a single system is capable of whereas the expected metric describes the
highest common level of interoperability for a system pair. The specific metric describes
the highest common level of interoperability between two information systems across all
PAID attributes. LISI has been reviewed and critiqued by many other researchers since
its publication. Recent reviews have been written by Brownsword, et al. (2004), Carney
& Oberndorf (2004), Clark & Jones (1999), Clark & Moon (2001), Kasunic & Anderson
(2004), Morris, et al. (2004), and Tolk (2003), among others.
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Interoperability Assessment Methodology (IAM)

MAIN CONTRIBUTION: Attributes of interoperability.
Leite’s Interoperability Assessment Methodology was initially published in the
pProceedings of the 66th Military Operations Research Society (MORS) Symposium
three months after LISI was published and was revised again in 1999 and 2003. It is
unknown if the author was aware of the LISI effort, however he did reference Mensh, et.
al.’s QoIM in his paper. Like QoIM, IAM is based upon the idea of “measurement and
quantification of a set of interoperability system components.” (Leite, 2003:1) IAM
identified nine components (vice QoIM’s seven) which are requirements, standards, data
elements, node connectivity, protocols, information flow, latency, interpretation, and
information utilization. Each of the nine components has either a “yes/no” answer or a
mathematical equation associated with it. Leite also defines “degrees of interconnection”
which are connectivity, availability, interpretation, understanding, utility, execution, and
feedback. (Ibid:3-8) He summarizes IAM in the form of a flowchart and applies the
process to the Navy’s Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense Program as an example. His
methodology was not institutionalized, but was referenced by Kasunic and Anderson in
2004 who state that IAM’s quality attributes can be used to extend the LISI model at the
mission slice level. (Kasunic & Anderson, 2004)
Organisational Interoperability Maturity Model for C2 (OIM)

MAIN CONTRIBUTION: Organizations interoperate, but have different interoperability
attributes than technical systems.
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In 1998, the Australian Defense Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO)
completed a Command and Control Support (C2S) study in which they described five
layers of C2 Support (Telecommunications, Info Technology, Info Management, C2
Process, and C2 Framework). (Clark & Jones, 1999) In this study, they pointed out that
LISI) is strongly technological, 2) focuses on system and technical compatibility, and 3)
does not address higher layers of C2 support. As a result, Clark & Jones determined to
create an organizational extension to LISI. The result of their labors is the Organisational
Interoperability Maturity Model (OIM) first introduced in June 1999 at the International
Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (ICCRTS), then revised in
2003 at the same conference by Fewell and Clark.
OIM was used to “identify problems and evaluate interoperability in a coalition
operation” (Fewell & Clark, 2003:3) Like LISI, OIM defined five levels of
interoperability (independent, cooperative, collaborative, combined, and unified).
However, unlike LISI’s technically-associated PAID attributes, OIM defined four
attributes of organizational interoperability—1) preparation, 2) understanding, 3)
command and coordination, and 4) ethos (Socio-Cultural factors). Fewell & Clark
supplied detailed descriptions of the attributes, identified multiple sub-attributes for each
of the four main attributes and used the revised model to analyze the operational
interoperability of three scenarios: 1) the multi-national force participating in the
Australian led, 1999-2000 International Force East Timor (INTERFET) operation, 2) an
Australia-US interoperability review, and 3) the Multinational Limited Objective
Experiment 2 (MNLOE2) held in February 2003. OIM was reviewed by several
researchers after its initial introduction in 1999. Some examples are: Briscombe, et al.
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(2006), Brownsword, et al. (2004), Clark & Jones (1999), Clark & Moon (2001), Fewell,
et al. (2004), Kasunic & Anderson (2004), and Morris, et al. (2004) Dekker published a
modification to the model which he uses to analyze the Black Hawk Down incident in
Mogadishu in 1993. (2005) It is unknown whether the OIM model has been
institutionalized by the Australian Department of Defence.
Stoplight

MAIN CONTRIBUTION: Operations & acquisition have interoperability requirements.
In 2002, Hamilton, et. al. published a very uncomplicated interoperability
measurement model which they simply called a Stoplight model. They stated that
“interoperability is notoriously difficult to measure,” yet gave a “simplified model” to
measure it. (Ibid:20-21) The model’s purpose is to help decision makers understand
whether or not their legacy systems meet operational and acquisition interoperability
requirements and is designed as a two-dimensional matrix in which “meets operational
requirements (yes/no)” appears on the rows of the matrix and “meets acquisition
requirements (yes/no)” appears on the columns. The intersections of the matrix are
colored red, yellow, orange, and green depending on how well the specific type of
requirement is met. Hamilton, et. al. give an example of how the color codings can be
overlaid on a timeline to show the plan to achieve improved interoperability in the future.
This model has not been institutionalized within the Department of Defense.
Levels of Conceptual Interoperability Model (LCIM)

MAIN CONTRIBUTION: Conceptual interoperability bridges system interoperability.
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The Levels of Conceptual Interoperability Model (LCIM) was published by Tolk
& Muguira in 2003 with the intent that it be used to “become a bridge between the
conceptual design and the technical design for implementation, integration, or
federation,” and that it be used to “enhance the…DoD Net-Centric Data Strategy for the
Global Information Grid (GIG).” (Tolk & Muguira, 2003:1) Additionally, they state that
it can be used as a framework “to determine in the early stages of the federation
development process whether meaningful interoperability between systems is possible.”
(Ibid) LCIM focuses on the world of modeling and simulation, and initially gave five
levels of interoperability but later extended to seven as a result of “new research at
VMASC and as the response to critique by the scientific community.” (Turnitsa & Tolk,
2006:1) The final levels are Level 0—No interoperability, Level 1—Technical
interoperability, Level 2—Syntactic Interoperability, Level 3—Semantic Interoperability,
Level 4—Pragmatic Interoperability, Level 5—Dynamic Interoperability, and Level 6—
Conceptual Interoperability. LCIM has traction within the modeling and simulation
community. LCIM reviewers include Brownsword, et al. (2004), Kasunic & Anderson
(2004), and Morris, et al. (2004).
Layers of Coalition Interoperability (LCI)

MAIN CONTRIBUTION: Operational interoperability is an extension of technical
interoperability.
Also in 2003, Tolk introduced a different, but similarly acronymed, Layers of
Coalition Interoperability (LCI) model which defines nine layers of interoperability. He
shows that there is a continuum between technical interoperability and operational
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interoperability rather than a distinct breakpoint between the two and that the interface
between technical and operational interoperability is made at the knowledge/awareness
layer. The nine layers in LCI are, from lowest to highest, 1) Physical Interoperability, 2)
Protocol Interoperability, 3) Data/Object Model Interoperability, 4) Information
Interoperability, 5) Knowledge/Awareness, 6) Aligned Procedures, 7) Aligned
Operations, 8) Harmonized/Strategy Doctrines, and 9) Political Objectives. These layers
are framed by a “common model of the operation.” Tolk proposes possible metrics for
his model as those contained in the NATO Code of Best Practice for C2 Assessment
(Stenbit, et. al., 2002a), Code of Best Practice for Experimentation (Stenbit, et. al.,
2002b), and Network Centric Warfare Metrics Framework (Alberts, et. al., 2000) LISI
and NMI were referenced by Tolk, but OIM was not. Tolk claims that LCI is not meant
to be a “universal replacement” for other frameworks, but is meant to be used to “help
formulate layered models.” (Tolk, 2003:17) LCI has been cited and briefly reviewed by
Morris, et al. (2004).
NATO C3 Technical Architecture Reference Model for Interoperability (NMI)

MAIN CONTRIBUTION: Same as LISI.
Version four of this NATO reference model was published in March 2003 and
according to Morris, et al., it was updated to closely reflect the LISI model in December
2003. (2004) It is no longer available on the NATO website. NMI originally described
four degrees of interoperability (not including degree 0 which was no interoperability).
The four degrees mapped directly to LISI’s top four levels and were given as: 1)
unstructured data exchange, 2) structured data exchange, 3) seamless sharing of data, and
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4) seamless sharing of information which. NMI was reviewed by Brownsword, et al.
(2004), Kasunic & Anderson (2004), Morris, et al. (2004), Tolk & Muguira (2003), and
Tolk (2003).
Net Centric Warfare Maturity Model (NCW)

MAIN CONTRIBUTION: Interoperability occurs in physical, information, cognitive,
and social domains; lack of interoperability increases difficulty in accomplishing the
mission.
Alberts & Hayes published Power to the Edge in 2003 and included a Net Centric
Warfare Maturity Model (NCW) in their chapter on interoperability. Besides
emphasizing the need for interoperability in military operations, they point out that
interoperability underpins the tenents of net-centric warfare. (Alberts & Hayes, 2003)
Specifically, they state that interoperability must be present in four domains: physical,
information, cognitive, and social. They correlate interoperability to mission
effectiveness by stating that “a lack of…interoperability on the part of an entity…makes
it difficult for them to contribute to the mission.” (Ibid:108) NCW models the maturity
of situational awareness and command and control in the context of interoperability
levels (Table 31). The five interoperability levels in the model are defined as Level 0 –
limited interoperability, Level 1—more entities share information, Level 2—
collaborative environments and processes, Level 3—shared awareness in the information
and cognitive domains, and Level 4—interoperability in the social domain.
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Table 31 NCW maturity model (Alberts & Hayes, 2003)
Command and Control
Traditional
Developing
Situational
Awareness

Shared
Awareness
Information
Sharing
Organic
Sources

Collaboration

Selfsynchronization

3

4

1

2

0

System-of-Systems Interoperability (SoSI) Model

MAIN CONTRIBUTION: System-of-system interoperability research is founded upon
operational, conceptual, and programmatic interoperability.
This simple model was published in 2004 by the Carnegie-Mellon University
Software Engineering Institute (CMU-SEI) and was developed to facilitate system-ofsystems interoperability research. (Morris, et al., 2004) SoSI is founded upon three types
of interoperability (operational, constructional, and programmatic) and the activities
associated with each. While it is a useful way of developing and integrating systems-ofsystems, SoSI lacks metrics to specifically measure interoperability, however it provides
a framework in which an analyst can use his/her own metrics. The SoSI report also
summarizes LISI, OIM, NMI, LCIM, and LCI. SoSI has not been institutionalized within
the Department of Defense.
Non-Technical Interoperability (NTI) Framework

MAIN CONTRIBUTION: Social, personnel, and process interoperability, as well as
organizational interoperability, are valid types of non-technical interoperability.
Stewart, et al., introduced the Non-Technical Interoperability (NTI) framework in
2004 to allow the United Kingdom’s (UK) Ministry of Defence (MOD) “to understand
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these aspects of interoperability better and to mitigate potential frictional factors in
multinational forces.” They felt that OIM was a “useful top-level framework” for the
data they captured in their own research, but recognized that it did not cover social,
personnel, and process interoperability. The four enabling OIM attributes form the core
of the NTI framework which provides a more detailed breakdown of these attributes.
While a complete set of metrics was not provided by Stewart, et al., they did propose a
Multinational Forces Cooperability Index which provides a score of 1, 2, 4, 8, 12, or 16
for two (preparedness and understanding) of the four attributes. The NTI framework was
developed as result of 45 interviews with UK military officers ranging in rank from Army
Captain to 3-star General. It is unknown if NTI has been institutionalized within the UK
Ministry of Defence.
Revised NATO Interoperability Directive (NID)

MAIN CONTRIBUTION: Levels of interoperability can be given in linguistic terms.
Schade notes that LISI takes a system view of interoperability and NCW takes a
force view. (2005) He points out that the NATO Interoperability Directive also uses a
system view of interoperability, but documents poorly labeled levels of interoperability.
He updates the NID labeling scheme, by applying linguistic terminology extracted from
Alberts & Hayes (2003), with the following, Level 0— missing interoperability, Level
1—physical interoperability, Level 2—syntactic interoperability, Level 3—semantic
interoperability, Level 4—pragmatic interoperability.
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Organisational Interoperability Agility Model (OIAM)

MAIN CONTRIBUTION: There are levels of ability of organizations to be agile in their
interoperation.
Kingston, et. al. of the Australian Defence Science and Technology organization
(DSTO) published the Organisational Interoperability Agility Model (OIAM) in 2005. It
“builds on the Organizational Interoperability Model developed by Clark and Jones” and
“aims to capture the dynamic aspects of working in coalitions including the ability of an
organization to contribute to the rapid formation and reformation of coalitions, including
novel ones.” (Kingston, et. al., 2005:2) Organizational agility is defined as “a single
organization’s potential to have agile interfaces to other organizations in future coalition
operations” and “assesses an organization’s ability to adapt to changing circumstances.”
(Ibid:3) Aligning with OIM, OIAM uses five levels of organizational agility (Static,
Amenable, Accommodating, Open, and Dynamic) as well as the four OIM attributes,
combining preparation and understanding. The model’s developers state they are at the
beginning of their research on organizational agility and that they plan to develop
additional metrics and perform case studies in order to refine the model. As a new
model, it has not yet been institutionalized by the Australian Department of Defence.
The Layered Interoperability Score (i-Score)

MAIN CONTRIBUTION: Interoperability measurements are operational process specific
and have a maximum value.
The Layered Interoperability Score (i-Score) is a quantitative method of
measuring the interoperability of all types of systems in the context of an operational
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process. (Ford, et. al., 2007a; 2008b) It makes use of existing architecture data and
accommodates more than one type of interoperability. Unique to the i-Score method is a
means of determining a realistic upper limit on interoperability for the systems supporting
the operational process. The i-Score method accommodates custom layers which allow
the analyst to compensate the i-Score measurement for any number of interoperabilityrelated performance factors such as bandwidth, protocols, mission capability rate,
probability of connection, or atmospheric effects, among others. Also possible are cost,
schedule, reliability, and performance layers to measure the impact of various
programmatic changes on the interoperability of the process. The method can be used to
make non-traditional interoperability measurements such as organizational or policy
interoperability measurements. The i-Score method has not been institutionalized within
the Department of Defense.
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IAM

Interoperability Assessment

LCI
LCIM
NCW

SoSI
NTI
NID

OIA
i-Score

Layers of Coalition Interoperability
Levels of Conceptual Interoperability

Net‐Centric Warfare

System of Systems Interoperability
Non-technical Interoperability

Revised NATO Interoperability Directive

Organisational Interoperability Agility
Interoperability Score

OIM
NMI
Stoplight

MCISI
LISI

Mil Comm. & Info Systems Interoperability
Levels of Information System Interoperability

Organisational Interoperability
NATO Reference Model for Interoperability
Stoplight

Acronym
SoIM
QoIM

Method
Spectrum of Interoperability
Quantification of Interoperability
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2005
2007

2005

2004
2004

2003

2003
2003

1999
1999
2002

1998

1996
1998

Date
1980
1989

{0,1,2,3,4} per organization
Real number per system, operational thread, network, or
mission

{0, 1, 2, 3, 4} per system

User defined
{1,2,4,8,12,16} per attribute per force (for Terminology
and ROE attributes only)

{0, 1, 2, 3, 4} per system

{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9} per coalition
{0,1,2,3,4} per model

Measure
{1,2,3,4,5,6,7} per system pair
x/y ratio for each of 7 components where x, y are
positive integers
Positive integer per system pair
Xny per info system where
X∈{General, Expected, Specific},
n∈{0,1,2,3,4},
y∈{a…z}
Various number & non-number measures per system
attribute
(0,1,2,3,4} per organization
{0,1,2,3,4} per info system
{Red, Yellow, Orange, Green} per legacy system

A4. Summary of Extant Interoperability Measure Formats

A5. A Survey of System Taxonomies
System Science System Taxonomies

Ludwig von Bertalanffy, a biologist accepted by many as the father of general
systems theory (GST), noted that systems are everywhere. (1955) He defined them as
“complexes of elements standing in interaction,” and promptly classified them as open or
closed, a classification which certainly originated long before von Bertalanffy’s time in
the disciplines of physics, chemistry, and biology.
Kenneth Boulding, an economist and the first president of the Society for General
Systems Research (now known as the International Society for the Systems Sciences) and
cofounder of GST, published a creative and more detailed classification of systems which
hierarchically classifies systems as 1) frameworks, 2) clockworks, 3) thermostats, 4)
cells, 5) plants, 6) animals, 7) human beings, 8) social organizations, and 9)
transcendental systems. (1956) Boulding’s classification scheme was self-described both
as a hierarchy of complexity and as a systematic framework in which he referred to each
of the nine classifications in the hierarchy as a level. Approximately thirty years later,
Boulding proposed a new, but related classification, stating that systems were either static
or dynamic and that “something of a hierarchy” of all systems which “correspond to
something in the real world” included systems which were either mechanical, cybernetic,
positive-feedback, creodic, reproductive, demographic, ecological, evolutionary, human,
and social. (1985: 18) He then agglomerates these ten as physical, biological, or social
systems and organizes the remainder of his book around discussions of the world as not
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just a physical, biological, and social system, but also as an economic, political,
communication, and evaluative system.
Twelve years after Boulding published his first classification scheme, Jordan
published a taxonomy of systems which grouped systems according to “intuitive guesses”
of three “organizing principles” each holding two “polar opposite” properties. (1968: 44)
Jordan defined eight cells (classifications) in his taxonomy, which were derived from his
principle-property framework, by taking one property from each of the three principles—
1) rate of change (structural/static or functional/dynamic), 2) purpose (purposive, nonpurposive), and 3) connectivity (mechanistic/organismic). As an example, Checkland
uses the taxonomy to classify a road network as a structural, purposive, mechanicallyconnected system but a mountain range as a structural, non-purposive, mechanically
connected set of entities. (1981) Checkland uses this logic to critique Jordan, noting that
in his belief, Jordan erroneously “ascribes the purpose, or lack of it, to the system itself”
rather than to the system’s creator. (Ibid: 108)
Thus, Checkland takes Jordan’s taxonomy as a foundation, merges some ideas
from Boulding and creates what he calls a systems typology which includes five classes
of systems (natural, design physical, design abstract, human activity, and transcendental
systems). The purpose of his typology is to identify classes of entities based upon their
origin. According to Checkland’s typology, the set of natural systems, which includes
both types of designed systems as well as the human activity systems, and the set of
transcendental systems are disjoint sets. Checkland is quite confident in the
completeness of his typology and declares that it “completes a simple systems map of the
universe which, as far as system classes is (sic) concerned, is itself complete.” (Ibid, 111)
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Wilson, a colleague of Checkland, adopted a revision of Checkland’s typology,
calling it a system classification instead. (1990) He removed transcendental systems
from the classification and restated the four remaining classes of systems as natural,
designed, human activity, and social and cultural systems. Wilson created his
classification of systems in order to help refine the definition of the word system to a
level that would be useful in modeling.
Probably without prior intention, Ackoff, in his oft-cited “Toward a System of
Systems Concepts,” published a system taxonomy of sorts, formed by definitions of
various types of systems. (1971) While definitely not hierarchical nor mutually
exclusive, his list of system types is never-the-less useful. Ackoff defines abstract,
concrete, closed, open, static (one-state), dynamic (multi-state), homeostatic, statemaintaining, goal-seeking, multi-goal seeking, purposive, purposeful, ideal-seeking,
variety-increasing, and variety-decreasing systems. Without explicitly stating so, he
infers that other types exist, but states that he defined “the most important types of
systems.” (Ibid: 661)
Valdma recently published a classification scheme for information, but noted that
an analogous scheme exists for classifying systems. (2007) His four-level, hierarchical
classification of systems directly mirrors his information classification model and puts
deterministic systems at the lowest level, followed by probabilistic systems, then
uncertain systems (sub-grouped into uncertain-deterministic, and uncertain-probabilistic),
and finally, fuzzy systems (sub-grouped into fuzzy-deterministic and fuzzy probabilistic).
His stated purpose in creating the classification is as a “first step in studying the nondeterministic phenomena” in the universe. (Ibid, 265)
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Systems Engineering System Taxonomies

In 1957, Goode and Machol wrote in System Engineering, that systems should be
classified “on the basis of the types of inputs with which they must cope.” (1957: 299)
They further defined this set of inputs as 1) input which is always the same or is of many
types, 2) input which occurs periodically (or very infrequently), and 3) input which does
or does not seek to destroy the system. Their rationale for developing the classification
was to aid in the definition of steps to be followed in order to find the “solution of the
problem of a large-scale or complex system.” (Ibid: 302)
Hall’s A Methodology for Systems Engineering, published five years later, has no
direct reference to system classification, but indirectly describes a classification of natural
vice man-made systems, discusses open and closed systems, and references von
Bertalanffy’s property of the hierarchical order of systems, (1962) Interestingly, Hall
interprets von Bertalanffy’s classification as a method useful in partitioning systems into
subsystems, loosely inferring classification can be used in design, and also states that a
system classification is useful in “enhancing the meaning of system.” (Ibid: 63, 68)
Martin, in his Systems Engineering Guidebook, indirectly classifies systems by
classifying product types, relating them to systems by stating that systems are comprised
of components, and components are comprised of one or more basic product types.
(1997) His basic product types, which he correctly notices are not mutually exclusive,
are hardware, software, personnel, facilities, data, materials, services, and techniques.
His rationale for creating a taxonomy of product types is to create a checklist “to ensure
that bases are covered” meaning that the required behavior for a system should not just be
allocated to hardware and software. (Ibid: 24)
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Shenhar, and Shenhar & Bonen proposed a taxonomy of systems in order to
demonstrate that system engineering design and management methods, as well as the
type of system engineering culture and style, which are appropriate for one type of
system are inappropriate for another. (1995, 1997) Their taxonomy is two-dimensional
and classifies systems “according to four levels of technological uncertainty (low,
medium, high, and super-high tech), and three levels of system scope (assembly, system,
and array).” (Ibid: 137) They cite the space shuttle as an example of a system which
NASA initially advertised to Congress as high-tech but making use of existing
technologies, but which, in hindsight, should have been managed as a super-high-tech
system making use of many not yet developed technologies and methods. Shenhar &
Bonen state that an understanding of their taxonomy and a proper classification of the
space shuttle as a system could possibly have prevented schedule delays and even might
have prevented the Challenger tragedy as NASA would have been “more keenly aware of
the possibility of trouble.” (Ibid, 144) Shenhar & Bonen admit that their framework “is
not conclusive” and requires further refinements and investigation, but believe that it is
useful in “finding better and more effective ways to manage the creation of different
kinds of systems.” (Ibid, 145)
Maier focused his research on the topic of architecting systems-of-systems.
(1999) He argued that systems-of-systems must possess “operational and managerial
independence of the systems components” and provided a “limited taxonomy” in which
system-of-systems are considered a “useful taxonomic distinction” separate from
monolithic systems. (1999:267-284) He further subdivided the taxonomic grouping of
system-of-systems into virtual, voluntary, and directed categories.
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Kovacic’s taxonomy provides “definition to the variety of fields that hold claim to
the term systems” and reduces the set of systems into “meaningful related clusters.”
(2005) He erroneously states that his taxonomy uniquely uses complexity as its basis, as
Boulding, whom Kovacic cites, called his taxonomy “a hierarchy of complexity.”
(Boulding, 1956: 200), Kovacic makes a unique application of complexity theory, but
more importantly notes that a good taxonomy must be inclusive, definitive, reductive,
and applicable. (2005) Additionally, he notes that systems are difficult to classify
because they are perceptions of the observer. Kovacic’s taxonomy is three-dimensional
with decomposed/un-decomposed, complex/simple, and loosely bounded/tightly bounded
as the three dichotomous categorizations.
Gideon et al., published a taxonomy of systems-of-systems in order to aid in the
understanding of the nature and attributes of systems-of-systems and because “a clearly
defined classification scheme is essential in developing common systems engineering
architectures and methodologies.” (2005) While they admit that their taxonomy “may
not be complete or even necessarily correct,” it represents one of the first attempts at a
classification scheme specifically for systems-of-systems. Their final taxonomy
subordinates systems-of-systems to systems in general, then defines sub-classifications of
acquisition type (dedicated or virtual), operational type (chaotic, collaborative, or
directed), and domain type (social, conceptual, or physical).
Blanchard and Fabrycky discuss classification of systems in Systems Engineering
and Analysis, but caveat by saying that the classifications they included are “only some

of those that could be presented” and indicate that systems can be classified “for
convenience and to provide insight into their wide range.” (2006: 6) They take the path
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of dichotomies as Jordan did and defined systems as natural and man-made, physical and
conceptual, static and dynamic, and closed and open. As is the case with others who
have classified systems, their classification scheme proposes agglomerations which
overlap—a property to be expected and one that is useful. Blanchard and Fabrycky
acknowledged tie-in between systems engineering and systems science and partially
aligned their system classifications to the nine levels of complex systems proposed by
Boulding.
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A6. Operational Process Modeling Methods

Table 32 Operational process modeling methods
ACT Formalism
A Language for Process Specification (ALPS)
AP213 Protocol within ISO 10303
UML 2.0 Behavior Diagram
EPFL’s Petri Net Representation
Core Plan Representation (CPR)
Entity-Relationship (E-R) Model
Functional Flow Block Diagram (FFBD)
Gantt Chart
Generalized Activity Network (GAN)
Hierarchical Task Networks (HTN)
Integration Definition for Function Modeling (IDEF0)
Process Flow and Object State Description Capture Method (IDEF3)
Issues, Nodes, Ordering, Variable, and Auxiliary (<I-N-OVA>) Constraint Model
Knowledge Interchange Format (KIF)
Open Planning Architecture (O-Plan) Task Formalism
OZONE
Parts and Action (PAct)
Product-Activity-Resource Model for Realiz. of Electro-Mech. Assemblies (PAR2)
Part 49 of ISO 10303
Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) Network
Petri Net
Process Flow Representation (PFR)
Process Interchange Format (PIF)
Quirk Models
Visual Process Modeling Language (VPML) (pre-1998 version)
Visual Process Modeling Language (VPML) (post-1998 version)
AND/OR Graph
Data Flow Diagram (DFD)
Digraph
State Transition Diagram (STD)
SysML Activity Diagram
Tree Structure
Process Specification Language (PSL)
Flow Chart
DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF) Functionally Decomposed Activity Diagram
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A7. Operational Effectiveness Measurement
Hierarchy of Measures of Operational Effectiveness

A hierarchy of measures was first described by the Military Operations Research
Society (Sweet, et. al., 1985) and was later adopted by the Department of Defense with
minor modification (Grimes, 2006). This hierarchy also seems to be widely accepted
outside these two communities, with slight modifications, and describes a hierarchical set
of measures ranging from dimensional parameters, to measures of performance, to
measures of effectiveness, to measures of force effectiveness, and finally to measures of
policy effectiveness (Green, 2001; Stenbit, et. al., 2002). This hierarchy is often rendered
as a pyramid or onion-skin model although it shouldn’t be viewed that rigidly. Similarly,
many authors strictly apply dimensional parameters to objects, measures of performance
to systems, measures of effectiveness to systems within an environment, measures of
force effectiveness to systems as part of a force, and measures of policy effectiveness to
high-level policy decisions, but there should be flexibility in order to accommodate
different system types (e.g., organizational systems). The preferred term in this research,
measure of operational effectiveness (MoOE), fits in the range of measurements between
measure of performance and measure of force effectiveness, inclusive.
Operational Effectiveness Assessment

Operational effectiveness assessment occurs during operational planning,
operational execution, and post-operation analysis. This is well documented in DoD joint
operational planning and joint operations publications (JP 5-0, 2006; JP 3-0, 2006). A
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common means of determining operational effectiveness is through measurement of
appropriate factors related to the operation. Although these measures can be qualitative,
Keeney states that quantifying the measures “clarifies the meaning of the (operational)
objectives, and this clarity…facilitates all aspects of decisonmaking.” (Keeney,
1992:129).
JP 3-0 Joint Operations (2006) and JP 5-0, Joint Operational Planning (2006)
define assessment as “the process that measures progress of the joint force toward
mission accomplishment” and state that commanders “continuously assess…the progress
of operations, and compare them to their initial vision and intent.” (Ibid:III-57)
Operational assessment uses both measures of effectiveness (MOE) and measures of
performance (MoP) (Ibid:III-59). Although JP 3-0 and JP 5-0 associate MOEs with
strategic assessment and MOPs with tactical assessment, since an operation in the context
of this dissertation can be strategic or tactical, the generalized term, measure of
operational effectiveness (MoOE), will be used from here onward. Since the two joint
publications state that an MoP is used to measure task performance and an MoE is used
to “determine progress of an operation toward achieving objectives,” (Ibid:III-60) it is
appropriate to say that an MoOE, although retaining some characteristics of an MoP (e.g.,
measurement of level of operational tasks, or thread, completion), is more closely aligned
with the definition of an MOE, and hence is appropriately named.
The initial MOEs defined during operational planning are also called success
criteria (JP 5-0, 2006:III-27). Indeed, MOEs are defined early (Step #2, Mission
Analysis of 7 steps) in the operational planning process and become “the basis for reports
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to senior commanders and civilian leaders on the progress of the operation” (Ibid)
because they measure “the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or
creation of an effect” (JP 3-0, 2006:IV-32; JP 5-0, 2006:III-60). In fact, according to
Murray in A Will to Measure, the desire to measure quantitatively is “irresistible” to
modern society and the armed forces use quantitative methods to explain actions to
leaders, politicians, and the public (2001:134). Murray aptly states that “the
interpretation of the MOE frequently forms the structure on which senior leaders base
their orders.” (Ibid)
JP 5-0 gives an example of an operation (evacuate all US personnel from an
embassy) and two associated MOEs (“are all personnel evacuated?” and “have any rules
of engagement been violated?”) which highlights the fact that MOEs are operation
dependent and that there are often more than one MOE associated with the operation.
(2006:III-27)
An appropriate MOE must be carefully selected. According to Murray, MOEs
which “adequately reflect and distill reality help decisionmakers make informed and
timely decisions,” while “poorly chosen measures have a multitude of negative effects”
(2001:134).
MoOE Characteristics

Multiple researchers give desirable characteristics of MoOEs. Fourteen
characteristics are consolidated below (in no special order) in Table 33 and are discussed
individually in succeeding paragraphs.
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Table 33 MoOE characteristics
Characteristic
1) Relevant
Also called “operational”
Also called “mission-oriented”
2) Measurable
3) Responsive
Also called “sensitive”
4) Resourced
5) Understandable
6) Discriminatory
7) Quantitative
8) Realistic
9) Objective
10) Appropriate
11) Inclusive
12) Independent
13) Valid
14) Reliable (Precision)

Relevant. An MOE must be relevant to the operation, or in other words, mission-

oriented. For example, during the Kosovo campaign, NATO’s focus on counting the
number of vehicles and weapons destroyed and the number of sorties flown and bombs
dropped “did not provide a sense of whether Yugoslavian leaders were ready to accede to
NATO demands” but instead validated “performance requirements” of weapons—an
irrelevant indicator of operational effectiveness of the campaign. (Murray, 2001:134). A
positive change in the MOE value should indicate greater operational success. Similarly,
a negative change in the value of the MOE value should indicate a decline in operational
success.
It should not be assumed, however, that an MOE must be a direct (also called
natural by Keeney (1992:101) measure of the success of the operation. Indeed, often
direct measures violate criteria #2 (measurability), but measurable inferential (also called
indicative, indirect, or constructed) measures may be available. For example, the MOE
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“level of the morale of the enemy” cannot be directly measured, but an inferential
measure such as “number of attacks per month made by the enemy” may be an adequate
estimate of enemy morale in that it indicates the enemy’s desire to continue the fight. If a
commander or leader must resort to using inferential MOEs, extra care must be taken to
ensure that the MOE is relevant. For example, Secretary McNamara used body count as
an inferential measure of operational effectiveness during the Vietnam war, but that
measure not only did not reflect progress in winning the war, but had many unintended
effects (Murray, 2001) such as failure of commander integrity, and possibly the
unnecessary killing of civilians.
Murray writes that it can be difficult to discover good MOEs which accurately
reflect the positive and negative trends in operational effectiveness because the
“underlying causal mechanisms are exceedingly difficult to determine” (Ibid:138). He
accurately observes that rarely is one measure appropriate but that most operational
effectiveness must be measured from a complex set of factors.
Measurable. An MOE must be measurable (Bornman, 1993; JP 3-0, 2006; JP 5-

0, 2006). Although JP 5-0 acknowledges that MOEs can be qualitative or quantitative,
quantitative MOEs are preferred because they are “less susceptible to subjective
interpretation.” (2006:III-61) Qualitative measures can usually be quantized. For
example, the MOE, “are all personnel evacuated,” is a yes or no question which can be
rendered as a 1 or 0. Similarly, the MOE, “to what level has the enemy’s ability to place
improvised explosive devices (IED) been degraded,” appears qualitative, but infers that a
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scale can be applied by using the word level. If a scale of 0 to 10 IEDs per day is used,
then the MOE becomes quantitative and measurable.
Responsive (Sensitive). An MOE must be responsive, or sensitive, to changes in

the operation. (Bornman, 2001; JP 3-0, 2006; JP 5-0, 2006) In order to give the
commander fidelity of understanding on how the effectiveness of the operation is
changing, the MOE must be sensitive to changes in operational effectiveness. For
example, if the operational goal is to assist democratic revolutionaries in overthrowing
their country’s dictatorship, a measurable and relevant, yet insensitive MOE could be,
“number of machines guns provided to the revolutionaries each month.” Although
machine guns may eventually help revolutionaries overthrow the dictatorship, the time
required for training and planning may result in delayed progress toward the goal of the
operation. In fact, more machine guns than necessary may be provided in successive
months as the operation’s commander attempts to accelerate the overthrow of the
dictatorship.
Resourced. An MOE must have the necessary resources (i.e., manpower, money,

time, etc.) allocated for data collection, analysis, and reporting (JP 3-0, 2006; JP 5-0,
2006). If resources are not allocated for assessment, it won’t matter how appropriate the
MOEs are, because the measurements will not be able to be made, or the measurements
may be incomplete or inaccurate. For example, if a commander desires to improve war
fighting efficiency of his unit, but does not have enough people on staff to dedicate to
data gathering and analysis, the commander may find that the efficiency analysis
eventually provided is shallow, too narrowly focused, or downright erroneous.
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Understandable. This characteristic is self explanatory and is also called simple

by Bornman (2001) and Green & Johnson (2002). An MOE must be understandable
(Keeney, 1992; Campbell, 2004) not only to the person making the measurement, but
also to the leader whose decisions are based upon the measurement.
Discriminatory. Bornman states that an MOE must be discriminatory in order to

“identify real differences between alternatives” (1993:2-3). This characteristic is related
to the characteristics of objectivity and independence described below.
Quantitative. Keeney writes that objectives are qualitative and attributes (MOEs)

are quantitative (1992). JP 3-0 states that MOEs are qualitative and MOPs are
quantitative (2006), however JP 5-0 states that MOEs are either qualitative or quantitative
(2006). Bornman insists that MOEs are quantitative (1993).
Realistic. Although Bornman calls out realistic as a separate characteristic of a

desirable MOE, “realistic” is largely implied in the more important characteristics of
measurable, resourced, and understandable—all of which, if missing, result in a MOE
which is not realistic. Murray reminds that realistic measures which “adequately distill
and accurately reflect reality help decisionmakers make informed, timely decisions.”
(2001:134)
Objective. Bornman states that measures can be objective or subjective, but lists

objectivity as a desirable characteristic. (1993) Keeney mentions that a subjective, or
qualitative, “structure” can be quantified using a value model. (1992) Keeney’s
philosophy is that any qualitative measure can be rendered quantitatively. This usually is
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accomplished by applying a scale, or other type of model, to give meaning to the values
of the measure. Non-objective measures are often constructed or proxy measures.
Appropriate. Bornman states that a measure of effectiveness should be

appropriate, which he defines as relating to “acceptable standards and analysis
objectives.” (1993:2-3)
Inclusive. Bornman also mentions that a desirable measure of effectiveness is

inclusive, meaning it “reflect(s) those standards required by the analysis objectives.”
(1993:2-3) No further clarification is offered although a reference is made to a 1985
Military Operations Research Society workshop which developed some (or possibly all)
of the characteristics listed in the Bornman (Army TRADOC) handbook. Unfortunately,
no bibliography was included in the handbook, so it is difficult to accurately identify the
source which Bornman referenced, although it likely was the 1985 document referenced
by Green & Johnson. (2002)
Independent. Independence is an important characteristic of an MOE, because it

drives the analyst to find measures of operational effectiveness which are not confounded
with each other. This is desirable from a commander’s perspective since it results in
measures which are distinct from each other. This allows commanders to change certain
aspects of their operation and measure that change without affecting other aspects of the
operation. In practice, it is difficult to describe independent MOEs. Design of
experiments and response surface methodology theory recommend if independence of
factors is impossible (i.e., due to cost, ease of measurement, or other reasons), then care
should be taken to ensure important factors are confounded with negligible factors. This
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minimizes the impact due to variable dependence. This same philosophy can be applied
to MOE selection by choosing measures of important effects which are not confounded
with a measure of another equally important effect.
Measure independence was listed as “desired but not essential” by Bornman
(1993) and was listed as a desired characteristic of MOEs by Green & Johnson. (2002)
The NATO Code of Best Practice for C2 Assessment states that analysis of operations is
challenging due to “the number of confounded variables” (Stenbit, et. al., 2002:191) and
and further states that independent measures are controllable.
Valid. Bullock states that a measurement is valid if it “reflects the…attributes it

was supposed to represent.” (2006:8)
Reliable. Finally, Bullock writes that a measure must be reliable (which he also

calls precision), meaning that the measurement process must be able to yield a consistent
and repeatable measurement.
MOE Types and Domains

Keeney lists three types of MOEs (which he called attributes)—natural,
constructed, and proxy. (1992) A natural MOE is one which has “a common
interpretation to everyone” such as annual profit in millions of dollars. (Ibid:101) A
constructed MOE is not a direct or natural measure, but includes a subjective judgment.
(Campbell, 2004) For example, the Richter scale for measuring earthquake intensity is a
constructed measure. (Ibid) Campbell points out that constructed measures, as they
become commonly known and understood can become natural measures (e.g., the Dow
Jones Industrial Average and the Gross National Product). Finally, the proxy MOE is an
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inferential, or indicator, measure which describes something related to what is actually
wanted to be measured. For example, the level of Carbon 14 is an indicator of the age of
an object. A natural measure is often objective whereas constructed and proxy measures
are often subjective. (Bornman, 1993) Although natural MOEs are the most desirable,
more often than not, constructed or proxy MOEs 1) more readily meet the MOE criteria,
2) cost less to gather data and measure, or are 3) more easily discovered. An MOE is
measured in the physical, information, or cognitive domain .(Stenbit, et. al., 2002)
Generally, measurements in the physical domain are easier to make and those in the
cognitive domain are more difficult.
MOE Summary

An MOE is defined as “a standard used to assess changes in the production of a
desired operational effect.” It is exists within the range of measure of performance,
measure of effectiveness, and measure of force effectiveness in the hierarchy of
measures. The three types of MOE—natural, constructed, and proxy—exist within the
physical, information, and cognitive domains. The best MOEs are relevant, measurable,
responsive, resourced, understandable, discriminatory, quantitative, realistic, objective,
appropriate, inclusive, independent, valid, and reliable. An MOE associates proper units
of measurement and includes limits on the range of the measurement as appropriate.
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Communicate
Service

Accommodate
Transform

Influence
Transform

Transform

Influence

Communicate
Somaction
Audition
Visualization

Accommodate

Physical

Accommodate

Technological

Biological
Influence

Dance
Interact

Influence *

Command

Influence

Accommodate
Communicate
Somaction
Audition
Visualization
Dance
Nourish
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*Conceptual systems can only interoperate with humans

Environmental

Organizational

Conceptual

Biological

Technological

Physical

Implement
Influence

Conceptual

Organizational

Service

Dance

Table 34 Example interoperability character framework

A8. Example Interoperability Character Framework

Influence

Transform

Transform

Accommodate

Environmental

Bibliography

Ackoff, R. "Towards a System of Systems Concepts." Management Science 17.11
(1971): 661-71.
Alberts, D., J. Garstka, and F. Stein. Network Centric Warfare. Washington DC: DoD
CCRP, 2000.
Alberts, D., and R. Hayes. Power to the Edge. Washington D.C.: DoD CCRP, 2003.
Amanowicz, M., and P. Gajewski. "Military Communications and Information Systems
Interoperability." Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Military Communications
Conference (1996).
Batagelj V. and M. Bren. “Comparing Resemblance Measures.” Journal of Classification
12.1 (1995): 73-90.
Baulieu, F. “A Classification of Presence/Absence Based Dissimilarity Coefficients.”
Journal of Classification 6.1 (1989): 233-246.
Bell, J. "A Methodology for Measuring Progress in War." Master of Science in
Operations Research Naval Postgraduate School, 2005.
Bir, Cevic. "Interoperability and Intervention Operations." RUSI Journal 142.6 (1997):
22-6.
Blanchard, B., and W. Fabrycky. Systems Engineering and Analysis. 4th ed. New Jersey:
Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006.
Bornman, L. Command and Control Measures of Effectiveness Handbook. TRAC-TD0393. Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC Analysis Center--Study and Analysis
Center, 1993.
Boulding, K. "General Systems Theory: The Skeleton of Science." Management Science
2.3 (1956): 197-208.
---. The World as a Total System. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1985.
Briscombe, N., et al. "D3C: A Coherent, Socio-Technical Framework for Identifying,
Modelling and Managing Risks in Coalition C2." Proceedings of the 11th
International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium.
Cambridge, UK, September 26-28, 2006.
Brownsword, L., et al. Current Perspectives on Interoperability. CMU/SEI-2004-TR-009.
Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute, 2004.
162

Buede, D. The Engineering Design of Systems. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2000.
Bullock, R., and R. Deckro. "Foundations for Systems Measurement." Measurement 39.8
(2006): 701-9.
Bullock, R. Theory of Effectiveness Measurement. PhD Dissertation AFIT/DS/ENS/0601. Air Force Institute of Technology, September 2006.
Campbell, P. Measures of Effectiveness: An Annotated Bibliography. Vol. SAND20042902. Albuquerque, New Mexico: Sandia National Laboratories, 2004.
Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute. "LISI." Carnegie Mellon
University. 2008. June 25, 2008
<http://www.sei.cmu.edu/isis/guide/introduction/lisi.htm>.
Carney, D., and P. Oberndorf. "Integration and Interoperability Models for Systems of
Systems." Proceedings of the System and Software Technology Conference. April
21, 2004.
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff. CJCSI 6212.01B Interoperability and Supportability of
Information Technology and National Security Systems. Washington DC: GPO,
2000.
---. CJCSI 6212.01C Interoperability and Supportability of Information Technology and
National Security Systems. Washington DC: GPO, 2003.
---. CJCSI 6212.01D Interoperability and Supportability of Information Technology and
National Security Systems. Washington DC: GPO, 2006.
---. CJCSM 3500.04D Universal Joint Task List. Washington DC: GPO, 2006.
---. "Joint Doctrine, Education and Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS)."
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2008. June 25, 2008
<https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp>.
---. Joint Vision 2020. Washington DC: GPO, 2006.
---. JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. Washington DC: GPO,
2007.
---. JP 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
Washington DC: GPO, 2008.

163

---. JP 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
Washington DC: GPO, 2004.
---. JP 3-0 Joint Operations. Washington DC: GPO, 2006.
---. JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats. Washington DC: GPO, 2007.
---. JP 3-13.1 Electronic Warfare. Washington DC: GPO, 2007.
---. JP 3-13.4 Military Deception. Washington DC: GPO, 2006.
---. JP 3-16 Multinational Operations. Washington DC: GPO, 2007.
---. JP 3-27 Homeland Defense. Washington DC: GPO, 2007.
---. JP 3-60 Joint Targeting. Washington DC: GPO, 2007.
---. JP 4-02 Health Service Support. Washington DC: GPO, 2006.
---. JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning. Washington DC: GPO, 2006.
---. JP 6-0 Joint Communications System. Washington DC: GPO, 2006.
Checkland, P. Systems Thinking, Systems Practice. Chichest, UK: John Wiley & Sons,
1981.
Clark, T., and R. Jones. "Organisational Interoperability Maturity Model for C2."
Proceedings of the 9th International Command and Control Research and
Technology Symposium. Newport, RI, June 29 - July 1, 1999.
Clark, T., and T. Moon. "Interoperability for Joint and Coalition Operations." Australian
Defence Force Journal 151 (2001): 23–36.
Curts, R., and D. Campbell. "Architecture: The Road to Interoperability." Proceedings of
the 4th Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium. Newport,
RI, June 29 - July 1, 1999.
Czekanowski, J. "Zarys Metod Statystycznych (Die Grundzuge Der Statischen
Metoden)." (1913).
Defense Acquisition University. "JCIDS MOE Development Process." June 29, 2006
<https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=45024>.
---. "Writing Mission/Capability Outcome-Based Performance MOEs." June 17, 2006
<https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=45026>.
164

Dekker, A. "C4ISR, the FINC Methodology, and Operations in Urban Terrain." Journal
of Battlefield Technology 8.1 (2005).
Department of Defense. C4ISR Architecture Working Group Final Report - Levels of
Information System Interoperability (LISI). Washington DC: OSD(ASD(C3I))
C4ISR AWG, 1998.
---. DoD Architecture Framework Volume I: Guidelines and Definitions. Washington
D.C.: ASD(NII), 2007.
---. DoD Architecture Framework Volume II: Product Descriptions. Washington DC:
ASD(NII), 2007.
---. DoD Architecture Framework Volume III: Architecture Data Description.
Washington DC: ASD(NII), 2007.
---. DoDD 2010.6 Standardization and Interoperability of Weapons Systems and
Equipment within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Washington DC: GPO,
1977.
---. DoDD 2010.6 Standardization and Interoperability of Weapons Systems and
Equipment within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Washington DC: GPO,
1980.
---. DoDD 4630.05 Interoperability and Supportability of Information Technology (IT)
and National Security Systems (NSS). Washington DC: GPO, 2007.
---. Systems Engineering Plan Preparation Guide v. 2.01. Washington DC: Office of the
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, 2008.
Department of the Air Force. AFDD 1 Air Force Basic Doctrine. Washington DC: GPO,
2003.
---. AFDD 2 Operations and Organization. Washington DC: GPO, 2007.
---. AFDD 2-1 Air Warfare. Washington DC: GPO, 2000.
---. AFDD 2-1.1 Counterair Operations. Washington DC: GPO, 2002.
---. AFDD 2-1.9 Targeting. Washington DC: GPO, 2006.
---. AFDD 2-5.1 Electronic Warfare, Washington DC: GPO, 2002.

165

---. AFDD 2-9 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations. Washington
DC: GPO, 2007.
Doyle, M., et al. A Value Function Approach to Information Operations MOE's: A
Preliminary Study. CMSA TR 97-04. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force
Institute of Technology, 1997.
Dunn, G., and B. Everitt. An Introduction to Mathematical Taxonomy. Mineola, NY:
Dover, 2004.
Garstka, J. “Network Centric Warfare: An Overview of Emerging Theory.” Phalanx 33.4
(2000): 1-33.
Federal CIO Council. "Federal Enterprise Architecture Framework Version 1.1." (1999):
80.
Fewell, S., and T. Clark. "Organisational Interoperability: Evaluation and Further
Development of the OIM Model." Proceedings of the 8th International Command
and Control Research and Technology Symposium. Washington DC, June 17-19,
2003.
Finkelstein, L., and M. Leaning. "A Review of the Fundamental Concepts of
Measurement." Measurement 2.1 (1984): 25.
Finkelstein, L., and R. Morawski. "Fundamental Concepts of Measurement."
Measurement 34.1 (2003): 1-2.
Finkelstein, L. "Widely, Strongly and Weakly Defined Measurement." Measurement 34.1
(2003): 39-48.
Florek, K., et al. "Taksonomia Wroclawska." Przeglad Antropol 17 (1951): 193–211.
Flyzik, J., et al. Treasury Enterprise Architecture Framework. Washington DC:
Department of the Treasury, 2000.
Ford, T., et al. "The Interoperability Score." Proceedings of the 5th Annual Conference
on Systems Engineering Research. Hoboken, N.J., March 14-16, 2007a.
---. "A Survey on Interoperability Measurement." Proceedings of the 12th International
Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium. Newport, RI, June
19-21, 2007b.
Ford, T., et al. "On the Application of Classification Concepts to Systems Engineering
Design and Evaluation." Systems Engineering Published on-line August 8, 2008a.

166

---. "Measuring System Interoperability: An i-Score Improvement." Proceedings of the
6th Annual Conference on Systems Engineering Research. Los Angeles, CA,
April 4-5, 2008b.
Gaedecke, D. The Difficulty in Measuring the Effectiveness of Airpower at the
Operational Level of War. ADA463283. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2006.
GAO. Interoperability: DoD’s Efforts to Achieve Interoperability of C3 Systems.
GAO/NSIAD 87-124. Washington: GPO, 1987.
Geisler, E. The Metrics of Science and Technology. Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 2000.
Gideon, J., C. Dagli and A. Miller. "Taxonomy of Systems-of-Systems." Proceedings of
the 3rd Annual Conference on Systems Engineering Research. Hoboken, NJ,
March 23-25, 2005.
Giles, L. Sun Tzu's the Art of War. London: Department of Oriental Printed Books,
British Museum, 1910.
Goode, H., and R. Machol. System Engineering: An Introduction to the Design of LargeScale Systems. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957.
Green, J., and B. Johnson. "Towards a Theory of Measures of Effectiveness."
Proceedings of the 7th International Command and Control Research and
Technology Symposium. Quebec City, Quebec, June 2002.
Green, J. "Establishing System Measures of Effectiveness." Proceedings of the 2nd
AIAA Biennial National Forum on Weapon System Effectiveness. Johns-Hopkins
University Applied Physics Laboratory, March 27-29, 2001.
Grimes, J. Code of Best Practice for Command and Control (C2) Assessment. Ed.
OASD(NII)/DoD CIO (DASDs), Principal Directors. Washington D.C.:
OASD(NII), 2006.
Guan, Y., X. Wang, and Q. Wang. “A New Measurement of Systematic Similarity.”
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics—Part A: Systems and
Humans 38.4 (2008): 743-758.
Hall, A. A Methodology for Systems Engineering. Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrund
Company, Inc., 1962.
Hamilton, J., J. Rosen, and P. Summers. "An Interoperability Roadmap for C4ISR
Legacy Systems." Acquisition Review Quarterly 28.Winter (2002): 17-31.
Haskins, C. Systems Engineering Handbook v3.1. Seattle, WA: INCOSE, 2007.
167

Heiler, S. "Semantic Interoperability." ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR) 27.2 (1995):
271-3.
Humphrey, W., and W. Sweet. A Method for Assessing the Software Engineering
Capability of Contractors. CMU/SEI-87-TR-23. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon
University Software Engineering Institute, 1987.
Hutchens, R. “The Net-Ready Key Performance Parameter.” Briefing at DISA Customer
Partnership Conference, May 2, 2007.
IBM. IBM Data Processing Techniques: Flow Charting Techniques. C20-8152-1. White
Plains, NY: IBM, 1969.
James, S. "Thinking Strategically about Information-Based Conflict: Developing an
Analytical Appoach to Operational Measures of Effectiveness." Master of Science
in Information Technology Management Naval Postgraduate School, 1996.
Jordan, N. "Some Thinking about Systems." Themes in Speculative Psychology. London:
Tavistock, 1968. 44-65.
Kasunic, M., and W. Anderson. Measuring Systems Interoperability: Challenges and
Opportunities. CMU/SEI-2004-TN-003. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie-Mellon
University Software Engineering Institute, 2004.
Keeney, R. Value-Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative Decisionmaking. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.
Keller, K. and R. Staelin. “Effects of Quality and Quantity of Information on Decision
Effectiveness.” Journal of Consumer Research 14.2 (1987): 200-13.
Kinder, T. "Mrs Miller Moves House: The Interoperability of Local Public Services in
Europe." Journal of European Social Policy 13.2 (2003): 141-57.
Kingston, G., S. Fewell and W. Richer. "An Organisational Interoperability Agility
Model." Proceedings of the 10th International Command and Control Research
and Technology Symposium. McLean, VA, June 13-16, 2005.
Knutilla, A., et al. Process Specification Language: An Analysis of Existing
Representations. NISTIR 6133. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards
and Technology, 1998.
Kosanke, K. "ISO Standards for Interoperability: A Comparison." Proceedings of the
First International Conference on Interoperability of Enterprise Software and
Applications, INTEROP-ESA. Geneva, Switzerland, February 23-25, 2005.
168

Kovacic, S. "General Taxonomy of System[Ic] Approaches for Analysis and Design."
Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics.
Hawaii, October 10-12, 2005.
Krieg, K. "Global Cooperation: From Idea to Reality, (remarks as delivered by the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, National Press
Club, Washington DC, Wednesday, September 7, 2005)." June 26, 2008
<www.acq.osd.mil/usd/previous_krieg_speeches/09-0705%20NR%20COMDEF%202005.doc>.
LaVean, G. "Interoperability in Defense Communications." Communications, IEEE
Transactions on [legacy, pre-1988] 28.9 (1980): 1445-55.
Leite, M. "Interoperability Assessment." Proceedings of the 66th Military Operations
Research Society Symposium. Monterey, CA, June 23-25, 1998.
Levine, L., et al. "Proceedings of the System of Systems Interoperability Workshop
(February 2003)." Proceedings of the System of Systems Interoperability
Workshop (February 2003). February 2003.
Linnaeus, C. Systema Naturae. 1st ed. Netherlands:, 1735.
Litwin, W., and A. Abdellatif. "Multidatabase Interoperability." Computer 19.12 (1986):
10-8.
Lyles, L. "Prepared Statement by Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, before
the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Defense (Lt. Gen. Lester
L. Lyles, USAF, Washington, D.C., Wednesday, April 14, 1999)." June 25, 1999
<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=394>.
Maddison, D., K. Schulz, and W. Maddison. "The Tree of Life Web Project." Zootaxa
1668 (2007): 19-40.
Magee, C., and O. de Weck. "Complex System Classification." Proceedings of the 14th
Annual International Council on Systems Engineering International Symposium.
Toulouse, France, June 20-24, 2004.
Maier, M. "Architecting Principles for Systems-of-Systems." Systems Engineering 1.4
(1999): 267-84.
Martin, J. Systems Engineering Guidebook: A Process for Developing Systems and
Products. New York: CRC Press, 1997.

169

Mendeleev, D. "The Dependence between the Properties of the Atomic Weights of the
Elements." Journal of the Russian Chemical Society (and Zeitschrift fur Chemie)
12 (1869): 405-6.
Mensh, D., R. Kite, and P. Darby. "A Methodology for Quantifying Interoperability."
Naval Engineers Journal 101.3 (1989): 251.
Microsoft Corp. "Goal: Estimate Resource Needs." Microsoft Corp. August 6, 2007
<http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/project/HA010971111033.aspx>.
Morris, E., et al. System of Systems Interoperability (SOSI): Final Report. CMU/SEI2004-TR-004. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon University, Software Engineering
Institute, 2004.
Moseley, M. To Fly, Fight and Win in the 21st Century (Speech Given to the Air Force
Association Air and Space Conference and Technology Exposition on Sep 26,
2007)., 2007.
Murray, W. "A Will to Measure." Parameters XXXI.3 (2001): 134-47.
NATO. NATO Allied Data Publication 34: NATO C3 Technical Architecture. Vol. 2.
Brussels, Belgium: NATO, 2003.
Nelson, J., et al. Measures of Effectiveness for Humanitarian Assistance Operations.
CRM-95-166.10. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 1996.
NIST. "Process Specification Language." February 15, 2007
<http://www.mel.nist.gov/psl/index.html>.
Nutwell, R., and D. Price. "On Common Footing: A Prescription for Improving
Information Interoperability in Multinational Operations." Armed Forces Journal
38.November (2000): 32-5.
Object Management Group. OMG SysML Specification. Object Management GroupJune
25, 2008 <www.omgsysml.org>.
Poppel, H. "Information Technology: The Trillion-Dollar Opportunity." ACM '87:
Proceedings of the 1987 Fall Joint Computer Conference on Exploring
Technology: Today and Tomorrow. Dallas, TX.
Presson, P. "Software Metrics and Interoperability." Proceedings of the 4th Computers in
Aerospace Conference. Hartford, CT, October 24-26, 1983.
Pugh, M., ed. Stedman's Medical Dictionary. 27th ed. Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott,
Williams, and Wilkins, 2000.
170

Ring, S., et al. "An Activity-Based Methodology for Development and Analysis of
Integrated Architectures." Proceedings of the 2004 Command and Control,
Research and Technology Symposium. San Diego, CA, June 15-17, 2004.
Sanders, M., and E. McCormick. Human Factors in Engineering and Design. Ed. J.
Anker and J. Morriss. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987.
Sarle, W. "Measurement Theory: Frequently Asked Questions." Disseminations of the
International Statistical Applications Institute 1.4 (1995): 61-6.
Schade, U. "Towards the Edge and Beyond: The Role of Interoperability." Proceedings
of the 10th International Command and Control, Research and Technology
Symposium. McLean, VA, June 13-16, 2005.
Scott, I. "Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with Ivan Scott, WTOP-Radio, Washington
D.C." Department of Defense. November 30, 2004 2004. June 25, 2008
<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2222>.
Semple, C., and M. Steel. Phylogenetics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Shenhar, A., and Z. Bonen. "The New Taxonomy of Systems: Toward an Adaptive
Systems Engineering Framework." IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and
Cybernetics, Part A 27.2 (1997): 137-45.
Shenhar, A. "A New Systems Engineering Taxonomy." Proceedings of the 5th
International Symposium of the National Council on Systems Engineering. St.
Louis, MO, July 22-26, 1995.
Smith, N., and T. Clark. "An Exploration of C2 Effectiveness--A Holistic Approach."
Proceedings of the 9th International Command and Control Research and
Technology Symposium. Copenhagen, Denmark, September 14-16, 2004.
Sneath, P., and R. Sokal. Numerical Taxonomy. San Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman and
Company, 1973.
Sneath, P. "Thirty Years of Numerical Taxonomy." Systematic Biology 44.3 (2005): 28198.
Sokal, R., and P. Sneath. Principles of Numerical Taxonomy. San Francisco, CA: W. H.
Freeman and Company, 1963.
Sproles, N. "Coming to Grips with Measures of Effectiveness." Systems Engineering 3.1
(2000): 50-8.

171

---. "The Difficult Problem of Establishing Measures of Effectiveness for Command and
Control: A Systems Engineering Perspective." Systems Engineering 4.2 (2001):
145-55.
---. "Formulating Measures of Effectiveness." Systems Engineering 5.4 (2002): 253-63.
Stenbit, J., L. Wells, and D. Alberts. NATO Code of Best Practice for Experimentation.
Washington DC: DoD CCRP, 2002a.
---. NATO Code of Best Practice for C2 Assessment. Washington DC: OASD(NII),
2002b.
Stewart, K., et al. "Non-Technical Interoperability in Multinational Forces." Proceedings
of the 9th International Command and Control Research and Technology
Symposium. Copenhagen, Denmark, September 14-16, 2004.
Stewart, K., et al. "Non-Technical Interoperability: The Challenge of Command
Leadership in Multinational Operations." Proceedings of the 10th International
Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium. McLean, VA, June
13-16, 2005.
Sutton, P. "Interoperability: A New Paradigm." Proceedings of the 1999 International
Conference on Computational Intelligence for Modeling, Control & Automation:
Neural Networks & Advanced Control Strategies (CIMCA’99). Vienna, Austria,
February 17-19, 1999.
Sweet, R., M. Metersky, and M. Sovereign. Command and Control Evaluation
Workshop. Military Operations Research Society, 1985.
SysML Partners. "OMG Systems Modeling Language (SysML) v1.0." (2007).
The Open Group. "Welcome to TOGAF Version 8.1.1 Enterprise Edition." The Open
Group. 2008. June 25, 2008 <http://www.opengroup.org/togaf/>.
Tirpak, J. "The New Way of Electron War." Air Force Magazine December 2004: 26-31.
Toffler, A. Future Shock. New York: Random House, 1970.
Tolk, A., and J. A. Muguira. "The Levels of Conceptual Interoperability Model."
Proceedings of the 2003 Fall Simulation Interoperability Workshop. Orlando, FL,
September 2003.
Tolk, A. "Beyond Technical Interoperability--Introducing a Reference Model for
Measures of Merit for Coalition Interoperability." Proceedings of the 8th Annual

172

International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium.
Washington D.C., June 17-19, 2003.
Turnitsa, C., and A. Tolk. "Battle Management Language: A Triangle with Five Sides."
Proceedings of the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO)
Spring Interoperability Workshop (SIW). Huntsville, AL, April 2-7, 2006.
U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center. Commander's Handbook for an
Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations. Suffolk, VA: USJFCOM, 2006.
US Joint Forces Command. Capstone Requirements Document: Global Information Grid.
Norfolk, VA: USJFCOM/J61, 2001.
Valdma, M. "A General Classification of Information and Systems." Oil Shale 24.2
(2007): 265-76.
Vernadat, F. Enterprise Modeling and Integration. New York, NY: Chapman and Hall,
1996.
von Bertalanffy, L. "General System Theory." Main Currents in Modern Thought 11.4
(1955): 75-83.
Wileden, J., et al. "Specification Level Interoperability." Proceedings of the 12th
International Conference on Software Engineering. Nice, France, March 26-30,
1990.
Wilson, B. Systems: Concepts, Methodologies, and Applications. 2d ed. New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1990.
Zachman, J. "A Framework for Information Systems Architecture." IBM Systems Journal
26.3 (1987): 276-92.

173

174

Form Approved
OMB No. 074-0188

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data
sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other
aspect of the collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no person shall be subject to an penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)
2. REPORT TYPE

22-08-2008
4.

3. DATES COVERED (From – To)

Doctoral Dissertation

TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Aug 05 – Sep 08
5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

INTEROPERABILITY MEASUREMENT

5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6.

AUTHOR(S)

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

Ford, Thomas C., Major, USAF

5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S)

Air Force Institute of Technology
Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN)
2950 Hobson Way, Building 640
WPAFB OH 45433-8865
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

N/A

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER

AFIT/DSE/ENV/08-S01
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S
ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

This research presents an inaugural general method of measuring the collaborative and confrontational
interoperability of a heterogeneous set of systems in the context of an operational process. The method is holistic,
fundamental, flexible, and mathematical in nature and accommodates all types of systems and interoperations. The
method relates the interoperability measurement to measures of operational effectiveness for confrontational
operational processes. Extant leveling methods of describing interoperability are shown to be a special case of the
more general method given in this research and the general interoperability measurement method is demonstrated
through the presentation of coalition interoperability, suppression of enemy air defenses, and precision strike
applications. Further application is recommended in technical, non-technical, cross-domain, and non-traditional
interoperability areas and additional research is suggested on the topics of indirect interoperability measurement and
collaborative interoperability impact on operational effectiveness.
15. SUBJECT TERMS

Interoperability, Measurement, Operational Effectiveness, Classification, System
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF:
a.
REPORT

U

b.
ABSTRACT

U

c. THIS
PAGE

U

17. LIMITATION
OF
ABSTRACT
UU

18.
NUMBER
OF
PAGES
197

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

John M. Colombi, AFIT/ENG
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)

(937) 255-3355, ext 3347
(john.colombi@afit.edu)
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

